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A SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PETRINE REFORMS:
A HISTORY-OF-EDUCATION METHODOLOGY

by



NICK KACH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Petrine Reforms: A History of Education Methodology," submitted by Nick Kach in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study was to test the applicability of Smelser's theory of collective behavior in explaining the reforms of Peter the Great. This was done in four successive stages.

First, the employment of a sociological model in historical investigation raised the question of the feasibility of an interdisciplinary approach in explaining socio-historical phenomena. Consequently, one section was devoted to justifying a rapprochement between sociology and history. The conclusion reached was that such a methodological design was not only feasible but also desirable.

Second, the Petrine period had to be placed within the context of Russia's historical development. This was done by tracing the evolution of five major social forces manifest in Russia's history and detailing their influence upon Russian society from early Slavic times to about 1700. The social forces considered are the force of nature, the supra-personal force of Eastern Christianity, the myth of the tsar, the nobility and Westernization. Each of these forces had a direct impact upon education.

Third, an understanding of the Petrine period necessitated reviewing Peter's major reforms. It was found that Peter, through his innovations, greatly accelerated basic trends and tendencies that had appeared within the Russian setting decades and even centuries before the eighteenth century.

Having set this groundwork, the study focused on applying

Smelser's theory. Basically, the theory employed involved a consideration of six determinants--structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth and spread of a generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization of participants for action, and the operation of social control. The primary problem, then, was an attempt to explain Peter's military and educational reforms in terms of the determinants listed above. Finally, an assessment of the utility of this structured approach to investigating this historical period was made. It was concluded that certain modifications in Smelser's theory had to be adopted to make the model useful in examining the era in question.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The main purpose of this study is to test the applicability of a sociological theory in explaining historical phenomena--in this case, the reforms of Peter the Great, Tsar of Russia (1682-1725). Specifically, Peter's reforms will be analyzed within the context of N. J. Smelser's theoretical framework of norm-oriented movements to test the utility of his explanatory model.

II. STATEMENT OF SUB-PROBLEM

Before such an analysis can be attempted, it is necessary to :

1. Understand Smelser's theory of collective behavior.
2. Depict the evolution of Russian society from early Slavic times to about 1700.
3. Delineate Peter the Great's major reforms.

III. DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The ideal procedure in formulating propositions is to create laboratory situations in which all the variables involved can be held constant with the exception of one which is manipulated systematically. Experimentation, however, is difficult in the social sciences and virtually impossible in the sphere of collective behavior. Consequently,

the theoretical propositions that are utilized in this study were developed by relying mainly on systematic illustrations from available literature on collective behavior.¹

From a sociological point of view, the above implies a major limitation as far as this study is concerned. As Arthur Schlesinger states,

Whether our investigations in the social sciences be statistical or dynamic. . .they. . .can never furnish us with a quantity of verifiable, significant information which begins to compare with that which we have learned to expect in the natural sciences. . . .There is much which we must leave, whether we like it or not, to the "unscientific," narrative method of the professional historian.²

The second limitation also arises out of the theoretical model. According to Smelser, an adequate explanation of a particular outburst of collective behavior involves the examination of the seven levels of specificity that characterize the internal organization of each component of social action. Logically, this procedure has merit since each level restricts the meaning of the component, thus facilitating the understanding of concrete action. However, it is exceedingly difficult and at times impossible to use these concepts when examining events that occurred three centuries ago, for they are also concerned with the individual's motivation, his interpretations of his external circumstances, and his own self-perception. Even in an age when sociological

¹Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 386.

²Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Humanist Looks at Empirical Social Research," American Sociological Review, XXVII (December, 1962), pp. 768-71.

and psychological techniques have been relatively well-developed, valuable data of this nature are difficult to acquire.³ For those eras when social psychology and sociology were unknown, data of this nature can only be constructed through inference--a method that magnifies the possibility of error. Therefore, in considering the historical events that occurred in the period of concern to this student, only the general propositions formulated by Smelser can be justifiably utilized.

Another limitation implicit in the research design derives from the fundamental lack of symmetry between prediction and retrodiction even though both embody the general principle of applying general statements to particular cases.

To begin with, there is the obvious point that a historical statement can never be tested directly by observation as can a statement about the future. When the time comes, we can check upon a prediction and see whether it comes true, whereas it might be said of the historian that he can never be found out.⁴

The nature of this study necessitated reliance on historical data--that is, historical statements which cannot be tested directly. Consequently the conclusions that are drawn are ex post facto interpretations rather than empirical generalizations which would allow predictions. From the sociological point of view, this is a disadvantage.

In addition, it should be pointed out that only two of Peter's reforms are analytically examined in a detailed way. Other reforms are

³Irwin Deutscher, "Words and Deeds: Social Science and Social Policy," Presidential address presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, August 28, 1965.

⁴Quentin Gibson, The Logic of Social Enquiry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 180.

described only. Because his entire reformatory program is not rigorously considered within the context of the theoretical model employed, only tentative conclusions can be drawn from the study.

IV. REASONS FOR THE STUDY

A survey of historical sources dealing with the Petrine period disclosed no previous attempt to analyze the Petrine reforms within a logical framework. Therefore, it was felt that such a study would be of value. Smelser claims to offer general principles which shape the development of norm-oriented movements as well as other forms of collective behavior. An effort is made to refute or substantiate this claim by focusing on the norm-oriented movement. Furthermore, to take Smelser's theory, largely derived from a modern and historically recent context and to test his generalizations and concepts in a different cultural and historical setting, is itself a challenge to scholarship.

V. SOURCES OF DATA

The main references for this study are a variety of general Russian history texts and Smelser's book, Theory of Collective Behavior. Minor references were found in a number of sociological sources. Biographies of Peter the Great by Jacob Abbott, Oscar Browning, Stephen Graham, Ian Grey, Vasili Kliuchevsky, Harold Lamb and Eugene Schuyler are also important references.

VI. METHOD OF PROCEDURE

The first six chapters in this study are mainly expository, the seventh and eighth analytical, while the last one is evaluative. Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter attempts to justify the rapprochement of history and sociology. The third chapter is a summary of Smelser's theory of collective behavior--that is, the theoretical model that is employed in explaining Peter's reforms within a systematized framework. In the fourth and fifth chapters, the origin and evolution of the social forces manifest in Russia's history and their implications for education are examined. Chronologically, these two sections are concerned with a period dating from early Kievan times to about 1700. The sixth chapter presents a detailed account of the major innovations that were introduced by Peter. It also specifies the reasons why the reforms are considered as instances of norm-oriented movements. The seventh chapter deals with Peter's reforms within the framework of Smelser's theory with special attention being given to his military and educational reforms. The eighth chapter deals with the effect that the Petrine reforms had upon the social forces discussed in chapters four and five. In the final chapter an evaluation is made of the applicability of the model in systematically explaining this dynamic period of Russian history.

CHAPTER II

SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY: A RAPPROCHEMENT

In Chapter I it was stated that the primary purpose of this study is to test the applicability of a sociological theory in historical investigation. Such a study would involve an inter-disciplinary approach. Though there is a considerable literature pertaining to the interaction between historians and sociologists, there are members of both fields of study who deprecate the union. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to establish logical grounds for the rapprochement of the two disciplines.

Though sociology and history differ in origin and purpose, both are concerned with investigating the same matter--human interaction.¹ Hence, in the words of Cahnman and Boskoff, ". . .this makes them partners and competitors at the same time."² Recognition of this relationship points to the need of examining the potential interdependence of history and sociology while bearing in mind the distinguishing features of both.

Though sociology and history ". . .study man in his association and confrontation with other men. . ."³--an objective that is pursued by whatever methods are suitable for the purpose--the methods differ.

¹W. J. Cahnman and A. Boskoff, Sociology and History (London: The Free Press of Glencoe Colber-Macmillan, 1964), p. 1.

²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 2.

Methodological differences arise from the fact that the historian studies completed events from recorded facts ". . . which are likely to be a small remnant of a multitude of relevant aspects of these events"⁴ while the sociologist has to select from a mass of facts that are relevant to a specific problem compelling him to create ". . . his own sources, in line with hypotheses he has formulated."⁵

The sources the sociologist has created to study his subject matter range from theoretical models to sophisticated statistical procedures. Though these modes of investigation have advantages, they carry with them their pitfalls, particularly if the data are selected to fit a methodological device or if the "myth of methodology"⁶ is widespread. Even sound methodological procedures can be unwisely urged to the point that,

Excessive effort can be diverted from substance to methodological problems, so that we are forever perfecting how to do something without ever getting around to do it even imperfectly.⁷

Yet despite the fact that critics have on occasion been justified in expressing dissatisfaction ". . . with what they view as excessive abstraction and overpreoccupation with esoteric methodology,"⁸ it remains true that sociology promises to open new dimensions for understanding man in

⁴Ibid. ⁵Ibid.

⁶A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 24.

⁷Ibid., p. 25.

⁸S. M. Lipset and N. J. Smelser, Sociology The Progress of a Decade (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 5.

all his social relations.⁹

If this is true historical research cannot remain unaffected. Future researchers, whether they be historians or sociologists, may attempt to hold constant specific factors when studying social events and may subject the object of their inquiry to quantitative as well as qualitative analysis.¹⁰ The use of sociological techniques in historical inquiry, however, poses no threat to the autonomy of history as a branch of study. Nor does the sociologists' recourse to historical data in formulating conceptual constructions endanger the autonomy of sociology. Rather, disciplinary interdependence precludes the acceptance of what Patrick Gardiner refers to as "...soap-bubble theories of separate spheres of existence."¹¹ Still, history and sociology would retain their autonomy for the difference between the two would be in the kinds of questions that are asked. And these differences will continually be with us for there would be no need for the sociologist to address himself to historical investigation if the historian asked the same questions that are of interest to the sociologist.¹² But the facts collected by the historian and the sociologist must be integrated into

⁹G. A. Lundberg and others, Sociology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 4.

¹⁰Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 3.

¹¹P. Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 33.

¹²S. D. Clark, "Sociology, History and the Problems of Social Change," Journal of the Political Science Association, XXV (November, 1959), pp. 389-400.

meaningful patterns and these will differ according to the way data are approached. Sociologists do approach their data differently but this does not necessarily mean that they will do so in a manner that is contrary to the spirit of historical inquiry.

Historians are ". . .concerned with describing past events and indicating how and why they occurred when they did."¹³ The explanations they seek to provide are stated in terms of a unique concatenation of personality and circumstances.¹⁴ But the next logical step which epitomizes the sociologists' objective, is also simple for

. . .If it is desirable and possible to attain some understanding of specific events and related periods, it is also desirable and possible to discover the extent to which explanations applicable to one situation may be extended to comparable situations from other times and places.¹⁵

The sociologist's objective then, with regard to his interest in historical phenomena, is the formulation of the most basic of all generalizations--generalizations that ". . .are identifications, the most enduring or recurring constituents in the flow of experience"¹⁶ Such identifications are significant since they constitute the basis for the construction of theories which are nothing else than the attempt to systematize our knowledge of the circumstances in which constancies occur.¹⁷

The objective stated above, however, is often countered by the

¹³Gardiner, op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁴E. H. Carr, What is History? (London: Macmillan, 1961), p. 81.

¹⁵Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁶Kaplan, op. cit., p. 85. ¹⁷Ibid.

first question that arises in connection with generalizations in behavioral science. The question is whether the study of man--in all his social relationships--is concerned with discovering and formulating generalizations at all. Max Weber, for example, expresses the view that, ". . .the student of cultural phenomena, of man and his works, is concerned with the concrete individual as contrasted with the abstract universal."¹⁸ Regarding the question of causality, Weber states that it ". . .is not a question of the subsumption of the event under some general rubric as a representative case but of its imputation as a consequence of some constellation."¹⁹ Weber's position does not repudiate the search for generalizations in the field of human behavior but he insists that they must only be instrumental in the achievement of other goals. Hence, ". . .the establishment of regularities is a means rather than an end. . . ."²⁰ Consequently, regardless of how we define understanding or explanation we must acknowledge the potential contribution of regularities among events. For example:

Asked a question about some problem of child behavior, the clinician will immediately counter with the question, "How old is the child?" Known regularities of development bear on the interpretation of the individual case even though our knowledge may not extend to the causal connections responsible for the regularity.²¹

There exists a conceptual relationship between the general and the particular and the researcher must extend and refine his conceptions

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 115.

¹⁹ M. Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 78-79.

²⁰ Kaplan, op. cit., p. 115.

²¹ Ibid., p. 116.

of both if he is to be successful in extending the boundaries of human knowledge. Thus a researcher

. . . May well be interested in coming to know a generalization so that he can understand particulars; but equally, the particular may be of . . . significance to him because of the contribution it makes to his quest for generality.²²

The fact that sociologists formulate generalizations about their subject matter does not necessarily imply that they claim to be able to frame precise laws of functional dependence. To make such a claim would be foolhardy for as Patrick Gardiner points out,

The ability to frame empirical laws in terms of functional formulas is dependent upon the existence of a conceptual framework in which the terms used have an accepted definition in use of a measurable kind.²³

Obviously not all terms are of this type. In the social sciences, for instance, the terms and concepts used are frequently exceedingly vague. It follows that ". . . the form of generalizations and the pattern of explanations in general, is relative to the conceptual framework involved."²⁴

Another consequence of the sociologist's lack of a precise conceptual framework is that an extensive debate has been carried out over the issue whether generalizations about human behavior can be formulated. The argument is that since the cultural sciences focus on particulars, there can be no reliable generalizations here because each individual is unique, while generalizations deal with what is common to many instances.

²²Ibid., p. 116.

²³Gardiner, op. cit., p. 23.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 23-24.

Both premises are true but the conclusion does not necessarily follow. Every individual case is unique; on the Leibnizian principle of the identity of indiscernables--". . .that the only way two monads can differ is in having different properties. . ."25--uniqueness is a re-statement of individuality. But every particular studied whether in the physical, biological, or cultural sciences is also an individual and therefore is unique. Generalizations formulated in all branches of study categorize individual instances together only on the basis of a similarity in some respect or other, not on the basis of identity. Generalizations do deal with elements that are common to many instances but ". . .uniqueness does not imply that nothing is shared with other individuals, only that not everything is common to them."26 A generalization requires a repeatability but what recurs is not the same instance but another instance that is sufficiently similar to former ones to serve the purpose of the generalization. And this requirement applies to generalizations about human beings as well as to those that are formulated about other subject matter.

Arguments similar to those that deny the merit of comparison or conscious conceptualization in the social sciences are also involved against the use of generalizations in historical inquiry. What is more, historians have yet to achieve consensus regarding the purposes and means of historical investigation. In fact,

²⁵George H. Sabine, "Leibniz," Encyclopedia Americana (1959 edition), XVII, p. 238.

²⁶Kaplan, op. cit., p. 117.

The philosophy of history tends to fall between two extremes. At one extreme lies the view that history is a branch of knowledge which is sui generis : at the other, there is the claim that it is, in some sense, a department of science or, at any rate, that it is capable of being transformed into such a department.²⁷

Though there may be some truth in both of these doctrines, each view taken in isolation leads to difficulty. As in the case of the sociologist, the historians' terms and concepts do not have ". . . an accepted definition in use of a measurable kind."²⁸ Consequently, the historian, like the social scientist, is unable to ". . . frame empirical laws in terms of functional formulae."²⁹ Furthermore, critics of the positivists point out that:

The historian concentrates upon the event in its 'unique individuality', regarding it, not as an instance of a type, not as a member of a class, but as something which is to be viewed for and in itself. And this interest in events for and in themselves is regarded as a distinguishing feature of historical writing.³⁰

Broadly speaking the contention seems correct. However, less defensible conclusions have been drawn from it.

For it is inferred that the uniqueness of the events studied by the historian excludes the possibility of their being classified or generalized about in any way. Uniqueness is regarded as a quality which historical events possess; any attempt to subsume them under a general rule, to assimilate them to other events of a similar kind, is to sin against the nature of historical fact.³¹

Some proponents of the above position

. . . Attempt to dichotomize the study of society into the study of the imperatives inherent in social systems on the one hand, and the study of historic sources of specific patterns of behavior on the other. . . .³²

²⁷Gardiner, op. cit., p. 32. ²⁸Ibid., p. 22. ²⁹Ibid., p. 21.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 40-41. ³¹Ibid., p. 41.

³²Lipset and Smelser, op. cit., p. 6.

Other members of this school of thought frequently condemn the behavioral scientists' efforts to systematize knowledge in a manner that is reminiscent of W. H. Auden when he says:

Thou shalt not answer questionnaires
Or quizzes upon world-affairs,
Nor with compliance
Take any test. Thou shalt not sit
With statisticians nor commit
A social science.³³

"The criticism that the efforts to formulate generalizations necessarily conflicts with the analysis of historical process. . ."³⁴ seems unwarranted for this appears to imply two false presuppositions. First, it suggests that the two types of explanations necessarily conflict rather than complement each other. Second, it implies that generalizations have no place in historical investigation. The fact is that historians do treat unique events as instances of generalizations. It is true that the historian investigating a particular event as the causes of the French Revolution is primarily concerned with the French Revolution rather than with the objective of revealing its similarities to other revolutions or of making use of his findings to support hypotheses he may have initially stated concerning the causes of revolutions in general. Yet he may introduce his work by indicating that revolutions are not sudden occurrences but logical culminations of processes that had been operative for a long time. He may also examine the history of France in the century preceding the revolution to establish

³³W. H. Auden, "Under Which Lyre a Reactionary Tract for the Times," Nones (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), pp. 61-62.

³⁴Lipset and Smelser, op. cit., p. 6.

the underlying causes. What is more, the historian

. . . May preface [his] work inquiring into. . . the causes of the French Revolution by mentioning the causes of revolutions in general; he may do this as a guide to show the reader the kind of factors he is looking for throughout his investigation.³⁵

Hence, while the historian is primarily concerned with reconstructing particular situations in the past, he is not free to disregard generalizations in his work of reconstruction.³⁶

In light of the arguments presented in the preceding paragraphs, it would appear that some of the asserted distinctions between history and sociology are belied in practice while others seem to be one of degree rather than kind. Gardiner, for example, feels that these differences ". . . may be accounted for not on grounds that necessitate the postulation of such worlds, but on other grounds connected with the purposes of historical research. . . ." ³⁷ More emphatic in their support of such a position are the sociologists, Cahnman and Boskoff. They believe that ". . . genuine differences between sociologists and historians stem not from logical or practical grounds, but from legitimate but somewhat arbitrarily selected items."³⁸

What, then, have been the distinctions between history and sociology that have been belied in practice or that seem to be one of degree rather than kind? A review of some of these distinctions and differences is presented below.

³⁵Gardiner, op. cit., p. 44. ³⁶Ibid., p. 45. ³⁷Ibid., p. 33.

³⁸Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 3.

Description and analysis. The dichotomy between description and analysis serves no useful purpose either for the historian or the sociologist since these processes are necessarily reciprocal.³⁹ "For those who give prominence to analysis and explanation, responsible description. . . is an indispensable base."⁴⁰ On the other hand, ". . . the selection of facts for descriptive purposes always presupposes some criteria of relevance which. . . are grounded in an explanatory scheme."⁴¹ Or as Kaplan points out, descriptions themselves may be explanatory while explanations may be concatenated descriptions.⁴²

The unique and the general. The argument that focuses on the 'presumed' incompatibility of the idiographic and the nomothetic objectives of history and sociology respectively, continues with the insistence that ". . . the study of man is interested precisely in what differentiates one person or historical situation from others, not what is shared with others."⁴³ Proponents of this premise overlook the fact that differences are explained and understood only by reference somewhere to similarities: ". . . how we conceive of an individual is a product of generalizations."⁴⁴ Uniqueness and generality are not features inherent in facts but are simply analytical modes of appraising

³⁹P. Bagby, Culture and History (London: Longmans Green, 1958), p. 50.

⁴⁰Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 3. ⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Kaplan, op. cit., p. 329. ⁴³Ibid., p. 117.

⁴⁴Ibid.

facts.⁴⁵ The historian or the sociologist may focus his interest upon the uniqueness of facts by segregating them from other facts or by ignoring points of similarity or he may emphasize the similarities and disregard the irrelevant differences. Evidently, the investigators' objective should serve as a guide in determining the relative value of such analytic aspects. However, over-emphasis of one aspect to the total exclusion of the other leads to unfavorable results for,

. . . If the differentia among facts are neglected, overly simplified generalizations are developed which explain everything and therefore nothing; but if similarities in facts are totally neglected, their existence becomes immune from explanation.
 . . .⁴⁶

Explanation depends upon a viable interplay between the general and the unique and if historians fail to identify generalities in their data, it must be the consequence of not looking for them.⁴⁷

Free will. Another presumed distinction between history and sociology is derived from the argument against the possibility of a behavioral science. Reference here is made to the argument from free will; that it is impossible to formulate general theories of action because human beings are free to make choices. What is often overlooked, however, is that

. . . In explaining why a particular cause of action was chosen among available alternatives, the historian refers to a number of

⁴⁵Gardiner, op. cit., pp. 31-41; Carr, op. cit., p. 59.

⁴⁶Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴⁷K. Bock, The Acceptance of Histories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), p. 110.

of determining factors, among which the background and personality of the actor as well as his assessment of the field of social forces within which he acts are said to be of decisive import.⁴⁸

Seen in this perspective, it is evident that "...the distinction between free choice and behavior that is compelled is drawn within the domain of causation, not between that domain and something presumed to be outside it."⁴⁹ Since free choice is not uncaused but includes as cause the aspirations and knowledge of the individual who is choosing, there seems to be no a priori reason why choices freely made should refuse to exhibit any regularities whatsoever.⁵⁰

Law and causation. Causation in history cannot be reduced to isolated ascertainable causes which lead to unambiguous ascertainable consequences. Rather, historical situations are characterized by a multiplicity of cause-and-effect relations that cannot be expressed in a single general principle. But the concatenation of events can be described, compared, and evaluated.

This means that we have before us unity in variation; situations change over time, but if essential elements remain identifiable, the result may be that one situation, while not the exact equivalent of another, nevertheless, contains an element of comparison that can serve as a guide in explanation.⁵¹

Sociologists have abandoned the quest for universal causal laws. Today, the majority of them limit their aim to matching a manageable variety of situations with a corresponding variety of appropriate theories. This

⁴⁸Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 5.

⁴⁹Kaplan, op. cit., p. 121. ⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

involves the use of the comparative method⁵² and of constructive typologies.⁵³

In summary, it can be said that the four presumed distinctions between history and sociology do little more than obscure the relations between the two disciplines. After having cleared away some of the conceptual and methodological obstacles that have hindered the rapprochement of the two branches of knowledge, it is necessary to explain what this student thinks the sociologist's approach to history should be. Though a variety of such approaches have been formulated, this writer favors the procedure that currently seems to be most commonly accepted.

1. The use of historical data for the purpose of illustrating and possibly testing the validity of sociological constructs and theories.
2. The attempt to confront theories with historical data to test the applicability of explanatory theories.

As used in this context, theories refer to constructs which are ". . . designed to assist in the analysis of phenomena that are restricted to a localized situation or a particular period in history."⁵⁴ By advocating the formulation of "middle-range" theories,⁵⁵ sociologists clear

⁵²C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 150-51.

⁵³H. Becker, "Interpretive Sociology and Constructive Typology," G. Gurvitch and W. E. Moore (eds.), Twentieth Century Sociology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945), pp. 70-95.

⁵⁴Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵⁵R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), Introd. pp. 5-10.

themselves of the charge that was justifiably levelled at them at ". . . an earlier stage of sociological inquiry, when sociology had not yet been clearly distinguishable from the philosophy of history. . . ."56-- that is, at the time when ". . . the quest for a single causal principle, applicable to all times and places, was believed to be possible of fulfillment."57 But when small-scale validation has been secured, it seems both logical and feasible to think in terms of broader generalizations.58 However, it must be remembered that it is too much to assume that such generalizations will hold for all possible cases for as Howard Becker points out, "The sociologist predicts but he does not prophecy."59 Yet despite the fact that the majority of sociologists tend to confine theorizing to phenomena that are restricted to a localized situation or a particular historical period, it is important to note that ". . . this does not exclude inter-societal comparison or the application of the theory in question to a variety of situations or periods, provided it is done flexibly."60 The formulation of such theories, though, must be guided by the belief that they are merely tools designed for the search for answers to problems and to be modified or discarded when they serve no purpose. "If they are made into ends, models are likely to be mistaken for entities and the tool that should have been a servant turns out to be a master."61

⁵⁶Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 7. ⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Becker, op. cit., p. 93. ⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 13. ⁶¹Ibid., p. 9.

In conclusion, it is hoped that a union between history and sociology will provide some of the ways and means by which those engaged in the two disciplines may learn to cooperate with each other more fruitfully. This hope is not based on the wishful thinking of a handful of aspiring sociologists, for "there is a widespread feeling on both sides that such interchange is vitally needed. . . ." ⁶²

⁶²Cahnman and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 13.

CHAPTER III

SMELSER'S THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

In the preceding chapter an effort was made to present a logical case for the general rapprochement of history and sociology. If the argument for such a union is valid, then the next logical step would be to confront a specific theory with historical data to test the applicability of the explanatory model. In this study, the principal aim is to test the utility of N. J. Smelser's theory of collective behavior in explaining historical phenomenon--in this instance, the reforms of Peter the Great. Before proceeding, however, it is first necessary to delineate the basic definitions and assumptions of the conceptual construct to be employed. These are extracted from Smelser's book, Theory of Collective Behavior.

Collective behavior, broadly defined, refers to the behavior of two or more individuals acting together. More specifically, collective behavior is defined as ". . .mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action."¹ This definition is qualified by three further defining characteristics. These are:

1. Collective behavior is guided by various beliefs.
2. These beliefs involve the belief in the existence of extraordinary forces and an assessment of the consequences which

¹Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 8.

follow if collective attempts to reconstitute social action are successful.

3. Collective behavior is not institutionalized behavior.

Smelser then turns his attention to what he calls the external division of the field. In other words, he defines the components of social action that social groups attempt to reconstitute. These components are values, norms, mobilization of individual motivation for organized roles, and situational facilities. From these Smelser derives the following typology of collective behavior.

- Value-oriented movement - Behavior mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief envisioning a reconstitution of values.
- Norm-oriented movement - Collective action mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief envisioning a reconstitution of norms.
- Hostile outburst - Collective behavior mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief which attributes the undesirable social condition to some agent or agents.
- Craze and panic - Behavior based on a generalized redefinition of situational facilities.

Next, Smelser raises the issue regarding what determines whether some form of collective behavior will occur, and attempts to systematize the determinants and note the changes in the combination of these which produce different outcomes. The scheme he employs to organize the

determinants resembles the economic concept referred to as the value-added process. To illustrate this concept he cites the example of the use of the term with reference to the conversion of iron ore into automobiles by a number of processing stages. The stages involved would range from the initial mining of the ore to the final step of selling the finished product.

The key element in this example is that the earlier stages must combine according to a certain pattern before the next stage can contribute its particular value to the finished product. . . . Every stage in the value-added process, therefore, is a necessary condition for the appropriate and effective addition of value in the next stage.²

In certain respects this approach is similar to the natural history approach to collective behavior. The latter involves the claim that certain uniformities of sequence characterize the unfolding of an episode of collective behavior. For example, Dawson and Gettys³ developed the following sequence: (1) a preliminary stage of social unrest, (2) a popular stage of collective excitement, (3) a stage of formal organization, (4) institutionalization. The difference between the value-added approach and the natural history approach is that in the former it is necessary to ". . . distinguish between the occurrence or existence of an event or situation, and the activation of this event or situation as a determinant."⁴

²Smelser, op. cit., p. 14.

³C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, An Introduction to Sociology (first edition; New York: The Ronald Press, 1929), pp. 787-803.

⁴Smelser, op. cit., p. 19.

The logic of this economic concept can be applied to collective behavior. Thus, many determinants must be present if collective action is to occur and these must combine in a definite pattern. As the process develops, the outcome becomes increasingly specific. The determinants of collective behavior are:

1. Structural conduciveness. At the most, conduciveness permits the occurrence of a given type of collective action. For example, the structure of a money-market economy is conducive to the occurrence of financial panics, though within the scope of conduciveness, possibilities of behavior other than panic remain. To limit the range of possible behavior, it is necessary to add more determinants.
2. Structural strain. Structural strain must fall within the scope established by the condition of conduciveness.
3. Growth and spread of a generalized belief. Generalized beliefs identify the source of strain and specify possible or appropriate responses. The growth and spread of a generalized belief must precede any attempt to reconstitute the strain-producing situation.
4. Precipitating factors. Precipitating factors are specific events which set the potential actors into action.
5. Mobilization of participants for action. In bringing the affected group into action, the role of the leaders is very important.
6. The operation of social control. These are the social agencies

or social forces that prevent or interrupt the accumulation of the above determinants. Social controls are divided into two types: (1) those which minimize conduciveness and strain, and (2) those mobilized after some type of collective behavior has begun to materialize.

By studying the different combinations of these determinants, Smelser believes it is possible to explain whether collective behavior of any type will occur and what type will occur. Before analyzing each type of collective behavior in terms of the six determinants, the author gives a detailed explanation of the components of social action. A summary of this account follows.

Values. Values, the most general component of social action,

. . . State in general terms the desirable ends which act as a guide to human endeavor; . . . they do not specify kinds of norms, kinds of organization, or kinds of facilities which are required to realize these ends.⁵

Exemplifying the general nature of this component is the term 'democracy.' This value forms the basis of the political system of Great Britain, United States, and France. Though common elements are present in the definition of democracy in each of the countries--for example, principles of representation, majority rule, et cetera,--these do not specifically delineate the institutional arrangements. Consequently, systems of election, legislation, administration, et cetera, vary widely among the three nations. These differences, however, are not at the value

⁵Smelser, op. cit., p. 25.

level; they are differences in the norms, in the social organization, and in the situational facilities.

Norms. Norms are more specific than values. They specify principles that regulate social conduct. Norms range from the formal type found in legal systems to the informal norms found in neighborhood cliques.

Mobilization of motivation into organized action. Values and norms specify general ends and general rules. They do not, however, specify who will pursue these goals, how the actions of these individuals will be organized into roles and organizations, and how the agents will be rewarded for participating in these roles and organizations. It is the third component which gives greater detail to social action. For example, families, churches, hospitals, political parties, and business firms, comprise the component of "mobilization of motivation into organized action."⁶ Effective performance in roles and organizations is rewarded with wealth, power, and prestige.


Situational facilities. Situational facilities, the final component of social action, "involve the means and obstacles which facilitate or hinder the attainment of concrete goals in the role or organizational context."⁷ This component refers to the actor's information regarding the opportunities and limitations presented by the environment

⁶Ibid., p. 28.

⁷Ibid.

as well as his own ability and skills to influence the environment.

The four components of social action are related to one another. In other words, they stand in a hierarchy.



Values are very general guides to action. They specify only general end states. At the level of norms, general rules define the rights and duties of individuals involved in social interaction. At the organizational level more details are specified--the structure of roles and organizations and the types of sanctions that facilitate the enactment of roles. Lastly, at the level of situational facilities, the specification of skills and knowledge, gives the most detailed aspects of social behavior.

Moving from top to bottom of the hierarchy, the components are of less importance to the integration of the social system. In other words, ". . .any redefinition of a component of social action necessarily makes for a readjustment in those components below it, but not necessarily in those above it."⁸

Besides being related to one another in a hierarchy, each of the

⁸Ibid., p. 33.

components has an internal organization which involves seven levels of specification. Each level restricts the meaning of the component thus making it more applicable to concrete action.⁹ The following table summarizes the internal structure of the components of social action. Moving across a row to the right and down a column "... adds more specific meaning to the process of producing concrete social action."¹⁰

The redefinition of a level of specificity at any point in Table I entails a corresponding redefinition of all the levels below and to the right of the specified point. This redefinition does not necessarily result in redefinitions of the levels above or to the left of the point in question. Table I by itself, however, "... gives no dynamic propositions concerning the course of behavior during an episode of collective behavior."¹¹ But by using these concepts Smelser constructs a theoretical framework that enables the student to explain collective behavior more adequately than by employing the natural history approach.

If collective behavior is to occur, some form of strain must be present. However, no direct relationship exists between a particular kind of strain and a particular kind of collective outcome.

Any kind of strain may be a determinant of any kind of collective behavior. . . . Which type or types depend on the progressive accumulation of the other determinants in the value-added process.¹²

Strain at any level of any component appears first at the operative levels (Levels 5-7). As the dissatisfaction becomes widespread and

⁹Ibid., p. 34. ¹⁰Ibid., p. 43.

¹¹Ibid., p. 45. ¹²Ibid., p. 49.

TABLE I

LEVELS OF SPECIFICITY OF THE COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL ACTION^a

Level	Values	Norms	Mobilization of Motivation to Organized Action	Situational Facilities
1.	Societal values	General conformity, (conformity, coopera- tion, altruistic attitudes)	Socialized motivation (first stage of socialization i.e., curb anti-social impulse)	Preconcep- tions con- cerning causality (assumptions concerning means-ends behavior)
2.	Legitimization of values for institutional- ized sectors	Specification of norms according to institutional sectors (types of conformity appro- priate to various sectors)	Generalized per- formance capa- city (capacity to contribute individual talent to role)	Codification of know- ledge (assump- tions organ- ized into generaliz- ations)
3.	Legitimization of rewards (kinds of acti- vities and re- wards that are to be legiti- mately pursued)	Specification of norms according to types of roles and organization (norma- tive principles according to types of organization)	Trained capacity (acquisition of attitudes and skills required in specialized roles)	Technology, or specifi- cation of knowledge in situational terms
4.	Legitimization of individual commitment (appropriate commitment for individual actor, e.g., personal success)	Specification of requirements for individual ob- servance of norms (require- ments for indi- vidual adherence to norms)	Transition to adult-role assumption	Procurement of wealth, of prestige to actuate Level 3

TABLE I (Continued)

Level	Values	Norms	Mobilization of Motivation to Organized Action	Situational Facilities
5.	Legitimization of competing values (cites competing values which must be respected)	Specification of norms of com- peting institu- tional sectors (rights and obligations to- wards others in connection with pursuit of given type of activity)	Allocation of sector of society (greater specialization within context of adult values)	Allocation of techno- logy to sec- tor of society
6.	Legitimization of values for realizing or- ganizational roles (e.g., commitment to values of effi- ciency)	Specification of rules of coopera- tion and coordina- tion within organization (coordination of activity within organiza- tion)	Allocation to specific roles or organizations	Allocation of effective technology to roles or organizations
7.	Legitimization of values for expenditure of effort (commit- ment to values of personal responsibility)	Specification of schedules and programs to regulate activity (detailed rules)	Allocation to roles and tasks within organiza- tion (individual now in position to do job)	Allocation of facilities within or- ganization to attain concrete goals

^aNeil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 44.

attention is focused on the source of operative failures, the higher levels are activated.

The most significant type of strain on situational facilities involves a condition of ambiguity. This may stem from insufficient knowledge or skills, several types of means conflicting with one another, or unpredictability of certain events. Strain may appear at the following levels of situational facilities:

Level 7: At this level, ambiguity centers around the adequacy of means in completing a concrete task.

Level 6: Ambiguity at this level of specificity arises with regard to the question of allocating facilities to attain the goals of the organization.

Level 5: At Level 5, ambiguity involves the problem of allocating facilities to the various sectors of society.

The mobilization series generates human motivation, channels it into organizations and roles, and is the seat of wealth, power, and prestige. Strain, here, involves the relation between responsible performance in roles and the rewards that are granted.¹³ Though the source of strains may be at the higher levels, strain would appear at the operative levels (5-7).

Level 7: Actual or potential deprivation in role performance.
Any real or imagined disjunction between responsibility or performance and rewards within the context of

¹³Ibid., p. 54.

organizational role performance gives rise to strain.

Level 6: Actual or potential deprivation related to organizational membership.

Strain at Level 6 involves a disruption between participation in an organization and the wealth, power, or prestige that are expected as rewards for such participation.

Level 5: Actual or potential deprivation of major social sectors.

At Level 5 a potential focus of strain involves a perceived misallocation of rewards whereby some sector of society receives more than its share of social prizes.

Normative strain, referred to as role strain, role conflict, and cross pressure, ". . . imply competing demands of different roles for the expenditure of limited time and energy, or for qualitatively different actions on the part of the individual."¹⁴

Level 7: Conflict of operative rules.

Strains at Level 7 develop as a consequence of conflicting directives from authority or as a result of competing demands from many roles.

Level 6: Strain on integration of organization.

Conditions which create individual role strain also give rise to strains for the organization as a whole.

Level 5: Strain in the relations among major social sectors.

²³W. J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," American Sociological Review, XXV (1960), pp. 483-96.

Here the normative regulation of the relations among the various sectors in society is considered.

Strain in the systems of values may result in the diffusion of different types of strain in a society or they may arise from the juxtaposition of two groups with divergent value systems. The levels at which value strains appear are:

Level 7: Strain on commitment to personal values.

Strain on personal values are created when attempts are made to convince those committed to them that these values are wrong. Such attempts or pressures imply a change in the individual's conception of man's relation to other men.¹⁵

Level 6: Strain on commitment to organizational goals.

Value strains at this level involve attempts to undermine the individual's commitment to organizational values.

Level 5: Strain on the principles of integration of values.

Value strains at Level 5 question the legitimacy of the value patterns.

In summary, value strain involves issues of commitment; normative strain arises over the issue of integrating human interaction; strain at the mobilization level concerns the balance between performance and rewards; strain on situational facilities involves ambiguity stemming

¹⁵ Smelser, op. cit., p. 63.

from insufficient knowledge or skills, several types of means conflicting with one another, or unpredictability of certain events.

As already indicated, some form of strain must exist if collective behavior is to occur. However, structural strain is a necessary not a sufficient condition for collective action. "Any type of structural strain may give rise to any type of collective behavior."¹⁶

To explain any episode of such behavior, it is necessary to investigate how these strains combine with the other determinants of social action.

Like other types of behavior, collective behavior is an attempt to eliminate conditions of strain by shifting attention to higher or more generalized levels of the components of social action. After redefining the higher level component, the people "...develop a belief which short-circuits from a very generalized component direct to the focus of strain."¹⁷ This is accomplished by integrating several levels of the components of action into a single belief which is expected to provide solutions to the conditions of strain. When people act on the basis of such a belief to redefine some component of social action, an episode of collective behavior occurs. Though such beliefs, referred to as 'generalized beliefs,' constitute only one of the stages in the value-added process, they are necessary to mobilize people for collective action. Their importance in this respect warrants a detailed examination of their growth and development.

Smelser states that generalized beliefs arise when some type of

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 66. ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 71.

strain is present.¹⁸ Hence, situational ambiguity, disjunction between performance and reward, normative misalignments, and value dissonance are appropriate settings. Strain at a higher component of social action necessarily implies a degree of ambiguity for all the lower levels. When this strain is not manageable within the existing framework of social readjustment, rumors, and generalized beliefs arise. The significance of generalized beliefs lies in the fact that they reduce the ambiguity created by conditions of structural strain and prepare individuals for episodes of collective behavior. Thus, "they create a common culture within which leadership, mobilization, and concerted action take place."¹⁹

According to Smelser, the major types of generalized beliefs are:

1. Hysteria, which defines an ambiguous situation as an absolute threat.
2. Wish-fulfillment, which eliminates ambiguity by offering efficacious generalized facilities.
3. Hostility, which reduces ambiguity by removing the object perceived as a threat.
4. Norm-oriented beliefs, which promise to restructure the threatened normative system.
5. Value-oriented beliefs, which envision changes in the threatened value structure.

Each generalized belief restructures some particular component of social

¹⁸Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 82.

action.

Thus hysteria and wish-fulfillment restructure the Facilities Series; hostility restructures the Mobilization Series; the norm-oriented belief restructures the Normative Series, and the value-oriented belief restructures the Value Series.²⁰

The connection cited above, that is, between strain and types of belief, is not a causal connection. Which type of belief that does arise is a function of strain and the nature of all the other determinants.

Provided that the other determinants permit the development of an episode of collective action, each belief produces some type of collective behavior. Hysterical beliefs lead to panic; wish-fulfillment beliefs to the craze; hostile beliefs, to scape-goating and mob violence; norm-oriented beliefs to reform movements; and value-oriented beliefs to political and religious revolutions, nationalist movements and the formation of cults.²¹

Before examining the unique combination of determinants which give rise to a unique outcome, Smelser details the development of generalized beliefs which precede episodes of collective behavior. Hysterical beliefs, wish-fulfillment beliefs, hostile beliefs, norm-oriented beliefs, and value-oriented beliefs are examined. A summary of his analysis of the norm-oriented and value-oriented beliefs is presented in the following paragraphs. The first three are not dealt with since they are of lesser significance to the historical events

²⁰Ibid., p. 20.

²¹Ibid., pp. 83-84.

that transpired during Peter the Great's reign.

Those who subscribe to a norm-oriented belief envision the restoration, modification, or creation of social norms and may demand a rule or agency to control the behavior of irresponsible individuals. "A norm-oriented movement, then, involves mobilization for action in the name of a belief envisioning the reconstitution of the Normative Series."²² This involves the restructuring of the lower components of social action. Hence, the creation of norm-oriented beliefs in the total value-added process is a developmental procedure that passes through a number of stages. Stage 1 involves a state of ambiguity which arises as a consequence of structural strain. Any kind of strain can give rise to a norm-oriented movement though whether this type of behavior or some other response will occur depends upon the other determinants in the value-added process.²³ Stage 2 involves anxiety (-Facilities). Stages 3 and 3a associate this anxiety to the irresponsible behavior of some agent (-Mobilization). At Stage 4 a higher level belief arises--the belief that the norms controlling the agents are inadequate (-Norms). Stage 4a short-circuits this belief to specific laws, rules, or customs. The belief that the normative malfunctioning can be corrected is expressed at Stage 5 (+Norms). At this level the belief is short-circuited to specific normative changes. Such changes will presumably control the action of the agents responsible for the undesirable situation (Stage 6 + Mobilization) and will

²²Ibid., p. 110.

²³Ibid., p. 112.

result in the eradication of the original source of strain (Stage 7 + Facilities). Table II represents these stages graphically.

Value-oriented beliefs envision modification in conceptions regarding nature, man's place in it, and man's relation to man.²⁴ Examples of such beliefs are religious doctrines (Mohammedanism); revolutionary doctrines (Marxism); secular beliefs associated with cults of withdrawal; nationalistic beliefs (such as those prevalent in many societies in Asia); miscellaneous beliefs which give rise to cults. Value-oriented beliefs involve the reconstitution of the Value-Series and imply the reconstitution of the lower-level components.

Thus the value-added belief includes the following nine stages. As in other generalized beliefs, Stage 1 involves ambiguity which arises from conditions of strain. Stage 2 involves anxiety (-Facilities). This is attributed to the action of specific individuals or agents (Stage 3 -Mobilization). Furthermore, society in general is believed to be in a state of conflict (Stage 4 -Norms). Finally, the conflict is defined as posing a threat to the societal values (Stage 5 -Values).

In addition, value-oriented beliefs envision the reconstitution of societal values (Stage 6 + Values). This implies the belief in harmony and stability (Stage 7 + Norms). Finally, those adhering to value-oriented beliefs hold that by a reconstitution of societal values the agents responsible for the condition of strain will be constrained, punished or eliminated (Stage 8 + Mobilization), and that

²⁴Ibid., p. 120.

TABLE II

VALUE-ADDED IN THE CREATION OF NORM-ORIENTED BELIEFS^a

Stage 1:	-Facilities Stage 2:	-Mobilization Stage 3:	-Norms Stage 4:	+Norms Stage 5:	+Mobilization Stage 6:	+Facilities Stage 7:
Strain giving rise to ambiguity	Anxiety	Generalized belief that agents are responsible for anxiety- producing state of affairs	Generalized belief that regulation of these agents is inadequate	Generalized belief in normative reorganization (e.g., "there ought to be a law")	Belief that normative change will destroy, re- move, damage or restrict responsible agent	Belief in omnipotence of norma- tive change
		(Short- circuit)	(Short- circuit)	(Short- circuit)	(Short- circuit)	(Short- circuit)
		Stage 3a: Identification of responsible agents and acceptance of exaggerated stories of "results" of evil-doing	Stage 4a: Identification of flaw in normative regulation	Stage 5a: Identification of specific normative change envisioned	Stage 6a: Assimilation of hostility to efficacy of normative change. Belief in ability of norm to punish par- ticular agent	Stage 7a: Exaggerated results in terms of original dissatisfac- tions

^aNeil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 113.

a condition of harmony and stability will follow (Stage 9 + Facilities). Table III represents these stages graphically.

All the beliefs analyzed in the preceding paragraphs are related to one another. All are attempts to reconstitute some component of social action. Their differences arise from the fact that each belief attempts to reconstitute a particular component. "Hysteria and wish-fulfillment focus in different ways on facilities; hostile beliefs on mobilization; norm-oriented beliefs on norms; and value-oriented beliefs on values."²⁵

The five beliefs stand in relation to one another in the following hierarchy:


Value-oriented beliefs	Top
Norm-oriented beliefs	
Hostile beliefs	
Wish-fulfillment beliefs	
Hysterical beliefs	Bottom

Each specific belief includes all the components of the beliefs below it plus a new ingredient which gives it its distinctive character.

Smelser then assigns the determinants of collective behavior to their place in the total value-added process by analyzing each type of collective action in its entirety. Since it is assumed that the panic, the craze, and the hostile outburst are of minor significance to historical inquiry that is concerned with social reforms, only

²⁵Ibid., p. 129.

TABLE III
VALUE-ADDED IN THE CREATION OF VALUE-ORIENTED BELIEFS ^a



^aNeil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) p. 124.

Smelser's analysis of the norm-oriented movement and the value-oriented movement will be presented in the pages that follow.

Participants of a norm-oriented movement ". . . attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a generalized belief."²⁶ These agents may try to affect the norms through their own efforts or may attempt to convince or induce some authority to do so. Any of the norms within a social system may become the subject of norm-oriented movements--movements which may occur on any scale. If the movement is successful, a normative innovation--a new law, custom, association--appears.

Normative changes, however, are not always preceded by movements initiated in the name of a generalized belief. In fact, all normative changes range along a continuum from those that are routinely incorporated to those that are realized as a consequence of agitation based on some generalized belief. This student, however, is primarily concerned with the latter because it is believed that Peter the Great's reforms were instances of such behavior.

Smelser analyzes norm-oriented movements under the categories previously mentioned--structural conduciveness, strain, generalized beliefs, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and the response of agencies of social control. Though such a treatment is similar to the study of the natural history of social movements, Smelser is primarily interested in establishing ". . . the conditions under which

²⁶Ibid., p. 270.

events become significant as determinants of a norm-oriented movement."²⁷ Thus, though he occasionally refers to temporal sequences of events, he does not attempt to ". . . formulate generalizations about natural histories, but to generate a systematic account of the activation of events and situations as determinants."²⁸

The most general condition of conduciveness involves the possibility for demanding changes in the normative structure without appearing to challenge the underlying value system. Social structures which meet these conditions of conduciveness are those in which the articulation of interests and the aggregation of interests are differentiated within themselves and from one another. Within such a social arrangement grievances are likely to take the form of a collective episode based upon a norm-oriented belief.

Assuming that the conditions of conduciveness remain unchanged, channels for expressing dissatisfaction must be available. In addition, the aggrieved must have some means of affecting the normative order.

For each channel available for influencing the normative order, it is possible to rely on one or more of many types of social organization--independent associations, political parties, pressure groups, clubs, political bosses, or informal gatherings.²⁹

Norm-oriented movements often are crystallized when the discontented are convinced that a particular method of agitation is no longer available to them. Should they feel that all the possible channels of agitation for normative change are being closed, discontent expresses itself in open hostility or as a value-oriented movement. One of the

²⁷Ibid., p. 277. ²⁸Ibid., p. 278. ²⁹Ibid., p. 282.

conditions that encourages the rise of norm-oriented movements is the presence of channels for initiating normative changes which are open but within which the chances of success are problematic. At the same time, other channels of expression must be perceived as unavailable.

In sum, structural conduciveness for norm-oriented movements requires both the accessibility to avenues for affecting normative change and the inaccessibility to other avenues.³⁰

Any disjunction between normative standards and actual social conditions may give rise to norm-oriented movements. This form of collective episode can be expected to occur particularly during periods when either norms or social conditions experience rapid change. "In sum, norm-oriented movements are usually fostered by strains which create demands for readjustment in the social situation."³¹ This general formula is qualified by the following:

1. Strain may result from changes in objective conditions or from changes in expectations.
2. Strains frequently appear when one subsystem of society changes more rapidly than other subsystems.
3. Negative stereotypes often are instrumental in convincing one group that another is conspiring to create conditions of strain.
4. Any particular norm-oriented movement may arise from different kinds of strain.
5. Conditions of strain must combine with conditions of conduciveness if the former is to become a determinant of a

³⁰Ibid., p. 286.

³¹Ibid., p. 290.

norm-oriented movement.

When strain combines with structural conduciveness, generalized beliefs begin to come into play as determinants in the total value-added process of collective behavior. These beliefs include the identification of the elements responsible for creating strain and the subsequent normative disharmony and involve a program that would eliminate the sources of strain. "The combination of all these components results in a cause in the name of which the aggrieved mobilize and agitate for normative change."³²

Other factors that play a significant role in the development of a generalized belief are the precipitating factors. By marking the symbolization of one of the conditions of strain, they focus the belief on a particular person, event, or situation and create a sense of urgency which hastens mobilization for action.³³ Furthermore, a precipitating factor may create a condition of strain since, as in all cases of collective behavior, a single event may be analytically significant in a number of ways.

"The final determinant in the value-added process that results in a norm-oriented movement is the mobilization of its participants for action."³⁴ The problem of mobilization is discussed under four headings:

1. The role of leaders.
2. The real and derived phases of mobilization.
3. The effect of the success or failure of the movement's

³²Ibid., p. 292.

³³Ibid., p. 294.

³⁴Ibid., p. 296.

specific tactics on the development of the movement.

4. The effect of the movement's overall success or failure on its development.³⁵

Two types of leadership are identifiable in all episodes of collective behavior--leadership in formulating the beliefs and leadership in mobilizing participants for action. In some instances a single individual performs both roles. As the movement progresses several new types of leadership appear--leadership that is required to meet immediate organizational exigencies rather than distant goals. These new leaders are bureaucratic types which, according to Roche and Sachs, are ". . .preoccupied with the reconciliation of diverse elements in order to secure harmony within the organization and maximize its external appeal."³⁶

In general, norm-oriented movements develop according to three temporal phases--the incipient phase, the phase of enthusiastic mobilization, and the phase of institutionalization. "The movement begins with slow, searching behavior; accelerates into a period of supercharged activity; then settles gradually into decline or routine, day-by-day activity."³⁷ If the norm-oriented movement is based on a belief that encompasses a wide variety of grievances, it is likely to attract

³⁵Ibid., pp. 296-97.

³⁶J. P. Roche and S. Sachs, "The Bureaucrat and the Enthusiast: An Exploration of the Leadership of Social Movements," Western Political Quarterly, VIII (1955), pp. 248-61.

³⁷Smelser, op. cit., pp. 298-99.

a large number of heterogeneous followers. Such movements usually display a diversity of motivation, a period of rapid growth and then rapid decline, a changing association among the components of the same general movement.

Norm-oriented movements have a number of channels for agitating and a corresponding variety of strategies for each channel. When one method appears to be losing its effectiveness, it is abandoned in favor of a more promising tactic. The issue of methods of agitation is frequently a source of conflict within norm-oriented movements.

In addition, any movement which is based upon an inclusive belief is bound to fail in some sense.

Because its fears and hopes are likely to be exaggerated through the process of generalization and short circuiting, even the adoption of the concrete proposals it advocates does not approach its expectations.³⁸

Consequently, every movement is only relatively successful. Those that are successful protect the gains they have won; unsuccessful ones generally decline.

Smelser then focuses his attention on the agencies of social control and considers what behavior on their part either encourages or discourages the emergence of norm-oriented movements. First, he states that general encouragement of a norm-oriented movement by political authorities consolidates the movement. Beyond this, if a norm-oriented movement is to retain its normative character,

³⁸Ibid., p. 305.

. . .The agencies of control must (a) permit expression of grievances but insist that this expression remain within the confines of legitimacy, and (b) give a hearing-- . . .--to the complaints at hand.³⁹

If the agencies of social control close the avenues to normative change, other types of collective outbursts are encouraged.

The fourth type of collective behavior Smelser analyzes is the value-oriented movement--a movement he defines as ". . .a collective attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name of a generalized belief."⁴⁰ Such beliefs, composed of indigenous cultural items or items from outside the culture, may involve the creation of values for the future.

Smelser also distinguishes between religious and secular value-oriented movements. Furthermore, he states that each of these movements differ according to their outcome. Thus, religious value-oriented movements may result in religious revolution, in the formation of a collectivity within an existing political system, or in the disappearance of the movement or absorption into another kind of movement. Similarly, secular value-oriented movements may result in a political revolution, in the formation of a collectivity within the existing political system, or it may also disappear. Not all religious or secular movements, however, are value-oriented movements. To be termed a value-oriented movement they ". . .must possess a distinctive generalized belief and proceed through a definite value-added process."⁴¹ Therefore, before analyzing a value-oriented movement it is necessary to recapitulate it

³⁹Ibid., p. 307.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 313.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 318.

in terms of the six determinants of the value-added scheme: structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth of a generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and social control.⁴²

With reference to the first determinant, Smelser points out that certain structural arrangements encourage value-added movements rather than other kinds of outbursts. For instance, in societies where the value-system is not differentiated from other components of action specific dissatisfactions with any social arrangement eventually may become protests against values. Another condition of conduciveness that determines why a value-oriented movement arises rather than some other form of outburst is "the availability of means to express protests or grievances among a population suffering from any kind of strain."⁴³ Hence, if alternative means of reconstituting the social situation are unavailable or perceived as unavailable, for example, in inflexible political structures, value-oriented beliefs tend to emerge. Not all value-oriented beliefs, however, result in revolutionary movements. They may disappear if the original grievances disappear or they may give rise to a sect, a political party, or a club.

Within the framework of structural conduciveness, conditions of strain become important as determinants of value-oriented movements. Strain that may set the stage for such movements may occur at the situational facilities level (example, inadequacy of knowledge to cope with new situations); at the mobilization level (example, failure of a

⁴²Ibid., p. 22.

⁴³Ibid., p. 324.

government in the conduct of war); at the normative level (example, the collapse of the normative system in times of war); at the level of values (example, imperfect assimilation of heterogeneous populations). The above, however, is an over-simplified list for in any value-oriented movement the strains are multiple and complex.⁴⁴ Furthermore, many types of strain are frequently incorporated in the same general movement.

Under conditions of conduciveness and strain, value-oriented beliefs begin to crystallize. The common feature of all value-oriented beliefs is that they focus on a source of evil that is defined as a

. . .Threat to the very foundation of the social order (Values) and by implication, to the normative arrangement, and to organized social life in general. In the same belief a positive set of values is put forth. A new social order is envisioned; institutional chaos will give way to harmony and stability; the evil will be eradicated and human happiness will result.⁴⁵

The next condition necessary for the occurrence of a value-oriented movement that Smelser deals with is the role of the precipitating factors. He defines a precipitating factor as ". . .an event that creates, sharpens, or exaggerates a condition of strain or conduciveness."⁴⁶ These factors may facilitate the realization of a movement by linking the generalized belief to concrete situations. Such is the case when precipitating factors provide the adherents of a generalized belief with concrete evidence that undesirable forces are operative within their society and are responsible for conditions of strain.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 342.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 348.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 352.

Given the conditions of structural conduciveness and structural strain, the crystallization of value-oriented beliefs and precipitating factors, a value-oriented movement will still fail to emerge unless there is mobilization for action. Because the determinant of mobilization is linked closely to social control, the outcome of a value-oriented movement depends largely upon the conditions of conduciveness and the manner in which the society reacts to the movement once it has arisen. Though the two determinants are operationally related, they are analytically separable. Therefore, mobilization for action is dealt with separately under four headings--leadership, the real and derived aspects of value-oriented movements, the effect of success or failure, and the institutionalization of the movement.

Charismatic leadership characterizes value-oriented movement. Leadership takes this form because the movement itself envisions the ". . .reconstruction of an entire social order, from top to bottom."⁴⁷ Though the role of the leader in value-oriented movements is important, Smelser warns against extrapolating from specific occasions and creating a 'great-man' theory of social movements.

Once a movement shows signs of succeeding, it gains many adherents who frequently join for reasons that are not related to the original aims of the movement. When this occurs it is often difficult to distinguish the real from the derived aspects of a value-oriented movement.

To a large degree, value-oriented movements display a pattern

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 356.

similar to norm-oriented movements. When one set of tactics begins to lose its effectiveness, other promising tactics appear, since for any given value-oriented movement a variety of potential means of agitation are available. For example, "...a nationalist movement may attempt to revive ancient cultural patterns, may agitate for normative reform, may engage in terrorist activity, and so on."⁴⁸ Changes in strategy are not always planned but may be the result of trial-and-error methods, the consequence of adapting to the actions of political authorities, or to splits between the leaders of the movement.

As a value-oriented movement develops, it has to adapt to the conditions that arise with permanent existence. New leaders must be found, new bases of financing established, and modes of recruitment must be routinized.

The final determinant Smelser deals with is social control. In the context of the theory, social control refers to "...the minimization of the effects of any of the stages of value-added process"⁴⁹ However, control is discussed in the following sense.

A value-oriented belief, once crystallized, has a potential for moving in many directions--it may come to naught; it may form into a cult, a sect, or eventually a denomination; it may become an underground conspiracy; it may secede from the parent body that spawned it; it may grow into a revolutionary attempt to overthrow constitutional authorities. Even at an advanced stage considerable indeterminacy remains as to the direction in which the movement may turn. A major determinant of the course of movement lies in the behavior of agencies of social control in response to the movement.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 358.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 364.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 364.

Value-oriented movements may be peacefully contained within a system if the authorities do one of the following:

1. Rule out the possibility of expressing hostility in an uninstitutionalized manner.
2. Rule out the possibility of directly challenging the legitimacy of specific government activities.
3. Make it possible to agitate peacefully for normative change.
4. Eliminate the source of strain that initiated the movement.

If the authorities adopt one of the above modes of action, the movement either disappears, changes to a norm-oriented movement or assumes a value-oriented form that does not challenge the legitimacy of the existing system. Not all authorities, however, follow a model of containment. Two ideal-type deviations from the model are permanent repression and repression followed by a weakening of effectiveness. If a policy of permanent repression is pursued, value-oriented movements tend to evolve toward a passive and politically non-threatening form of organization. On the other hand, if a period of effective suppression is followed by inconsistency, vacillation, or weakness on the part of the authorities, the movement begins to evolve toward a value-oriented revolutionary movement. When a movement turns in a revolutionary direction, the use of force is always a possibility. However, "...whether it becomes an actuality, and how it becomes an actuality are open questions."⁵¹

⁵¹Ibid., p. 379.

The preceding paragraphs present a summary of Smelser's outline of a model value-added process in which several determinants combine to give rise to a norm-oriented or value-oriented movement. However, Smelser has not tried

. . .To account for the evolution of any single movement, but rather to extricate from the histories of many movements the principles which shape the development of norm-oriented or value-oriented movements in general.⁵²

In Chapter VII⁴ this student will attempt to apply this model to a number of single historical movements to test its usefulness in specific historical inquiry.

⁵²Ibid., p. 310.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL FORCES IN RUSSIAN HISTORY--FROM EARLY

SLAVIC TIMES TO 1700

To explain the reforms of the Petrine period of Russian history within the theoretical framework of Smelser's theory of collective behavior, necessitates the delineation of the components of social action that characterized Russian society prior to Peter's ascendancy to political power. A sociological survey of this nature can be theoretically structured by gathering historical data for each level of the society's cultural pyramid. The student can then define the values, norms, organized roles, and situational facilities of this social system, identify the major institutions, and gain some understanding of the interrelationships that existed among the component social forces. Though there are certain advantages in using structural functional analysis, this methodological technique does not provide a framework within which the process of social change can be adequately explained. This system of inquiry frequently obscures the fact that a society's values at any particular time are the consequence of logical culminations of cultural evolution--a process which may be impeded or accelerated by individuals who, in their time, play key leadership roles.

As mentioned above, an adequate understanding of a specific society's culture cannot be realized by structural functional analysis. What is required is a study which focuses on the origins and evolution

of end-goals and the rules that are necessary if these goals are to be attained. The stress on origins ". . . is born of the belief that all ages are equidistant from eternity and that formative influences sometimes tell us more about later developments than immediately precedent circumstances."¹ Yet even this approach does not permit one to present a complete etiological account of the cultural patterns that characterized seventeenth century Russia. Our picture of the socio-psychological phenomenon

. . . Has been pre-selected and predetermined for us, not so much by accident as by people who were consciously or unconsciously imbued with a particular view and thought the facts that supported that view worth preserving.²

However, a fairly comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon can be obtained by analyzing the composite influences of the forces or orientations that have, over the centuries, largely determined the course of Russian spiritual, intellectual, emotional, and physical life. The origins of the selected orientations will be determined and the changes that characterized their development from Kievan times to about 1700 will be outlined.

The problem is one of defining components of social action. With reference to Russia where ". . . two streams of history--East and West--jostle and influence one another. . .,"³ the magnitude of the task is

¹James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), Preface, p. x.

²Edward H. Carr, What is History? (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 12.

³Nicolas Berdyaev, The Russian Idea (London: Geoffrey Bles--The Century Press, 1947), p. 2.

made apparent in such statements as:

Russia is not to be understood by intellectual processes. You cannot take her measurements with a common yardstick, she has a form and stature of her own; you can only believe in Russia.⁴

Similarly, Berdyaev states that, "The Russians are a people in the highest degree polarized: they are a conglomeration of contradictions."⁵ But historians must disavow the possibility of certain phenomena forever remaining in the realm of the incomprehensible and must constantly strive to formulate rational explanations. With this perspective in mind, one may look at the history of Russian culture and recognize ". . .the forces rather than the forms behind it. . .forces which seem capable of weaving their own strange web of crises and creativity out of the efforts of men."⁶

What, then, have been the major forces manifest in the Russian historical experience and how have the perceptions of these forces evolved to establish the cultural patterns that characterized Russian society at the close of the Muscovite period? The forces that have been selected for analysis are:

1. The cult of nature.
2. The supra-personal force of Eastern Christianity.
3. The myth of the tsar.
4. The nobility.

⁴K. Kohn, The Mind of Modern Russia (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 93.

⁵Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 1. ⁶Billington, op. cit., Preface, p. ix.

5. The impact of Western Europe.

The influences of the first force, that of nature itself, are most clearly evident in the life of the Russian people before their conversion to Christianity. Religious foundations of the old Russian culture were based upon sun-worship which not only constituted the core of the old Slavic religion but also expressed the essence of their world view.⁷ The course of the sun through the seasons was believed to affect the fortunes of men; its yearly course ". . . was understood as a cosmic drama--the death and new birth of the Sun-god."⁸ Associated with sun-worship was the cult of certain plants and animals. For example, birch trees were venerated because they were considered to be the 'Tree of Life'. Of the animals, the horse, the deer, the cow, and the goat were closely connected with sun-worship. Two other deities occupying an important position in the Kievan pantheon were Perun, god of thunder and war and Mokosh, meaning moisture. Since Mokosh helped the earth to produce, the old Russian concept of Mati Syra Zemlia (damp mother earth) was associated with Mokosh. However, none of the animistic conceptions of godhood attained the clarity that was developed, for example, by the Greeks. According to Platonov, the Slavs had neither special temples nor priests. East Slavic paganism lacked elaborate organization or institutional development. "Here and there, in open spaces, they erected crude images to their deities, and to these idols they offered

⁷George Vernadsky, The Origin of Russia (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 108.

⁸Ibid., p. 111.

sacrifices. . . ."9

In 988 or 989, Vladimir, Grand Prince of the Kievan state, was baptized at Korsun. Returning to Kiev, Vladimir, with the assistance of a Greek clergy, set out to convert his subjects. Though the new religion, according to historical account, spread peaceably, the effectiveness of the baptism constitutes a controversial issue. A number of historians, including Platonov and Golubinsky, claim that Christianity ". . . retained only a superficial hold on the masses, which remained stubbornly heathen. . . . Some scholars speak of dvoeverie, meaning a double faith."¹⁰

Though consensus is lacking, historical evidence supports the proposition that the influence of the cult of nature in the Russian social structure did not abruptly end with the adoption of Christianity. What did occur was the ". . . continuing influx of primitive animism into an ever-expanding Christian culture."¹¹ Thus, the pagan festival celebrating the winter solstice merged with the Nativity after Russia's conversion to Christianity. Similarly:

The cattle-god Volos became Vlasy, the saint, whom icons show accompanied by an ox. Ilya, the severe saint who brings thunder, replaced the fire-god Perun. . . . The elaborate ritual of the Church often served merely as a new language for ancient fears and aspirations.¹²

The merging of conceptions regarding the forces of nature with

⁹S. F. Platonov, History of Russia, trans. E. Aronsberg (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 32.

¹⁰Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 58.

¹¹Billington, op. cit., p. 18.

¹²Marthe Blinoff, Life and Thought in Old Russia (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1961), p. 69.

Christianity illustrates the fact that all social forces are components of a social system and each of the variables making up the system influences and in turn is influenced by the interactions that continuously occur among the totality of its parts.

On the other hand, certain superstitions have survived, retaining their pagan characteristics without becoming part of the Christian culture. A. S. Rappoport, traveling in Russia in the first and second decades of the twentieth century, reports finding evidence of the survival of a number of such superstitions. For example, the moujik (peasant) in Great Russia and Little Russia still believe in witchcraft, in the snakhar (he who knows all), in the domovoi (house fairies), in the vedma (witch), and in the Ourodjiwy (imbeciles gifted with second sight).¹³

In true paganistic form or as integrated components of the Christian legend, the cult of nature has continued to affect the life patterns of the Russian people. For example:

. . .The mythological damp mother earth has beckoned in many forms from the first monastery in the caves of Kiev to the present-day shrine of the mummified Lenin and the gilded catacombs of the Moscow subway.¹⁴

Even Russian thinkers are frequently considered as poets rather than formal philosophers and ". . .behind the apparently accidental similarity of the Russian words for poet and element (stikhi, stikhiia) lie many

¹³A. S. Rappoport, Home Life in Russia (London: Methuen and Company Limited, 1913), pp. 58-67.

¹⁴Billington, op. cit., Preface, p. x.

intimate links between Russian culture and the natural world."¹⁵ For individuals like Dostoevsky, Grigoriev, and Strakhov, writing in the nineteenth century, ". . . Russian life was, more closely than in other countries, organically related to the forces of the earth."¹⁶ Because they ". . . stressed some sacramental element in Mother Earth. . ."¹⁷, they were frequently referred to as pochvenniki, from the word, pochva, soil.

Peasant, novelist, and philosopher were all profoundly influenced by the forces of nature. How does one account for the prevalence of this phenomenon in what Berdyaev has termed this colossal 'East-West World'? An interesting explanation is proposed by Blinoff. She points out that the Russian people for the major part of Russian history have predominantly been peasants and have therefore remained ". . . closer to primitive nature and more attuned to her mysteries. . ."¹⁸ than Western people. Throughout the centuries the Russian peasant migrated as necessity demanded, endured the severest oppressions, and fled Tartar conquerors. The earth, the tilling of the soil, and the recurring seasons were the only permanent things in life. "Whatever memories endured were linked with the earth. The native civilization that emerged was that of an earth-bound and earth-loving peasant tradition."¹⁹

Eastern Christianity, the second significant force behind Russia's

¹⁵ Ibid., Preface, p. ix.

¹⁶ Blinoff, op. cit., p. 69.

¹⁷ Ibid. ¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

culture was introduced to the Balkans during 'the second golden age' of Byzantine's history. The introduction to and acceptance of this new form of worship, as well as its integration into the Slavic society, can be examined within the hypothetical framework developed by Ralph Linton. In A Study of Man, Linton points out that the rapid growth of human culture is largely a result of societies borrowing elements from other cultures. "This transfer of culture elements from one society to another is known as diffusion,"²⁰--a process which is extremely important to cultural development. Linton asserts that, "There is probably no culture extant today which owes more than ten per cent of its total element to invention made by members of its own society."²¹

Though Linton feels that the dynamics of diffusion can be understood only by actually observing the process, he has formulated the following general principles:

1. Usually, elements of culture are borrowed first by societies that are adjacent to the point where the element originated. Later, remote societies incorporate these elements into their culture. Hence, contact and time are important variables in the process of diffusion.
2. Diffusion requires a donor and a receiver.
3. Diffusion is characterized by three distinct processes: presentation of new cultural elements, acceptance by the

²⁰Ralph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936), p. 324.

²¹Ibid., p. 324.

receiving culture, and integration of the elements into the society's culture.

The process of presentation presupposes contact between different cultures. Such contacts, established by the activities of individuals, vary from those in which societies are brought into close relationship to trade contacts or to those in which a single individual settles in a foreign country.

The original geographic area over which Byzantine influence was predominant included the Balkans. The close relationship that existed between a civilization that was then in its prime and a young and growing society facilitated the presentation of new cultural elements, in this case, Christianity, to the Balkans. An important moment in this process was the mission to the Slavs of Cyril and Methodius, two Greek brothers (monks). Followers of Cyril and Methodius extended liturgical and literary activities to the contiguous Kievan state in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

Another factor influencing diffusion is the inherent communicability of cultural elements. Certain elements are easily expressed, either verbally or in the form of ordinary physical acts. Complex patterns of social behavior, for example religion, can also be presented but,

. . . The associations which give them potentialities for function cannot be transmitted. A borrowing group may imitate their outward form, but it will usually be found that it has introduced new elements to replace those which could not be genuinely

communicated to it.²²

The difficulty in expressing associations and emotional responses which give meaning to complex elements (for example, religion) within a cultural configuration undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the esthetic and ritualistic aspects were the predominant characteristics of Russian Christianity. Russian Orthodoxy ". . . accepted unquestionably Orthodox definitions of truth and Byzantine forms of art; but complex philosophic traditions and literary conventions of Byzantine were never properly assimilated."²³ Consequently, no major philosophical nor theological ideas were developed throughout the Kievan or appanage periods of Russian history.

The reaction of the receiving group to the presentation of new elements represents the acceptance stage of diffusion. In most instances societies that incorporate these new elements do so without coercion. Statements from the Russian Primary Chronicle indicate that Christianity met with little active resistance. For example, ". . . when any man wished to be baptized, he was not hindered, but only mocked."²⁴ Thus, conversion ". . . came quickly and relatively painlessly. . . ."²⁵ though there were instances when paganism was a force to be reckoned with. In 983, for instance, a pagan mob at Kiev killed two Varangian

²²Ibid., p. 339.

²³Billington, op. cit., p. 6.

²⁴"The Russian Primary Chronicle Excerpts," cited by Thomas Riha, Readings in Russian Civilization, Thomas Riha (ed.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), I, p. 25.

²⁵Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 57.

Christians because the father refused to surrender his son for sacrifice to the gods.

Generally, new traits are accepted on the basis of their utility and compatibility to the existing culture configuration. Most historians agree that the Kievan state, rather than resembling a modern nation, was but a loose federation of a number of areas held together only by exceptionally capable grand princes. Hence, the widespread acceptance of a uniform religion ". . . was an event that united the scattered tribes of the Eastern Slavs into a single state. . . ." ²⁶ Following the collapse of the Kievan state this bond of unity continued to play a decisive role in Russian history. It insured the survival of the Russians as a major people and was an important factor in bringing about the political unification of the Muscovite state.

Also facilitating the acceptance of Christianity by the Russians was the fact that conversion did not conflict directly with important elements present in the existing primitive culture. Accommodation rather than conflict characterized the pattern of interaction that prevailed between pagan and Christian elements. Hence, many pagan beliefs were incorporated into Christian doctrines and numerous paganist practices were translated into Christian rituals. ²⁷

Another factor which facilitates a society's acceptance of a new

²⁶ Dimitri Obolensky, "Russia's Byzantine Heritage," Readings in Russian Civilization, Thomas Riha (ed.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), I, p. 202.

²⁷ See pp. 60-61 of this study.

culture trait is the prestige of the donor group. "The average society believes in its general superiority. . . ,but at the same time admits that some other society or societies are superior in particular respects."²⁸ Annual visits to Constantinople gave the Russians direct contact with the Greco-Roman civilization.

The impact of the imperial city, considered in its physical aspects alone, on the senses of the rude barbarians from the forests and swamps of the north, must have been tremendous. The solemn services in the magnificent cathedral of St. Sophia, the impressive singing and the overpowering incense, could not fail to sway the mind of the Rus.²⁹

Historical records as the Russian Primary Chronicle attest to the prestige of Eastern Christianity.

Then we went to Greece, and the Greeks led us to edifices where they worship their God, and we knew not whether we were in heaven or on earth. For on earth there is no such splendor or beauty and we are at a loss to describe it. We only know that God dwells there among men, and their service is fairer than the ceremonies of other nations.³⁰

However, there were factors that hindered the acceptance of Christianity. Effective preaching was difficult because the Christian doctrines were too abstract to be understood by the masses. Furthermore, there were few individuals who could explain the new faith to the pagan population. In the early days, the higher clergy and some of the lower clerics were Greeks whose knowledge of the Russian language was limited.

²⁸Linton, op. cit., p. 344.

²⁹Jesse D. Clarkson, A History of Russia (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 32.

³⁰Samuel H. Cross (trans.), "The Russian Primary Chronicle," Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), XII, p. 199.

Christianity was first accepted by the upper classes and then filtered down to the other segments of society. The acceptance of Eastern Orthodoxy by the influential members of the early Kievan society facilitated the final process of diffusion, that is, the integration of the new cultural elements into the pre-existing culture configuration. Contributing to the integration of Christianity into the Kievan culture was Vladimir's conversion. Though Kiev had known Christianity for over half a century prior to Vladimir, particularly by the rich and powerful, his conversion and efforts to baptize his subjects were significant to the institutionalization of the non-material traits collectively referred to as Christianity. The institutionalization of Orthodoxy began in 990 when Vladimir returned from Greece with a retinue of priests. Compulsory baptisms were performed, a Tithe Church was constructed at Kiev, and bishoprics were established in all the major centers.³¹

The institutionalization of Eastern Christianity in early Russia has played a central role in Russian history--". . .not as an isolated aspect of culture but as an all-permeating force within it."³² Though closely linked to Byzantium, a factor which contributed to the independence of the Russian Church in its relation with the state, Kievan Christianity did develop on its own. "This Russification. . .became gradually apparent. . .in its total influence on Russian society and

³¹Clarkson, op. cit., p. 34.

³²Billington, op. cit., Preface, p. x.

culture."³³

Conversion involved more than a change in the form of religious worship since Christianity also expressed itself in the formulation of new laws and institutions. The hierarchical structure of the Greek Church was established in Russia. Thus, the patriarch at Constantinople was the head of the Church. Under him was the metropolitan at Kiev who in turn exercised authority over the remaining clergy. Such a system or organization contributed to the unification of the clergy of the land.

The jurisdiction of the metropolitan and the bishops extended not only to those connected with the church but to the entire populace. Individuals were governed and judged, as was done by the Greek clergy, on the basis of a special code of laws, the Nomocanon. Other social responsibilities assumed by the Church included the establishment of schools, the care of the sick and disabled, an attempt to raise the general standards of morality, the canonization of local saints, and the development of church architecture and art. Yet despite the comprehensiveness of ecclesiastical authority, the Kievan period was characterized by ". . . remarkable cooperation, rather than conflict, between Church and State."³⁴ In fact, the Church impressed the princes with the idea that they were ordained by God to punish the evil and show mercy to the virtuous. The Christian conception of the prince as 'a servant of god' was contrary to the pagan belief that the prince was only the leader of his druzhina and could be banished or killed. In a loosely structured

³³Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 58. ³⁴Ibid., p. 59.

civilization, where the princely authority was weak and divided, the unity of Kievan Russia was that of a common faith.

The social, political, and educational activities of the Church have already been mentioned. In addition to these, a number of other significant features of Orthodox Christianity deserve attention since the influence of these features upon Russian society are apparent throughout the whole of the nation's history. First, because Kievan Russia inherited a highly developed religion--a religion that was believed to have already solved all of life's problems--the Russians felt that all that was to be accomplished was "...the transformation of the earthly dominion into the ecclesiastical dominion. . . ." ³⁵ To attain this end, all that was required was to participate in 'right praising'. Attracted by the aesthetic appeal of a ritualized liturgy rather than by rational theological arguments, the Orthodox religion was "...unable to build up the Russian mentality, but on the contrary. . .suffered from this primitiveness." ³⁶ Consequently, no cultural theology was developed; no major contribution was made to the Christian heritage. Traditional forms of art and worship were considered inviolable and innovations came to be interpreted as signs of the coming apocalypse. This eschatological psychosis became even more pronounced during the appanage (1240-1480) and Muscovite periods.

³⁵ Billington, op. cit., p. 11.

³⁶ Paul Miliukov, Outlines of Russia Culture Part I Religion and the Church (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943), p. 2.

The second distinguishing feature of Orthodoxy originates in the uncritical acceptance of the Orthodox definition of truth and the desire to see this truth in concrete form. This desire accounts for the sense of history that characterized Russian culture. Thus, the possession of miraculous powers was attributed to an unbroken success of ecclesiastical individuals--prophets, apostles, patriarchs. Also contributing to the development of an awareness of historical continuity and destiny was the legend that Christianity was introduced to Russia by the apostle Andrew just as Peter had introduced it to Rome. As early as 1049 Ilarion, Metropolitan of Kiev, in his Easter sermon referred to Kiev as the New Jerusalem and envisioned a coming age of glory for Russia. The belief in the supreme nature and the supreme historical mission of Orthodoxy and of Russia prevails throughout Russian history right down to and including the Communist period.

A third feature of Orthodoxy is that the development of the iconostasis provided a model for the hierarchical structure of Russian society. The term chin (rank) originally used for the order of the icon screen became, eventually, the term for prescribed rank in the Muscovite state. "By the seventeenth century, this concept became the basis of the entire social order."³⁷ Thus, the introduction of a new legal code, the Ulhozenie of 1649, was in essence an iconographic guide for the behavior of each social stratum.

The decline and collapse of the Kievan state was followed by the

³⁷Billington, op. cit., p. 35.

period of Mongol domination--a period which began about 1240 and continued until the termination of tribute in 1480. Though Kiev no longer was the political and economic center of Russia, important aspects of the Kievan legacy lived on to stand the Russians in good stead. The metropolitan in Kiev headed the Church of the entire land; the grand prince, also in Kiev, represented the secular power of the state. Both of these offices survived the Mongol devastation and suzerainty and, despite a shift in their locale, remained significant to Russian history. Cruelty, lawlessness, and anarchy characterized this period. The masses, however, patiently endured all these woes attributing them to the wrath of God at the sins of His people and particularly at the fratricidal warfare and petty quarrels of the princes. By turning men's attention from petty quarrels to higher ideals, the Church facilitated the reestablishment of unity within Russia.

Throughout the appanage period the Church was able to maintain its privileged position. Enjoying the benevolence of the Mongol khan and the protection of the Russian princes, it retained a high degree of unity and organization in a society that was characterized by destructive Mongol raids and internicine strife. As in Kievan times, cooperation rather than conflict characterized the relationship that prevailed between these two institutions. Muscovite princes made pilgrimages to monasteries, sought their material assistance and spiritual guidance before undertaking military action, and granted the Church large areas of newly acquired land. In return, the ecclesiastical hierarchy provided ideological support for the grand rulers of the

emerging Muscovite state.

Contributing to the rise of Muscovy was the transference of the seat of the metropolitan from Kiev to Moscow. Accomplished in 1326, through the efforts of Ivan Kalita, it not only added to the prestige of this principality but also made Moscow the spiritual center of Russia. Old myths were adopted and new ones devised to add to the prestige of Moscow--a practice which became common particularly during the reign of Ivan III.

The growing importance of the Church in the economic and political spheres of the appanage period was paralleled by other important developments. In 1448, Metropolitan Isidore was condemned by a council of Russian ecclesiastics. Following this, the council elected and consecrated its own metropolitan, disregarding the traditional practice of sending this official to Constantinople for confirmation. The severance of their allegiance to the Byzantine See marked the beginning of the autocephalous period in the history of the Russian Church.

Despite the autonomy gained by the Church and the rise to greatness of the Muscovite state, Russian civilization lacked a clear division of authority. In Byzantium, reference was made not to Church and state but rather to ". . .two types of sanctified authority."³⁸ In Russia the two institutions were even more closely intertwined. No permanent administrative departments in the civil sphere were established, even in crude form, until the sixteenth century. Similarly, there was a

³⁸ Billington, op. cit., p. 61.

lack of diocesan structure in the ecclesiastical sphere. This lack of structural differentiation inevitably led to conflict between the Church and the state concerning their respective areas of authority. Toward the end of the fifteenth century, the conflict expressed itself in controversies within the Russian Orthodox Church. The most notable clash of the century saw the 'possessors' pitted against the 'non-possessors', over the question of monastic property. The underlying issue, however, was the nature of authority in this patriarchal society. Advocating a close union between the autocrat and a rich powerful Church, the 'possessors' championed the rise of absolutism in Muscovy and the interests of those favoring such development. The 'non-possessors' insisted that the Church and state should be independent of each other. Reflecting the aristocratic opposition to centralization, they claimed that since the state was a secular entity, it had no jurisdiction in matters of religion. In 1503, the Church Council resolved the controversy by deciding in favor of the 'possessors'. Thus, a close union between Church and state was established.

The secular issues involved in the controversy, that is the position and authority of the ruler, often assumed a religious tone. As already indicated, legends and doctrines appeared to justify the position of the Muscovite rulers as they successfully 'gathered Russia'.

The Muscovite Tsars regarded themselves as the successors of the Byzantine Emperors. They traced the succession back to Augustus Caesar. . . .The line of descent went even further--it went back to Nebuchadnezzar. There is a legend about the sending of the imperial regalia to Vladimir Monomakh by the Greek Emperor

Monomakh.³⁹

Perhaps the doctrine that was most influential in establishing the belief that the tsar was God's viceregent on earth was the theory developed by Philotheus, Abbot of Pskov. In early Kievan times, as was mentioned previously, the Church sought to impress upon the princes that they were rulers by divine right. By the end of the fifteenth century, this former vaguely defined belief was clearly articulated. In the letters of Philotheus to Ivan III, he addressed him not only as Tsar but as ". . .holder of the reins of the divine holy throne of the universal apostolic Church."⁴⁰ This postulate was part of a theory the Abbot fully developed--the theory of Moscow, the Third Rome.

The church of ancient Rome fell because of Appollinarian heresy . . . ; as to the second Rome--the church of Constantinople--it has been hewn by the axes of Ishmaelites, but this third new Rome--the Holy Apostolic church, under thy mighty rule, shines throughout the entire world more brightly than the sun. All the Orthodox Christian realms have converged in thine own. Thou art the sole Autocrat of the universe, the only Tsar of the Christians⁴¹

Since the acceptance of a new non-material trait by a receiving culture or segment of a culture is, to an extent, a function of the clarity of the donor's presentation, the letters of Philotheus contributed to the diffusion and integration of the doctrine within the Russian society and to the dogmatic acceptance of its tenets by future tsars.

The idea of the Third Rome has historical continuity for it was

³⁹Berdyayev, op. cit., p. 9. ⁴⁰Billington, op. cit., p. 64.

⁴¹Miliukov, op. cit., pp. 15, 16.

believed to be expressed in the Tsardom of Muscovy, then in the Empire and finally in the Third International. In the Muscovite period, it contributed towards the maintenance of a close alliance between the Church and the tsars--an alliance consolidated by the Josephite victory. In effect, the victory was really a compact; the Church kept its enormous wealth; the tsar received ecclesiastical support for the premise that ". . . though an Emperor in body be like all other, yet in power he is like God."⁴² Under Ivan the Terrible the conception that the prince was the leader of a Christian civilization was translated from theoretical postulation into concrete reality.

It has been indicated that the question of the tsar's position often took on religious coloration. Also mentioned was that the attributing of divine characteristics to the tsars was a practice that dated back to the early Kievan epoch. The whole question concerning the evolving conceptions of the tsar shall be dealt with in greater detail in the section concerned with the third force manifest in the cultural history of Russia--the myth of the tsar.

The victory of the 'possessors' and the extension of their influence throughout the sixteenth century was largely due to the efforts of Joseph Sanin, Abbot of the Volokolamsk Monastery. Yet, without the popular reverence for the monastic ideal, it is doubtful whether the movement would have been successful. Material wealth and secular power

⁴²Ihor Sevcenko, "A Neglected Byzantine Source of Muscovite Political Ideology," Harvard Slavic Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), II, p. 142.

were sought by the leaders of Russian society but, in theory, they dedicated the wealth to God and sought ecclesiastical sanctity for the exercise of power. Though it has been argued that religion affected the lives of the medieval Russians superficially, the ethical and social importance of Russian Christianity should not be overlooked. The degree to which everyday life was influenced by the Christian ethic is largely a matter of speculation. Ordinary believers, were undoubtedly impressed by imperial claims and by its messianic philosophy but because of their low-level of education, they were unable to develop a genuine interest in theological polemics. However, "Christian standards of behavior remained at least the ideal of the Russian people."⁴³ Humility and self-abnegation, ". . .the attempt to be very like the Lord in the outpouring of love and the acceptance of suffering in the kenotic manner of Russia's first national saints. . ."⁴⁴, characterized the attitudes of the masses. One of the consequences of the acceptance of these monastic ideals was the elimination of secular culture in the sixteenth century--exemplifying the ubiquitous influence of the Church. In the closing decades of this century, the Church strengthened its organization and consolidated its position as a key institution in Muscovite Russia by terminating its subordination to the patriarch at Constantinople.

Accomplished primarily as a result of Boris Godunov's diplomacy, the Russian ecclesiastics obtained the right to appoint their own patriarch. Hermogen, Philaret, and Nikon, patriarchs in the seventeenth

⁴³Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 133. ⁴⁴Billington, op. cit., p. 65.

century, played significant roles in Russian history. Hermogen, in the Times of Troubles (1598-1613), rallied the Russian masses to effectively support the liberation movement. The importance of Philaret in Russian history is of equal significance. In 1619, he returned from Polish captivity and in the same year was made patriarch. Because there was no clear central authority in Moscow at this time, despite the coronation of Michael in 1613, the strong-willed Philaret was able to dominate the Russian political scene until the 1630's. The extent of his authority during this period is evidenced by the fact that in addition to his ecclesiastical status, he was granted the title of Great Sovereign. The title was not merely a symbol; all decrees were issued in the names of both. The simultaneous incumbency of two great sovereigns indicates that the Russian political system lacked structural differentiation. In part, the absence of a clearly defined centralized authority was a consequence of the alliance between the Church and state. This alliance, which dates back to Kievan times, was reaffirmed by the victory of the Josephites in the sixteenth century. Though the victorious Josephites apparently resolved the controversial issue of Church-state authority by supporting the union of Church and state, both institutions were to find that the union was too close and inconvenient.

During the Times of Troubles, tsarist authority was seriously weakened while that of the patriarch increased dramatically. The continued weakness of the Romanov dynasty encouraged temptations for establishing episcopal rule. Thus, the Church sought to strengthen the ecclesiastical hierarchy, increase its control over the monasteries, and

increase the discipline and educational level of the clergy by printing catechistic and devotional manuals. In fact, though they continued to speak in terms of a symphony of powers, the episcopates attempted to affirm the superiority of the spiritual estate over the temporal one. To a large extent, the clerics' ambitions were realized by the middle of the seventeenth century. The degree of their success is evident in a letter Alexis wrote to Metropolitan Nikon in 1651--a letter addressed to 'the great sun' from 'your earthly tsar'.⁴⁵ In his bid to heighten the authority of the patriarch and that of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, Nikon sought to bring about uniformity to Russian religious worship. The only way this could be accomplished was to compare Russia's theological texts to the original Greek manuscripts. In comparing the Greek and Russian texts, graduates of the Kievan ecclesiastical school found in the Russian books, besides errors in translations and transcriptions, interpolations that differed from the Greek texts. Consequently, the erroneous translations and transcriptions were corrected and the Russian interpolations deleted from holy texts.⁴⁶ Though the masses, taught to believe in the infallibility of their faith and Russia's messianic mission,⁴⁷ opposed these changes, the Council of 1666 condemned Nikon's opponents--setting the stage for the only major schism in the history of Russian orthodoxy. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that the Schism arose simply over questions of details or ritual. There is no doubt

⁴⁵Billington, op. cit., p. 131 (DNR 1875 No. 10, p. 105).

⁴⁶Miliukov, op. cit., p. 33. ⁴⁷Ibid., p. 36.

that no small part in the Schism was played by the weakness in the spiritual life of the people, the low level of education, Russian obscurantism, and the aggrandizement of the episcopal hierarchy.⁴⁸

The Schism of the seventeenth century was of great significance to the whole of Russian history. Dogmatic adherence to tradition and the idolization of the past--factors that contributed to precipitating the split within the Church--have continued to influence the behaviour and thought of the Russian people up to modern times. Perhaps the most clearly articulated philosophy stemming directly from the reverence of the past was expressed by the Slavophiles of the nineteenth century.⁴⁹ The Schism also undermined the strength of the Russian Church. In 1666-67, the Church Council, though it approved most of Nikon's reforms, definitively rejected his attempt to establish a powerful theocratic state. Instead, the council reaffirmed the Kievan concept of equipoise between the spiritual and temporal powers. Besides losing its bid for authority over temporal matters, the Church's position in the spiritual sphere was also weakened. The official Church defeated the fundamentalists--a task accomplished largely through the backing of the tsar.⁵⁰ Yet this did not mean victory for the theocrats. The Council of 1666-67 devoted most of its time to the deposition of Nikon with the result that

⁴⁸ Berdyaev, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

⁴⁹ Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin, "The Wealth and Strength of Russia," from "Letter on Russian History" (1847) in Nikolai Platonovich Barsukov, *Zhizn i trudy M.P. Pogodina* (22 vols., St. Petersburg, 1888-1910), V, pp. 165-67. Cited by Hans Kohn (ed.), The Mind of Modern Russia (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), pp. 60-68.

⁵⁰ B. H. Sumner, Survey of Russian History (second revised edition; London: Duckworth, 1947), p. 193.

the Church was clearly subordinated to the state. Positions in ecclesiastical administration, enlarged by the addition of twenty new dioceses, were granted to priests who were state appointed.

Yet despite the subordination of the new Church hierarchy to the state, the patriarch retained a considerable degree of authority. Until 1700, Russia had a two-fold monarchy--the tsar and the patriarch.⁵¹ Inevitably, this led to conflict. As Richardson Wright states ". . .the prestige and power of the patriarch of Moscow had constantly caused friction with the throne."⁵² This problem persisted until its final resolution by Peter the Great.

To this point, two forces manifest in the history of Russia's cultural evolution have been dealt with--the cult of nature and Eastern Christianity. In the preceding pages it has been indicated that some of the conceptions about the forces of nature have survived as distinct animistic beliefs up to the present century while others have blended with or have become part of the Russian Orthodox belief. Mention has also been made of the fact that Orthodox Christianity had fostered the development of certain beliefs concerning the position and power of the tsar. In other words, Eastern Christianity, a social force, facilitated the evolvment of another social force, the myth of the tsar, and furthermore, provided ideological justification for its acceptance by and its

⁵¹Richardson Wright, The Russians, An Interpretation (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1917), p. 92.

⁵²Ibid., p. 92.

integration into the dynamic Russian social structure. In turn, the functions and structure of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy were influenced by the tsar. This phenomenon again illustrates the interrelatedness of the components that make up social systems.

Though the myth of the tsar cannot be dissociated from Eastern Christianity, the conceptions of the tsar and the unique nature of some of these evolutionary conceptions have been so significant to the complex of Russian history, that a more detailed analysis of this social force is justified.

Psychologists and anthropologists have shown that most myths are founded on the universal need to explain and justify reality. Since myths are expressions of human needs and since they occur in time and space, they are part of the province of the historian.

Hence the Russian myths about the ruler are not manifestations of inherent and eternal Russian characteristics. . . . Instead, they indicate popular reaction to the particular conditions of Russian life, the unique circumstances of Russian history.⁵³

Up to the eighteenth century over one hundred of the eight hundred Russian saints had been princes or princesses.⁵⁴ Some, for example Saint Vladimir, were regarded as saints for ecclesiastical reasons; others, for example Boris and Gleb, were canonized on the grounds that they were 'passion-sufferers'. "The brothers did not die for Christ but in Christ, imitating Christ and His passion;. . . ." ⁵⁵ While the

⁵³Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 1.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 6. ⁵⁵Ibid., p. 7.

canonization of the youthful Boris and Gleb may have been the consequence of the attempt to satisfy the need for saints to act as "intercessors for the new Christian people,"⁵⁶ princes who voluntarily accepted death were sanctified because ". . . they died for what they were as Christ died for what He was. . ."⁵⁷ and in so doing expiated their own sins and became intercessors before Christ. Thus, they retained their status as protectors of the Russian land and people after death.

The last of the passion-suffering saintly princes was Tsarevich Dmitrii, son of Ivan the Terrible, whose death in 1591 marked the end of the Muscovite dynasty. Though an investigating commission, headed by Basil Shuisky, declared that Dmitrii injured himself fatally while in an epileptic fit, the populace accused the prince's guardians of murder and killed them.⁵⁸ Thus, the myth of the saintly princes was maintained for, "what more fitting end to the dynasty of saintly princes could be found than the sacrificial death of its last and most innocent member?"⁵⁹

Contributing to the myth of the holy princes was the behavior of active rulers who were sanctified because of their willingness to die for the Russian land. The most famous of the defenders of the Russian land, the secular prince par excellence, was Grand Prince Alexander Nevskii. In the vitae of this prince, compiled by Serebriansky, Alexander is depicted as the foreordained minister Dei, successful in his military campaigns because of the qualities that were given to him by God.

⁵⁶Ibid. ⁵⁷Ibid., p. 10. ⁵⁸Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 171.

⁵⁹Cherniavsky, op. cit., p. 17.

Besides accounting for his victories, his vitae also portrays Alexander's deeds of martyrdom, exemplified in his voyages to Khan Batu to intercede for the Russian towns and people who had displeased the sovereign.

A subtle difference between the passion-sufferers and the active warrior princes can be established. Alexander represented a different aspect of Christ's image than did the passion-sufferers. The latter ". . . were princely saints who suffered because they were princes, . . . active warrior princes were saintly princes, . . . who ruled gloriously because they were saints."⁶⁰ Yet, no sharp difference can be drawn, for the two types of saintliness were, in part, unified by elements derived from the Christian faith. Death for the Russian land and death for Christ were equivalent for passion-sufferers and for princely saints.

In the death for the fatherland which. . . was equated with death for the faith, the prince stands as mediator between men and Christ; he dies for Christ as they die for Him. And the prince, mediator between man and God in life as a prince, remains a mediator and intercessor, after his death as a saint.⁶¹

The Russian desire to equate the two types of saintliness created tensions concerning the dual nature of the princes that differed from those created in Western Medieval Europe. In the West, tension existed between the prince's divine nature and human one. In Russia, the tension was between the divine nature that was attributed to the prince's power and the saintly nature that was attributed to the prince as a man. By the twelfth century, the West had resolved the tension by distinguishing between the king as man and the king as an incumbent of divine office.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 27.

In Russia, the tension was not resolved and the two natures of the prince, the princely and human, were both deified.

An amazing feature in Russian history is the comprehensiveness of the myth of saintly princes and princely saints. Of the fourteen princes of Kiev, from Saint Vladimir to Saint Bogoliubsky, ten are listed as saints.⁶² In the case of the Moscow dynasty, of the twelve Riurik princes, seven were recognized as saints: Daniel, Iurii, Ivan I, Dmitrii Donskoi, Basil III, Ivan IV, and Theodore. It is also possible that the lists are not complete; that in the Russian popular tradition all princes were considered saints, either through their actions or simply as a consequence of their princely status. Without attempting to compile a complete list and statistical analysis of the saint-princes, it is possible to conjecture reasons for the widespread prevalence of these myths. In the vitae of Russian princes, Cherniavsky found a constant identification of Russia with Christianity--a consequence of the fact that the theory of the state was introduced into Russia as part of the Christian ethos. Since the state and the Christian faith were synonymous, the prince, in working for the state, became a worker for Christ and thereby had a legitimate claim to the ranks of the saints.⁶³ Thus:

In Russia the person of the prince received such enormous emphasis because it, and the faith, were the main if not the only concrete expression of the Russian State and its continuity both during the Kievan and Tartar periods.⁶⁴

The duality of the nature and function of the prince was revealed as the

⁶²Ibid., p. 32.

⁶³Ibid., p. 33.

⁶⁴Ibid.

prince sought to attain the humility of the monks. The attainment of this humility, in turn, explained the glory of his reign. In fact, the majority of the Muscovite tsars took monastic vows before their death.⁶⁵ Of those who did not take the vows, Iurii was murdered; Dmitrii died as a layman; concerning Basil I and Ivan III, the Chronicles have no information. With reference to Basil II, the Chronicles state that he was not permitted to take the monastic vow. "At this time his wounds became infected and he fell gravely ill and desired to take the monastic vows, but he was not allowed to [do so]" ⁶⁶

Since the granting of monkhood lay within the hands of the metropolitan and the bishops, the injunction was in effect an attempt by the Church to change the princely myth. The attempt to change the image of the prince corresponded with the development of political thought in Medieval Russia which, in turn, was affected by the historic events that occurred in the reign of Basil III. These events were the civil war in Muscovy which resulted in the victory of the senior line of the Muscovy dynasty; the unification of Northeast Russia; the attempt at the Council of Florence to unite the Latin and Greek churches; the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The internal events saw the emergence of a strong centralized nation while the external events influenced the dominant aspects of the political theory for this new state. Russian rejection of any union with the Latin church left the Russians with the attitude that they were the only true Christians. It was the prince,

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 34.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 35.

however, who was credited with saving and confirming Russia ". . . through his own piety and efforts."⁶⁷ With the fall of Constantinople, interpreted as the result of Byzantine's religious back-sliding, a spiritual void was created. Moscow was proclaimed the center of the Orthodox world. New status and new prestige accorded to Moscow and its ruler were dramatically expressed in the letter of Philotheus to Basil III.⁶⁸ In the words of Cherniavsky, the letter claims that:

Because ever since the Council of Florence, orthodoxy and thereby salvation are identical with Russia, the concept of Russia . . . acquires a luster and prominence expressed by the imperial image of Moscow, the Third Rome; because Russia's new status was established by its ruler. . . his image acquires greater glory. . . expressed by the title of tsar.⁶⁹

Though the Russian rulers had been princely saints or saintly princes for a long time, the new powers of the ruler were that of a tsar ruling over a kingdom. New myths justifying this power were formulated--myths which claimed that the tsar attained imperial rank from the emperors of Constantinople, for example 'the gifts of Monomakhos'. Legends were also advanced which traced the genealogy of Russian rulers to Roman emperors. Thus, with the emergence of a centralized state and the termination of Mongol suzerainty, new conceptions of the ruler and

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 37.

⁶⁸There is a lack of consensus among the historians regarding to whom the famous letter was sent. Miliukov states that Philotheus sent it to Ivan II while Cherniavsky claims that it was first propounded to Basil III. In Billington's opinion the 'famous image' was first addressed to Ivan III though the earliest surviving statement is in a letter to Basil III in 1511. N. Maslennikov, on the other hand, advances the argument that the correspondence was in fact with Ivan IV.

⁶⁹Cherniavsky, op. cit., p. 39.

state were devised to account for the changing reality. Byzantine sources were modified and new myths formulated--myths which now emphasized the prince as a power rather than the prince as a person.

The myth of the saint prince and the new image of the tsar influenced each other in the developing myth of the ruler. In the period that corresponded roughly to the reign of Ivan IV, the traditional myth of the prince was absorbed into the new myth of the tsar whose models were the imperial rulers of Rome and Constantinople.

This absorption destroyed the tension between the twin but unequal natures of the Agapitan ruler. . . .The twin natures of the ruler were neither sundered nor abolished, but merged, for the human nature of the princes was as exalted as his divine office.⁷⁰

The clearest image of the seventeenth century tsar is presented by Alexis (1645-1676), the tishaishii, the most gentle tsar. The epithet characterizes Alexis as being pious and Christ-loving--qualities he had to possess as a man to be a true tsar. However, though the tsar possessed the qualities of a saint, he was no longer portrayed as the complete image of Christ. Two reasons are offered as explanations to account for the translation of the saint prince into the pious tsar. First, the ruler was now identified with the state, an abstraction echoing Byzantine imperial ideology, resulting in the replacement of the epiphanic Christ as the model of the prince by the abstract image of God. The second reason was a consequence of the creation of a new institution in Russia--the patriarchate. In the course of the controversy between Patriarch Nikon and Alexis, the former departed from his

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 52.

original position of the equality of the two powers to claim that the tsar's office was in essence lower than that of the patriarch. As already indicated, the Church Council settled the argument and affirmed the tsar's supremacy in both spiritual and temporal matters. Thus, is illustrated the power of the ruler myth.

By the second half of the seventeenth century the myth of the saint-prince was translated into ". . .an exaltation of the person of the tsar, to the level of. . .his divine nature as ruler."⁷¹ In a sense, the tsar as a man was absorbed by the divine nature of the tsar as a ruler. However, a reverse process also took place, for if the tsar as a man was pious and most gentle, then in his actions he showed the personal qualities of the ruler.⁷² The myth of the pious ruler was nurtured by the belief that the salvation of Russia as a state and the salvation of the world depended upon the Orthodoxy and personal piety of the tsar. It was this foundation for the myth of the ruler that Peter the Great undercut.

Myths concerning the tsar were not the only forces that influenced the status of the tsar's position or the degree of authority he exercised. Also significant was the influence of the nobility. The degree of their importance to Russian history will be illustrated in the following outline of Russian constitutionalism.

Byzantine chronicles, which provide the earliest information on the social and political life of the Slavs, assert that the early

⁷¹Ibid., p. 70.

⁷²Ibid.

In the south-western regions, particularly in Galicia and Volynia, the higher nobility was the strongest political group. Aristocratic domination in this region has been attributed, in part, to the diffusion of elements of western feudalism coming through Poland and Hungary.⁷⁶

Whereas the evolution of Novgorod was characterized by the eminence of the veche and the evolution of Galicia and Volynia by that of the boyars, the development of the Muscovite state witnessed the triumph of the monarchical element of power. Though some of the north-eastern towns have been an integral part of the Kievan state, they were situated in an area that had no definite boundaries. This encouraged expansion to the north and to the east. Since frontier regions are not characterized by established institutions or vested interests, the princes' authority was not seriously challenged. Consequently, they became increasingly important ". . .while other elements of the Kievan political system declined and even atrophied."⁷⁷ Though the emergence of the Muscovite state and the concomitant aggrandizement of the princes resulted in the destruction of the veche's power by the end of the fifteenth century, the aristocratic element that underlay the organization of the Kievan political system survived to play for centuries an important role in Russian history. Originally, this group was comprised of the retainers of the prince, the druzhina, and the local nobility. Over a period of time the two fused into a single group under the name

⁷⁶George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (first edition; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 32.

⁷⁷Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 123.

of boyars.

Though the prince occupied the key position in the administration of the Kievan state, he had to coordinate his efforts with local elements such as the veche and the boyars. From consultations and joint work of the prince and his druzhina, developed the council of boyars or the boyar дума. Though some historians reject the claim that the boyar дума was a definite legal limitation of princely power, they do not deny its importance as an adviser and collaborator to the prince. Historical evidence, however, supports the premise that this institution exercised its authority to a degree beyond that of an advisory body. Riasanovsky states that there are few known cases where the druzhina refused to support the prince because they had not been consulted.⁷⁸ Further evidence is reflected in the earliest extant code of laws--the Russian Justice. For example, Article I of "The Expanded Version" states:

If a man kills a man [the following relatives of the murdered man may avenge him]: the brother is to avenge his brother, or the father, [his son], or the son of the sister, [their respective uncle]. If there is no avenger the wergeld is set to the amount of 80 grivna in the case [the murdered man] was a prince's councilor or a prince's steward; if he is a [Kievan] Russian--a palace guard, a merchant, or a boyar's steward, or a sheriff--or if he was an izqoi, or a [Novgorodian] Slav, [the wergeld] is 40 grivna.⁷⁹

The main objective of the "Expanded Version" was to enforce the authority of the princes by demanding the payment of a double bloodwite for the murder of their officials. But since the enforcement of the princes'

⁷⁸Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 55.

⁷⁹Austin P. Evans (ed.), Medieval Russian Laws, trans. George Vernadsky (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 35.

authority depended upon the activities of officials exclusively drawn from the aristocratic class, the written law abetted the consolidation of the boyars' position in the political structure.

Statements regarding the pervasive extent of the boyars' authority are found in the texts of Soviet writers. K. V. Bazilevich, S. V. Bakhrushin, A. M. Pankratova, and A. V. Fokht claim that the veche in Novgorod did not reflect the interests of the masses, but were ". . . entirely controlled by the boyar feudal lords, . . . By means of bribes. . . the boyars created a faction of rowdies with whose help they dominated the veche."⁸⁰ Less distinguished members of the veche were at times bribed ". . . to drown the speakers in a din of noise"⁸¹ when the opposition threatened the outcome of a desired decision. That the boyars were the only principals guilty of this practice is as improbable as the generalization that the Novgorodian veche was but an institution that was manipulated in the interests of the aristocracy. Distortion of historical facts on the part of some Soviet writers is a consequence of their attempt to explain all historical phenomena in terms of Marx's grandiose theory. Yet the premise that the boyars did exercise considerable authority throughout the Russian historical experience cannot be dismissed as a Marxian conceptual construct. Up to the middle of the sixteenth century, the boyars were the only ones delegated with executive,

⁸⁰ A. M. Pankratova (ed.), A History of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), pp. 86-87.

⁸¹ Harry Dorosh, Russian Constitutionalism (New York: Exposition Press, 1944), p. 7.

military, and judicial authority. Muscovite rulers appointed the chiefs of their civil and military administration, beginning with those presiding over various bureaus or departments and ending with governors of provinces and cities, from the ranks of the higher nobility. In making these appointments, the ruler scrupulously observed the rules of precedence known as mestnichestvo. In accordance with these rules, titled nobility occupied the highest rank in the hierarchy of the councillors, the rank of the boyar дума. The next stratum was occupied by okolnichi, or those who attended the person of the grand prince and later on the tsar, and the members of the lowest stratum were either unconnected with the council or were simply summoned to be present at some of its meetings. This last group was known as noblemen belonging to the дума (dumai dvoriani). The mestnichestvo was, in effect, an unwritten constitution which assured the members of the higher nobility the right to a position in the state's political or military structure.

Since appointments to positions in the state's machinery, known as kormleniia (feedings) were considered personal awards, the governors turned to their own profits all the revenue that exceeded the sums demanded by the state. Excessive corruption and graft were practiced. Consequently, the lower classes came to look upon the boyars as the chief cause of their misery and ". . .bitterly complained of the misuse they made of their almost uncontrolled power, of the want of justice and charity in their dealings with those they governed or judged."⁸²

⁸²Maxime Kovalevsky, Russian Political Institutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1902), p. 36.

These negative attitudes towards the boyars in conjunction with the myth of the pious tsar contributed to the "tsar-centeredness"⁸³ of the Russian popular uprisings. The clear distinction the rebels made between the tsar and his administrators is evident in the sporadic insurrections and in the more powerful peasant movements. For example, in the coin riot (1662) the crowd that forced Alexis to negotiate with them demanded the abolition of copper coinage and insisted that the tsar deliver the most odious boyars to them. Similarly, Stenka Razin, leader of the 1667 revolt, claimed that his objective was to ". . .beat the boyars and rich. . ." ⁸⁴ because they were traitors to the tsar. The conflicts, then, manifest throughout the Muscovite period, were frequently the consequence of political contradictions that were based on the fact that the ruler had to act through an aristocratic administration. This arrangement inevitably led to conflict between the centralized authority and the boyars.

Contradictions in the Russian political system were particularly evident in the appanage and early Muscovite period. For instance, though the boyars and freemen made contracts with the political head of the country in which they intended to settle, they were at liberty to leave him and change their allegiance to another prince. This right of transferring allegiance is recognized by the following statement in a treaty signed by the Prince of Tver with the Grand Duke of Lithuania in

⁸³Cherniavsky, op. cit., p. 70.

⁸⁴Pankratova, op. cit., p. 228.

1449; "Our boyars and men of service may freely withdraw from one of us to the other."⁸⁵ On their votchina or patrimony (landholdings that prevailed in the appanage period) the landlords levied taxes, administered justice and acted in general as virtual rulers. However, with the unification of Russia, the rulers of the Muscovite state took the position that the land of their subjects could not pass out of their jurisdiction. Severe steps were taken by Basil III to prevent the boyars from abandoning Muscovite service and entering into similar relations with other powers. He declared that such acts be judged as treason. The land of departing lords was confiscated and, when caught, seceders were imprisoned or executed.

Corresponding with the abrogation of the boyars' right to transfer allegiance from one power to another was the gradual change in the system of holding land--from votchina (patrimonial estates) to pomestie (land granted under provision of service). The earliest extant reference to the pomestie is found in Ivan Kalita's testament. However, it developed on a large scale only in the fifteenth and subsequent centuries as the rising Muscovite state, in order to expand and defend its territory, granted the local princes and boyars control of their estates on conditions of military service as well as the performance of other duties. From the decades of the fourteenth century to about the middle of the sixteenth century, the number of estates granted for service increased gradually.

⁸⁵ Kovalevsky, Modern Customs and Ancient Laws, p. 157.

The second half of the latter century, however, witnessed dramatic changes. Under the pretense of a boyar conspiracy, Tsar Ivan IV proceeded to execute members of the higher nobility. Those who escaped execution were deported to frontier zones. The confiscated patrimonial estates were distributed to oprichniks (court adherents). In one decade, Ivan IV almost completely destroyed ". . .the former social and governmental organization of Russia, the patrimonial system. . .and created a new order of dvoriane or courtiers."⁸⁶ Another consequence of Ivan's reign of terror was that the boyar *duma* lost, to a certain extent, its aristocratic character. Social origin was no longer the sole criterion of selection for membership in the boyar ranks since many new families attained this position by having their daughters marry the tsar or his relatives. (Examples are the Godunovs and the Romanovs.)⁸⁷

The new boyar families (for example, the Godunovs, the Romanovs) and survivors of the old nobility (for example, the Shuiskys, the Miloslavskys, etc.,) continued to play an influential role in the history of Russia. Conflict between this class and the autocrat, Boris Godunov, during the Dynastic Phase of the Time of Troubles, culminated in the tsar's instituting a veritable purge of them in 1601. Yet by 1606, the boyar party triumphed; a member of their class, Prince Basil Shuisky, was crowned tsar. Though Shuisky considered himself an autocrat, his power was limited, to a degree, by the boyars who helped to

⁸⁶Vernadsky, A History of Russia, p. 59.

⁸⁷Kovalevsky, Russian Political Institutions, pp. 47-48.

elect him.⁸⁸ Upon his ascension to the throne:

The new ruler made certain revealing promises: he would not execute anyone without the decision of the boyar дума; innocent members of a family would not suffer because of a guilty relative;. . .and false informers would be punished.⁸⁹

Historians such as H. Dorosh and M. Kovalevsky interpret Shuisky's declaration as an effective limitation of autocracy. According to the author of The Historical and Geographical Description of the Northern and Eastern Parts of Europe and Asia, Strohlenberg, the boyars imposed the following constitutional limitations:

No new contributions were to be made and no innovations were to be introduced in the old legislation without the consent of the Douma. No new contributions were to be levied unless previously discussed and accepted by the same council.⁹⁰

These constitutional limitations were very similar to those established in England by the Magna Carta.

Dissident opinions regarding this issue have also been expressed. Riasanovsky, for instance, is of the opinion that such claims over-state the case. However, he does acknowledge that:

. . .The tsar's assurances did reflect his ties to the boyars as well as efforts of the latter to obtain minimal guarantees against the kind of persecution practiced by such rulers as Ivan IV and Boris Godunov.⁹¹

Furthermore, he claims that ". . .the boyars acquired a certain degree of freedom under the new monarch and often behaved willfully and

⁸⁸Dorosh, op. cit., p. 22. ⁸⁹Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 181.

⁹⁰Strohlenberg, "Historisch-Geographische Beschreibung der Nordl. und Oestl. Theile von Europa und Asien," 1703, p. 202, cited by Kovalevsky, Modern Customs and Ancient Laws, op. cit., p. 175.

⁹¹Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 181.

disobediently in their relations with him."⁹² Though Riasanovsky does not go so far as to say that the tsar's power was effectively limited by the boyars, his statements support the thesis that the latter did exercise considerable authority during the latter half of the Time of Troubles. In fact, "the boyars attained their greatest power in the reign of Basil Shuisky and the period immediately following his deposition"⁹³ when the boyar дума assumed direct control over the affairs of the Muscovite state. Their power, however, lacked popular support and failed to last. According to Riasanovsky, their status following the election of Michael to the throne was reduced to that of servants of the tsar. Kovalevsky, on the other hand, does not believe that those who took part in the elections, particularly the boyars, abandoned all ideas about instituting constitutional limitations on the autocrats and cites both Russian and foreign authorities to support his contention. To begin with, he refers to Kotoschichin, the Russian refugee in Sweden, who allegedly stated that: "although he [Michael] declares himself an autocrat, he could do nothing without the council of boiars."⁹⁴ With reference to the nature of these limitations, Kotoschichin mentions that the tsar promised ". . .to think all matters together with the boiars and men of council."⁹⁵

In further support of his view that restrictions were imposed

⁹²Ibid. ⁹³Ibid., p. 191.

⁹⁴Kotoschichin, "Treatise on the State of Russia in the Reign of Alexis," cited by Kovalevsky, Russian Political Institutions, op. cit., p. 59.

⁹⁵Ibid.

upon Michael at the time of the election, Kovalevsky states:

A contemporary annalist, born at Pskov, relates with indignation how under Michael, the boiars had the country in their power . . . did not fear him. . . and. . . had obliged the Monarch. . . to swear that he would not condemn to death men in high position and belonging to boiar families. . . .⁹⁶

He also cites accounts by Tatischev, a Russian historian, Fokkerodt, the Swedish writer, and Straalenberg, a German authority, who agree that though the election of Tsar Michael was general, he had to sign a charter. Kovalevsky, however, glosses over the fact that the latter three historians primarily credit the zemskii sobor (an institution similar to a gathering of representatives of estates in other European countries) rather than the boyar дума for any limitations that were placed on the tsar's authority. On this issue, Riasanovsky merely states that the zemskii sobor ". . . in fact participated in the government of Russia throughout the first decade of the new reign."⁹⁷ He also adds that, "Michael worked very closely with the boyar дума."⁹⁸ Though Kovalevsky's supposition may not be corroborated, the fact that the boyars worked with Michael in administering the affairs of the state, indicates that they were not simply unequivocal servants of the tsar.

The importance of the boyars to Russian history is further exemplified by the important role they played in the zemskie sobory-- assemblies or representatives of various social groups convened by the tsar to discuss and decide important state issues. Though the assembly

⁹⁶ Kovalevsky, Russian Political Institutions, pp. 59-60.

⁹⁷ Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 193. ⁹⁸ Ibid.

of 1471 has been referred to as the forerunner of the zemskie sobory, the first full-fledged sobor did not occur until the middle of the sixteenth century. The distinguishing feature of the Russian assemblies was their division into three houses: the Church Council, the Council of Boyars, and members who represented groups of freemen from different sections of the country as the lower nobility, the third estate, and in 1614 and 1682, the peasants. Though a number of social classes were generally represented at the sobory, there is historical evidence supporting the contention that a number of their assemblies were dominated by the boyars. For instance, ". . .the assemblies which in 1584 confirmed the right of Theodor to occupy the throne. . .was. . .composed of nothing but the chief clergy and members of the higher and lower nobility."⁹⁹ In 1595 the assembly that was convened to consider the issue of clerical immunities was comprised only of members of the higher clergy and members of the boyar дума. Also, the assembly which in 1606 elected Shuisky as tsar was chiefly of boyars.

The extent of the assemblies' authority and their position in the Muscovite political structure has remained a controversial issue. Historians such as Kliuchevsky, Florinsky, and Dorosh claim that the sobory, acting in an advisory capacity, aided and supported the policies of the tsar and made no attempt to limit his power. Kliuchevsky states that the sobory were not national assemblies but consultations of the

⁹⁹Kovalevsky, Modern Customs and Ancient Laws, p. 172.

government with its agents.¹⁰⁰ Supporting this view is Florinsky's assertion that:

The members of the sobor were not spokesmen for local interests; they were government officers familiar with the situation in the provinces, and they were called together to supply information, to answer questions, and to carry out decisions. Although this gathering is sometimes described as democratic in character, such was not the case.¹⁰¹

Different views, however, have also been expressed. Tikhomirov, Soviet historians, and western scholars such as Keep ". . . point out that the zemskie sobory, after all, dealt with the most important matters and often dealt with them decisively: the succession to the throne, war and peace, and major financial measures."¹⁰² Also, Kovalevsky is of the opinion that the part it played in the general politics of the land was a large one. He adds that even if they had no jurisdiction in matters regarding the choice of the important administrators or bureaucrats, ". . . it had a much higher right, that of choosing the Csars."¹⁰³ The fact that the boyars expressed their opinion and exercised their influence through two institutions--the boyar dumas and the zemskie sobory--attests to the importance of their position in Muscovite Russia.

Yet there is no doubt that the power of the boyars waned throughout the latter half of the fifteenth and subsequent centuries. To cite

¹⁰⁰V. O. Kluchevsky, A History of Russia, trans. C. J. Hogarth (New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), I, pp. 309-19.

¹⁰¹Michael Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), I, p. 196.

¹⁰²Riasanovsky, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

¹⁰³Kovalevsky, Russian Political Institutions, p. 201.

one example, if contention for precedence had been a sign of the political power they wielded at the court of the tsar,¹⁰⁴ then the abolition of the mestnichestvo in 1681-82 was an indication of their decreasing status and changing relationship to the autocracy. In fact, with the growth of the pomestie system and the standardization of state service, the higher nobility coalesced into a fairly homogeneous class of service gentry. The extent to which the power of the boyars was curtailed by the end of the seventeenth century is evident in the fact that Peter the Great, early in the eighteenth century, met no opposition in abolishing the boyar дума.

But if the boyars' influence in the Russian social, political, and economic order steadily diminished, that of the new nobility, the service gentry, became increasingly prominent. As already indicated, the origins of this class and the pomestie system date back to Ivan Kalita's reign. However, this form of social and governmental organization became well developed only in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a consequence of a concomitant occurrence--the emergence and expansion of the Muscovite state. The transition from the votchina or patrimonial boyar system to the pomestie or service gentry system was, in general, a gradual process. However, the decade of oprichnina rule, during the reign of Ivan IV, dramatically accelerated the rate of this social and political evolution. Toward the end of the sixteenth century the new land-owning class, the service gentry, was firmly established. This

¹⁰⁴Pankratova, op. cit., p. 146.

". . .new ruling class,. . .remained the basic political force in the Russian state until the middle of the nineteenth century."¹⁰⁵

Rapid expansion and continuous wars on all fronts except the north and north-east contributed to the growth of the service gentry, which, in turn, meant that more and more state lands and peasants came into the possession of the landlords through the pomestie system. Hence, the privileged position the gentry occupied in the power structure of the Russian social system stemmed from the fact that the Muscovite state relied on service people to expand and to defend its growing territory. To insure their ability to serve the state, the Muscovite authorities attempted to guarantee the labor force of the gentry.

Originally, the majority of the Kievan peasants were free men. Dependence upon the landlords usually began with contracts. Inability to pay off obligations on the part of the peasants, resulted in the emergence of several types of bondage in the Kievan state. When the conditions of the contract were fulfilled, the peasant was free to leave his master. At first, this right of removal could be exercised at any time of the year but since it was detrimental to the agricultural interests of the landlord, fixed periods were established in the autumn and spring. By the end of the fifteenth century, the peasant could leave his master only around Saint George's Day, provided that all his obligations were settled.

The first Soudebnik, the legal code published by Ivan II in 1497, speaks of the festival of Saint George, which according to

¹⁰⁵ Vernadsky, A History of Russia (first edition), p. 60.

the Russian calendar falls on the 26th of November, as a period at which all removals ought to take place.¹⁰⁶

With the expansion of the Muscovite state and the consolidation of pomestie agriculture, human bondage increased rapidly. Conditions of servitude became more and more oppressive as gentry landlords, in order to meet state obligations, made increasing demands upon the peasants. Consequently, many tried to escape their servitude by migrating to newly conquered lands, for example, Kazan and Astrakhan. The government, however, acting in the interests of the landlords made determined efforts to eliminate peasant transfers and to stop migrations. Forbidden Years, proclaimed in 1601, 1602, et cetera, disallowed the peasants to move or be moved by other landlords who paid their obligations even around Saint George's Day. Following 1607, those who were caught harboring fugitive serfs were penalized. Also, the period of time during which the landlord could reclaim the peasant who had moved from his ancient dwelling was extended ". . . from five years at the end of the sixteenth century to an indefinite term as we find it in the Ulhozenie [the new law code] of 1649."¹⁰⁷ The Ulhozenie ". . . assumed the principle, 'once a serf always a serf' and gave full satisfaction to gentry."¹⁰⁸ Initially, serfs were considered as responsible subjects of the government, but as landlords came to exercise increasing authority on their estates, the serfs' status deteriorated to that of chattel slaves.

The internal contradiction in the Muscovite state, based on the

¹⁰⁶ Kovalevsky, Modern Customs and Ancient Laws, p. 214.

¹⁰⁷ Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 205. ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 206.

fact that the ruler had to act first through an aristocratic administration and later primarily through a gentry administration, contributed to the establishment of serfdom in Russia. Hence, human bondage, which constituted the basis of Russian society for centuries, was institutionalized to insure that the gentry fulfilled their military and administrative obligations. The establishment of serfdom, largely a consequence of the tsar's dependency on the landlords, reflected the extent of the latter's influence during the Muscovite period. Moreover, the gentry maintained their influential position up to the middle of the nineteenth century despite changes in the economic, political, social, and intellectual spheres of Russian life. The important position they occupied in the power structure of nineteenth century Russia is exemplified by their ability to influence the policies of strong-willed and determined autocrats such as Nicholas I. Thus:

Nicholas I personally disapproved of that institution [serfdom]: in the army and in the country at large he saw only too well the misery it produced, and he remained constantly apprehensive of the danger of insurrection; also the autocrat had no sympathy for aristocratic privilege when it clashed with the interests of the state. Yet as he explained in 1842 in the State Council: "There is no doubt that serfdom, as it exists at present in our land, is an evil, palpable and obvious to all. But to touch it now would be a still more disastrous evil... ." In fact throughout his reign the emperor feared, at the same time, two different revolutions. There was the danger that the gentry might bid to obtain a constitution if the government decided to deprive the landlords of their serfs.¹⁰⁹

Imbued with religious and class superstitions and concerned solely with preserving the status quo and protecting their own interests, the

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 363.

nobility opposed any reforms that proposed to change the social and moral condition of the nation. Consequently, this powerful class, because of their conservatism and egocentricity, resisted the reforms of Peter the Great even though ". . .his reforms, for all their importance, did not create a new form of state: they were to a large extent the very rapid and energetic extension of ideas and practices already to be found in the generation before him."¹¹⁰

Attention will now be focused on the fifth force manifest in the history of Russia's cultural evolution--the impact of Westernization. From early Slavic to contemporary times, the influx of foreign ideas have, to some degree, influenced the Russian way of life. The religion, the written language, and the political theories of the Kievan state experienced a fundamental Byzantine influence. "Borrowing, to be sure, forms the very core of cultural history."¹¹¹

However, though the economic and social development stemmed from the Kievan period, the decline and collapse of the unitary state was followed by regression in most fields of culture. Destructive Mongol raids, the exaction of tribute by the Tartars, and internicine warfare among the princes of the proliferating appanages led to the impoverishment of the Russian masses. Also, the Mongol conquest cut off Russia from Novgorod, where the German influence was felt, from Kiev and the South-west, where Western ideas were penetrating, and from Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine civilization. Consequently, it contributed

¹¹⁰ Sumner, op. cit., p. 102. ¹¹¹ Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 64.

to the emerging xenophobia of the Great Russians during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Isolation from the West was largely responsible for the fact that Russia experienced no Renaissance and no Reformation. In contrast to western countries, the Muscovite society was characterized by backwardness in virtually every field. Yet despite its parochialism, the government, during this period, displayed an increasing interest in the West.

International relations with European countries constituted one source of political and social contact. Relations established with distant nations such as England, concerned a large variety of matters. For example, ". . .an English merchant, Sir John Merrick, helped to negotiate the Treaty of Stolbovo between Sweden and Russia."¹¹² Foreign trade was another important channel for cultural and economic intercourse. In 1553 Chancellor, seeking a northern route to India, landed on the Bay of Cholmogory. Proceeding to Moscow he was successful in establishing direct relations between England and Russia. In the years that followed, English merchants, united in a company, established factories in Vologda and Archangel, exported Russian products such as mast wood, flax, and linen, and contrived to exclude Dutch and Spanish merchants. So successful were the English traders that in the middle of the seventeenth century Russian merchants petitioned the tsar to protect them from foreign competition.¹¹³ Also facilitating the introduction of

¹¹²Ibid., p. 230.

¹¹³Kovalevsky, Russian Political Institutions, p. 27.

Western ideas to Muscovy were the artisans, craftsmen and other foreign specialists who were either encouraged or invited to come to Russia.

The relations that had already developed in the late fifteenth century between Moscow and the West, especially Italy, were strengthened following Ivan's marriage to Sophia Paleologue. Sophia's train included ". . . highly trained Greeks and Italians whose services were enlisted to build fortresses, churches, stone buildings, to cast cannons, to coin money, and to undertake diplomatic missions."¹¹⁴

The number of foreigners coming to Moscow increased up to the end of the sixteenth century. During the Time of Troubles, their number was reduced. However, after this turbulent period, the influx resumed to the extent that the influence of foreign merchants, doctors, engineers, and army officers spread from the confines of the court to the home and the school. By the middle of the seventeenth century foreigners in Muscovite service numbered in the thousands. In 1652 Alexis assigned them a section of Moscow referred to as Nemetskaia Sloboda, or the German Suburb.

At first only a small number of Russians accepted Western ideas and customs. Later, influential individuals such as the Chief of the Diplomatic Office and his aide became advocates of cultural reform. Following the example of these distinguished persons, members of the upper stratum of Muscovite society adopted new customs and ideas. In reading, in the writing of secular stories, in the construction of

¹¹⁴Platonov, op. cit., pp. 107-109.

baroque buildings, in the painting of portraits, in the eating of salads, and the smoking of tobacco, the influence of the West was manifested in the later decades of seventeenth century Russia. Hence, the reforms of Peter the Great were but the logical culminations of the preceding tendencies. Yet, despite the cultural change that was in progress, Peter's reform ". . . was a revolution which came from above."¹¹⁵ In other words, Peter I was directly responsible for dramatically accelerating the process that was transforming Russian society. When Pushkin spoke of Peter opening a window to the West so that the Russian nation could learn to keep their household, he spoke conservatively. Peter did much more than open a window--he thrust open a door, a wide door.¹¹⁶

In the preceding pages, each social force and its influence on Russian thought and the Russian way of life was discussed, principally as a separate entity. Such an approach, though, obscures the inter-relationships that existed between the forces in question. As has already been shown, many aspects of the myth of nature became integrated into Eastern Christianity. The latter, in turn, cannot be divorced from considerations of the myth of the tsar. But political, social, and economic developments necessitated modifications in the status and conceptions of the tsar. These changes profoundly influenced the relationship between the sovereign and the nobility. Finally, the four forces mentioned exerted a tremendous impact on the process of Westernization. For example, the superstitions and the provincialism that grew out of or

¹¹⁵Berdyayev, op. cit., p. 14. ¹¹⁶Wright, op. cit., p. 81.

accompanied the myth of nature and Eastern Christianity, presented serious obstacles to the acceptance of Western ideas which the rulers, generally speaking, promoted. Also opposing change were the nobles. Steeped in ignorance and conservatism they hoped to maintain the status quo. In concluding, it may be said that, though the social forces manifest in Russian history can be considered separately for analytical purposes, they were in reality complexly interrelated.

CHAPTER V

INFLUENCES OF THE SOCIAL FORCES MANIFEST IN RUSSIA'S

HISTORY UPON EDUCATION--EARLY SLAVIC

TIMES TO ABOUT 1700

The social forces manifest in Russia's cultural history have played a prominent role in determining the culture configuration of the Kievan, appanage (1480 -ca 1533) and Muscovite societies. Values, beliefs, attitudes, and overt patterns of social interaction have been moulded by their influence. Directly and indirectly, education felt the impact of these forces. Their implications for education will be illustrated within the context of the history of Russian education from Kievan times to about 1700.

The earliest written references to the Slavs are found in the works of Pliny the Elder (23 A.D. - 79 A.D.) and Tacitus (ca55 A.D.- ?). Important later accounts were produced in the sixth century by Procopius and Jordanes. However, most historians now agree that the Slavs formed a significant part of the population of Southern and Central Russia from Scythian times (from 700 to 200 B.C.).¹ Historical evidence indicates that in the third century A.D., the East Slavs fought against the Goths. These Germanic invaders eventually established a state that extended from the Black Sea to the Baltic. The Gothic period, however, ended

¹Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 20.

about A.D. 370 as new invaders from Asia, the Huns, swept across Russia, forcing the East Slavs to migrate westward. Following the demise of the Hunnic state, the East Slavs were again conquered; this time by an Asiatic people known as the Avars. In the seventh century A.D. another Turkic speaking people, the Khazars, established a state on the south-east Russian steppe. At the dawn of Kievan history, a number of East Slavic tribes were paying tribute to them. By the twelfth century, according to the Kievan Primary Chronicle,

. . .The East Slavs were divided into twelve tribes located on the broad expanse of the Russian plain, from the Black Sea, the Danube, and the Carpathian mountains, across the Ukraine, and beyond, northward to the Novgorod territory, and eastward toward the Volga.²

These early Russians were pagans: they had religious beliefs but no organized religion.³ They worshipped the forces of nature, the Sky, the Sun, the Thunder, and the Moist-Mother Earth. Every household had its own patron spirit. Idols, however, were unknown. These were brought later by the Normans.

The Slavs loved music and singing. Their bayany (bards) composed and sang songs to the accompaniment of musical instruments. The common instruments were the gusli--a type of zither, and the sviriel--a type of flute.⁴

Hunting, fishing, beekeeping, and agriculture were the principal occupations of the early Slavs. They raised crops such as wheat, rye,

² Ibid.

³D. S. Mirsky, Russia (third edition; London: The Cresset Press, 1952), p. 26.

⁴Olga Svir, Let Us Understand Russia (New York: All-Slavic Publishing House Inc., 1965), p. 26.

barley, flax, and hemp. They also mastered many trades including carpentry, metal-working, and spinning and weaving. Artifacts discovered in the Dniester basin confirm the existence of handicraft industries in the early centuries of the present era.

Though the Russian Primary Chronicle started the recorded Russian history with the year 862, research proves that Russian history began much earlier. Reports of an anonymous ninth century geographer (866-90) mention several Slav tribes and their towns--". . .the Buzhane had 230 towns; the Ulichy 318; the Volynyane, 70, etc."⁵ Before the end of the ninth century, the Russians had already built cities such as Kiev, Novgorod, Pskov, Chernigov, Polotsk, and others. Theories describing the Slavs as a barbarous people whose culture originated only after the appearance of the Normans are not substantiated by toponymic studies (the study of place names of a region) of the early Slavic towns. The overwhelming majority of these towns and cities bear Slavic names.

It follows, therefore, that the earliest Russian towns were founded by Eastern Slavs rather than by some other people. The Eastern Slavs were, consequently, the first and principal founders of towns and urban life in Kiev Rus.⁶

Further proof of Russia's early history is evident in her trading activities. The presence of Russian merchants in Bagdad has been recorded by Hordadbey, an Arabian writer who lived in the first half of the ninth century.⁷ This had been corroborated. Archeological

⁵ M. Tikhomirov, The Towns of Ancient Rus (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), p. 7.

⁶ Ibid., p. 14. ⁷ Svir, op. cit., p. 27.

excavations in Russia have unearthed Arabian coins of the eighth and ninth centuries. Trade was also carried on with the Scandinavian countries, with Greece, and with the Volga Bulgars.

Despite the notable economic and social developments of the early Russians, they had no formal means of transmitting their culture across the generations. It is even doubtful that letters of any sort were known to the Slavs of the pre-Christian period.⁸ A Bulgarian source of the ninth century declares that ". . .originally the Slavs had no letters but counted and calculated by lines and notches. . . ." ⁹ Because they had no written language, their educational practices had features that are common to pre-literate societies (usually referred to as primitive societies). In such societies economic factors exert a significant influence on man's ideas and institutions. Man's primary needs are physical and while it is true ". . .that man cannot live by bread alone, it is just as true that he cannot live physically or spiritually without it."¹⁰

But the economic force has not been the sole determinant of man's thoughts and actions since a close relationship exists between man's physical wants and his religious beliefs. Examples of this relationship are seen even in advanced religious systems. For instance:

⁸Samuel H. Cross, "Primitive Slavic Culture," A Handbook of Slavonic Studies, Leonid Strakhovsky (ed.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 37.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰James Mulhern, A History of Education (second edition; New York: The Roland Press Company, 1959), p. 4.

The Egyptian heaven. . . was described by Egyptian priests as a field of beans where the corn grew many cubits high, and in the Christian Scriptures heaven is described as a place where man never suffers the pangs of thirst and hunger.¹¹

Evidently the religious force had a profound impact on the thought-life and institutions of primitive societies. Ignorant of the natural causes of most phenomena, primitive man evolved animistic beliefs as a means of explaining and controlling natural forces. These beliefs were all encompassing for they had to do with such things as food, clothing, shelter, arts, industries, customs, and the spirit world. The folkways which embodied these ideas were acquired by the youth through imitation, a process which is largely unconscious. "Primitive education is, then, in a very important sense, cultural in character."¹² In general, the educational practices of pre-literate societies, based as they were on the cult of nature, fostered the continuation of a conservative culture that, to a large extent, impeded the institutionalization of formal education and the development of objective attitudes of inquiry. The educational practices of the early Slavic communities fall into this category. Here, the above influences of the cult of nature upon education persisted throughout the early period of Russia's history.

The literate stage in 'the land of the Rus' began in the Kievan period. During the reign of Vladimir (ca. 980-1015) and Iaroslav the Wise (1019-1054), this society attained its golden age. Vladimir reaffirmed the authority of the state which had been weakened during the years of strife that had followed Sviatoslav's death. Galician towns

¹¹Ibid., p. 5.

¹²Ibid., p. 41.

that had been lost to Poland were recovered, Lithuanian tribes to the north of Kiev were subdued, and the Turkic nomads, the Pechenegs, were successfully contained. To defend and hold the newly acquired territories, fortresses were built, and settlers were brought to the frontier areas. The growth of trade and agriculture, and the development of crafts facilitated the emergence of numerous towns.

In towns and in the rural areas the most important agencies in the transfer of culture were not formal institutions of instruction but the family and the community. The family's educational role was not restricted to socialization; vocational instruction necessary for adult life was also its responsibility. Only in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries did merchant and craft guilds make their appearance--organizations which supplemented the family's efforts in providing vocational training.

A key movement in Kievan history was the introduction of Eastern Orthodoxy. Practical goals played an important part in motivating the Eastern Church and the Byzantine state officials to present this cultural element to their north-eastern neighbors. From early Kievan times the Rus made repeated attacks on Constantinople. Following the raid of 860, the Byzantine authorities attempted to ". . .mitigate the fierce spirit of the Rus by preaching Christianity to them."¹³ At this time the patriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Orthodox Church, was Photius, a man of great intellect. His attempt to extend Byzantine's spiritual authority beyond the borders of the empire was another factor

¹³George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, Ancient Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), I, p. 345.

that influenced the revival of the missionary activities of the Byzantine Church.

The Christian mission to the Slavs was headed by two Greek brothers from Macedonia, Cyril and Methodius. Because of his extensive theological and philosophical knowledge and his familiarity with the Russian language, Cyril, according to his biographer, was considered the only possible candidate for this mission. In about A.D. 862, Cyril and Methodius came to Moravia. By this time, part of the population had already been converted to Christianity by German missionaries. The latter, having no knowledge of the Slavic language, conducted their services in Latin. These were incomprehensible to the masses.

From the outset Cyril advocated the use of the Slavic language for the Moravian Church. This idea was approved by Photius. Once this decision was made, ". . .the immediate problem was that of having at least the basic church books translated into Slavic and written in Slavic."¹⁴ Though the Slavs at this time may have used the Greek alphabet, it was not well suited to the Slavic language. There is also evidence that the Crimean Rus did have a form of written language of their own. The biographer of the Life of the Philosopher Constantine states that during Cyril's stay in Korsun,

. . .He found there a copy of Gospel and the Psalms written in Russian characters and he found a man speaking that language and spoke to him and understood the meaning of what he said, and, adjusting it to his own dialect, he analyzed the characters, both for the vowels and the consonants, and praying to God, started

¹⁴Ibid., p. 355.

quickly to read and speak Russian.¹⁵

A number of theories have been proposed to identify these Russian characters. The most plausible one is that the north Caucasian Christian communities used Armenian or Georgian characters to write liturgical texts and prayers as early as the seventh century. From the north Caucasians, the Crimean Rus may have borrowed the characters and adapted them to their own language. This, then, may have been the Russian letters that Cyril's biographer mentions.

Faced with the problem of translating liturgical books into the Slavic language, Cyril ". . . did not accept the Russian characters as he found them, but revised and adapted them more closely to the needs of the Slavic language."¹⁶ This revision and adaption may have resulted in the invention known as the Glagolitic alphabet. The dominant view today is that the Cyrillic alphabet, the alphabet used by the Russians up to the eighteenth century, was developed later by disciples of Methodius.

The Slavic language, which had its origin in the work of Cyril and Methodius, became the language of the Church and is known as Church Slavonic.

It was the language of most of the Slavic literate during the Middle Ages, and early modern period, and it was also to become the foundation from which the Russian literary language developed.¹⁷

Furthermore, it laid the foundation for the development of the whole Slavic civilization.¹⁸

¹⁵ Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 348. ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 357.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 359. ¹⁸ Ibid.

Besides laying the foundation for the development of the Slavic written language, Cyril and Methodius translated the Gospel, the Psalms, and the church service books into the Slavic language. Followers of the Greek brothers presented ". . .these liturgical and literary activities to Kievan Russia in the tenth and early eleventh century."¹⁹ With the extension of these activities, the Slavs acquired one of the three languages of worship in medieval Christianity.

Though Greek Orthodoxy was accepted as the national creed toward the end of the tenth century, it was not unknown in Kiev before that date.

The treaty of 945 refers to a Russian church (St. Elias) and distinguishes between Christian Rus and pagan Rus. Princess Olga herself was baptized under the name of Helen in 955, two years before she paid an official visit to Constantinople.²⁰

However, Olga's conversion had little effect upon the pagan faith of her subjects. In fact, paganism experienced a strong revival in the early part of Vladimir's reign. According to the Chronicle, Vladimir originally was ". . .a robust and insatiable pagan."²¹ In about 988, however, he accepted the Christian faith. Following his conversion heralds were sent

. . .Throughout the whole city to proclaim that if any inhabitant, rich or poor, did not betake himself to the river, he would risk the Prince's displeasure. When the people heard these words, they wept for joy and exclaimed their enthusiasm. "If this was not good, the Prince and his boyars would not have accepted it."

¹⁹ James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 5.

²⁰ Jesse D. Clarkson, A History of Russia (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 32.

²¹ Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), I, p. 126.

. . . There was joy in heaven and upon earth to behold so many souls saved.²²

The acceptance of Eastern Orthodoxy accelerated the influx of Byzantine cultural influence to the Kievan lands. Literature, art, political theory, law, customs, and manners experienced the impact of the Byzantine civilization. The growth of the Christian Church marked the emergence of a new institution in the Kievan society--an institution that was to play a primary role in the history of Russia.

Christianity was not confined to the growing ecclesiastical organization. The influences of Orthodoxy also permeated Kievan society and culture. Of particular significance is the impact it had upon education. As was already indicated, the introduction of literacy and Christianity in Russia were simultaneous occurrences. Though some evidence exists that the Russians were acquainted with writing prior to 988--and even if this were the case--there is no doubt that ". . . the conversion firmly and permanently established the written language in Russia."²³

Following Russia's conversion to Christianity, the Church and the princes sponsored education. The Church needed a trained clergy to spread the Christian culture; the princes needed clerks for their administration. After Vladimir returned from Korsun where he had been

²²Samuel H. Cross (trans.), "The Russian Primary Chronicle," Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), XII, pp. 214-15.

²³Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 60.

converted to the Christian faith, he and his advisers built churches and schools and appointed priests to take charge of education. In the Book of Annals are passages stating that Vladimir compelled the children of the nobility to attend school for instruction in book learning. However, his efforts to initiate compulsory education to the upper members of Kievan society were met with strong opposition. "The mothers of these children wept bitterly over them, for they were not yet strong in faith, but mourned as for the dead."²⁴

An illustration to this passage of the Book of Annals may be found in the "Life" of St. Feodosi, who attended a school in Kursk in the early eleventh century--obviously one of the schools organized under Vladimir's orders. While his mother did not object to his going to school, she became worried when the boy was carried away by the new Christian ideas he learned there and decided to enter a monastery. She tried in vain to dissuade him--even beating him did not help. . .and he finally became a monk. . . .²⁵

Obviously, though the outward form of Christianity was accepted, the Russian people of those days did not understand the essence of Orthodoxy. The pagan rituals were modified but the inner meanings and associations remained the same as before the conversion. Hence, opposition to formal instruction stemmed from the force of tradition which in its generic and elemental aspects was rooted in the cult of nature.

Despite the fact that institutionalized instruction was opposed, princes and the higher clergy considered books and education essential in the extension of Christianity and in administering the secular affairs

²⁴George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, Kievan Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), II, p. 72.

²⁵Ibid.

of the state. Greek books were translated into Slavonic and translations were imported from Bulgaria and Serbia. Most of the translations were the work of priests or monks whose aim was to propagate the Christian faith. Indigenous literary works, also of this nature, were

. . .Produced in the eleventh century by such men as Ilarion, who wrote the Eulogy of Volodimir; St. Theodosius, the author of sermons; Jacob, the monk, and Nestor, coauthors of Volodimir the Great, of Boris and Gleb, and of St. Theodore; and the Abbot Daniel, who wrote of his pilgrimage to the Holy Land.²⁶

Historical source materials indicate that Prince Iaroslav the Wise (1019-1054) furthered the extension of education. Scribes were ordered to translate Greek literature into the Slavic language; books were collected and deposited in the Church of Saint Sophia. During his life "The World History" of George Hamartolos, a Greek chronicler, and the Byzantine law regulating ecclesiastical matters were translated into Slavonic. The translation project and the library ". . .amounted to the establishment at Kiev of an important institution of learning."²⁷ Schools were also founded in provincial cities. "From the Life of St. Feodosi, we know that a school existed in Kursk around the year 1023."²⁸ Around 1030 Iaroslav founded a divinity school at Novgorod. Here he assembled three hundred children of the upper classes and the clergy to be instructed from books. Regarding the education of the masses, Iaroslav exhorted the parish priests to 'teach the people'. Even some of the Russian girls received a formal education. According to Tatischev,

²⁶Michael Hrushevsky, A History of the Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), pp. 118-19.

²⁷Vernadsky, Kievan Russia, p. 80.

²⁸Ibid., p. 277.

Princess Anna, daughter of Vsevolod I of Kiev, organized a school for girls near the end of the eleventh century. In this institution they were taught reading, writing, handicrafts, and singing.

Another institution that played a significant role in sponsoring Christianity and learning was the monasteries. Though it is believed that they made their first appearance at the same time as Christianity, the first ones referred to in the Chronicle are those that were established in the middle of the eleventh century. Most of the monasteries of Kievan Russia were founded by princes and by wealthy boyars who desired private establishments that would administer to their spiritual needs. An example of royal patronage is the building of two monasteries at Kiev by Iaroslav ". . .one for men by the name of his own angel, Saint George, near the Golden Gates, the other for women, which he called after Sainte Irene, the angel of his consort."²⁹ Other monastic centers, like the Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, were founded by ascetic individuals who tried to harmonize life with Christian ideals. Because of the support received from the princes, monasteries spread rapidly throughout Kievan Russia. By the end of the Kievan period, fifty-eight monasteries and twelve nunneries had been established.³⁰

Overall, the monasteries played a vital cultural role. The effect of the monastery on the community was to a large extent due to the fact that the cloisters were the centers of learning. Most of the wealthier

²⁹A. N. Mouravieff, A History of the Church of Russia, trans. R. W. Blackmore (London: Joseph Masters, 1842), p. 22.

³⁰Vernadsky, Kievan Russia, p. 206.

monasteries had a good library. It was there that scribes translated books, wrote hagiographies, and compiled chronicles. The clergy, however, had no monopoly over the art of writing. But the writing of books being a labor and time consuming process, required materials that were too expensive for the art to have become popular. Consequently, the transcription of books and the composition of other literary works were largely done by the clergy, especially the monks.

After Iaroslav's death, Russia became divided into principalities. The eldest member of the family became the grand prince of Kiev while the other brothers were given the administration of other towns. As the royal family increased, principalities were divided into smaller areas. Before his death, Iaroslav urged his sons to live in peace and to obey the grand prince. The sons failed to live up to this request as each sought to unite the country under his rule. Consequently, bloody civil wars occurred. Iaroslav's great accomplishment of 'gathering the lands of the Rus' was not achieved again by his sons. During this period of internal strife, the Kievan state was confronted by another wave of Turkish invaders, the Polovtsy. These nomad bands were even more destructive than the Pechenegs whom they had defeated and pushed toward the Danube.³¹ In 1061 they attacked the Kievan territory. After that first assault, they continuously threatened the autonomy of Kievan Russia.

The Kievan state, however, experienced a brief revival under Vladimir Monomakh. Grand Prince of Kiev from 1113 to 1125, Monomakh

³¹Hrushevsky, op. cit., p. 83.

proved to be a powerful ruler and skillful statesman. Though he waged war against foreign elements continuously, Monomakh distinguished himself as a social legislator and promoter of education. With the assistance of the highest officials of the state, Vladimir revised legislation regarding loans and indentured labor. Limits were imposed on the rates of interest that could be charged on long-term loans; certain formalities were required before impoverished individuals could sell themselves into slavery. "Social legislation was for him an extension of Christian charity."³² In his famous "Testament" he instructed his sons

. . .Not [to] forget the poor, but nourish them. Do not bury your riches in the bosom of the earth, for that is contrary to the precepts of Christianity. Be a father to the orphans. . . . Put to death no one, for nothing is more sacred than the soul of a Christian. . . .³³

Besides the emphasis he placed on charitable deeds, Vladimir stressed the significance of education. A passage from his "Testament" reveals the high value he attributed to learning. "When you have learned anything useful try to preserve it in your memory, and strive ceaselessly to get knowledge."³⁴

By the time of Vladimir Monomakh's rule, the basis for a Slavic written literature had already been laid. Prior to the conversion of the Russians to Christianity, Kievan literature consisted of oral creations. Folklore, developed in the past, was verbally transmitted from generation to generation. The songs, proverbs, riddles, fairy tales,

³²Vernadsky, Kievan Russia, p. 95. ³³Svir, op. cit., p. 37.

³⁴Ibid.

byliny, and funeral dirges that constitute Kievan folklore, besides reflecting the social relations of the time, ". . .possess outstanding lyrical and generally artistic qualities that have received recognition throughout the world."³⁵ Kievan written literature developed in close association with the evolution of Christian religion. It consisted, primarily, of Church service books, Old Testament narratives, sermons, hymns, and biographies of saints. Sacred literature of this period ". . .was more remarkable for its embellishments than for the content of its ideas."³⁶ The earliest extant Russian manuscript, the "Ostromir Codex," written in 1056-57, is a colorful ornamental collection of biblical verses. In fact, the majority of the one hundred eight surviving manuscripts from the eleventh and twelfth centuries were collections of sermons richly decorated by Russian scribes.

Monomakh's "Testament," referred to previously, is an example of the secular literature of that period. Other examples are the chronicles. The first Russian Chronicle was written in Novgorod in the early eleventh century. In 1039 the first Kievan Chronicle was started. This project was undoubtedly connected with the organization of the Kievan diocese and the educational reforms of Iaroslav. Initially, the writing of the Chronicle was sponsored by the metropolitan of Kiev. Later a copy was sent to the Monastery of the Caves, whose monks undertook the responsibility of recording future events and observations. About 1110 the monks of this institution began writing ". . .on the basis of the earlier

³⁵Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 61. ³⁶Billington, op. cit., p. 7.

chronicles, a comprehensive history of Russia."³⁷ It was called the Book of Annals (The Russian Primary Chronicle). Most contemporary historians agree that the work is a digest of which the original Chronicle of Kiev is only one part.³⁸ Because of the wide variety of local sources upon which the work is based, the script stands before us ". . . as a true mirror of the tendencies, sentiments, and ideals of that day."³⁹

The monks were also responsible for most of the other chronicles that were written during this period. Examples of these are the Volynian and the Galician chronicle of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the Suzdalian chronicle of the same period.

In poetry the most significant contribution is "The Tale of Igor's Campaigns," Written in a stylistic form, this poem has been acclaimed by Pushkin as ". . . that lonely monument in the desert of our literature."⁴⁰ The content of the "Tale" relates an episode of the struggle between the Russian princes and the Polovtsy. Though the poem deals with an event of little historical significance, it provides an illuminating picture of the religious and moral outlook of the time. Christian, heathen, and secular elements can be discerned in its artistic

³⁷Vernadsky, Kievan Russia, p. 285.

³⁸V. O. Kluchevsky, A History of Russia, trans. C. J. Hogarth (New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), I, p. 6.

³⁹Ibid., p. 27.

⁴⁰Anotole G. Mazour, Russia Past and Present (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1951), p. 215.

structure.⁴¹ Of the three, the Christian element is mentioned least of all. Only four sentences specifically indicate that the author was a Christian. Pagan elements, on the other hand, are referred to frequently both in the names of the gods and in the poet's attitude towards nature and life. Hence, ". . .the elements are addressed with the title 'lord', which suggests not so much sympathetic intimacy with nature as awe and reverence towards it."⁴²

O Wind, mighty Wind! Why dost thou blow so violently, O lord?
 Why dost thou hurl the Huns' arrows with their light wings against
 my beloved's warriors? Why has thou, O lord, scattered my joy
 over the feathery grass? . . .O bright and thrice-bright Sun! . . .
 Why didst thou, O lord, spread thy burning rays upon my beloved's
 warriors?⁴³

Though the poet as well as Igor were Christians, the poet's attitude reflects the persisting influence of the cult of nature ". . .for in speaking of nature he cannot help feeling it as a living being. . . ."⁴⁴ The third component that can be distinguished in the "Tale" are the secular elements. These are expressed in the social ethics that are portrayed throughout "Igor's Tale": the ethics of clan, the ethics of class or military virtues, and the ethics of mother country or patriotism.

The literature of the period reflected the extent to which formal education had taken root in Kievan society. Yet an overall assessment indicates that education was poorly organized and not available to the masses. Since learning and literature were primarily in the hands of the

⁴¹George P. Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 317.

⁴²Ibid., p. 324. ⁴³Ibid. ⁴⁴Ibid., p. 325.

clergy, the art was applied chiefly to prepare hierarchs for the Church to spread the Christian culture. Only the larger monasteries and cathedrals conducted regular schools. At such centers, it was possible to obtain a higher education which included learning how to write in the correct style and to read Greek. In most of the other schools, however, education was generally limited to reading. Wealthy parents whose sons did not attend monastic schools were usually tutored by the clergy. This tutorial system further restricted education to the few. Furthermore, the Church in Kievan times and in subsequent periods opposed popular education on the grounds that learning bred heresy. Nowhere are the shortcomings of the educational system better reflected than in the fact that Russia ". . . had not yet the educational means sufficient to replace the Greek priests with equally well-trained ones of her own."⁴⁵ The problem is clearly articulated in the complaints of a Novgorod archbishop of the fifteenth century:

They bring me a peasant to be ordained as a priest or deacon. I bid him read the Epistles, and he does not know how to begin. I bid him read the Psalter, he cannot take the first step. . . . I order him to be taught at least the liturgical prayers, but he is unable even to repeat the words one gives him. . . . And if I refuse to ordain him, I am told: such is the world, your Holiness, we cannot find anyone versed in knowledge.⁴⁶

The same situation existed as late as the beginning of the seventeenth century. Elder Arsenius, a reviser of church books, stated that his opponents were

⁴⁵ Paul Miliukov, Outlines of Russian Culture Part I, Religion and the Church (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943), p. 10.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

. . . Scarcely qualified in the alphabet, and were not certain which letter was a vowel and which a consonant; and as to the parts of speech--the voice, the gender, singular and plural, tense, and person--these did not even enter their minds.⁴⁷

Since only a small proportion of the lower clergy was literate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it is presumed that the situation was worse in the earlier period. Yet this was the group that was responsible for educating the Russian people. According to twentieth century standards, it is little wonder that the result was far from satisfactory. In light of the evidence cited above, it would appear that Vernadsky overstates the case when he claims that all the princes and all the clergy were educated.⁴⁸ Yet, there is no doubt that the Kievan culture could not have developed to the level it did without an educated stratum of society.

Despite a high level of cultural development, the Kievan state declined and eventually fell. After the death of Mstislav, son of Monomakh, the forces of dissension that had threatened Kievan unity after Iaroslav's rule reappeared. Mstislav's heirs were opposed by the younger sons of Monomakh. The ensuing strife resulted in frequent changes in the occupancy of the throne. Competing princes recruited bands of Polovtsians who ravaged the countryside, killed many inhabitants, and carried off large numbers as slaves. Thus, the once glorious kingdom of Kiev was reduced to a state of anarchy. A passage from the "Song of the Legion of Ihor" illustrates the dying political life of Kiev:

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 28. ⁴⁸Vernadsky, Kievan Russia, p. 280.

Darkness covered the light on the River Kayala; like a brood of panthers, the Polovtsians spread throughout the land of Rus. Already dishonor has taken the place of glory; already woe has been loosed.⁴⁹

Further troubles confronted Kiev. Descendents of George Monomakh had settled in the Volga region. From their north-eastern centers they made repeated attempts to further weaken the declining power of the Kievan state. In 1169 Prince Andrew Bogoliubskii of Rostov and Suzdal, taking advantage of the dissension within the Kievan dynasty, sent an army to destroy the city on the Dnieper. The assault was successful. Churches and monasteries were pillaged, icons, rare books, vestments, and church bells were taken to the north, and inhabitants were killed or taken as slaves. Following his conquest, Andrew transferred the capital to the city of Vladimir. In 1203 Andrew's brother ordered another attack on Kiev. Again the city was ravaged. Such conflicts paved the way for the complete destruction of the Kievan state in 1240 by the Mongols.

The decline and eventual collapse of the Kievan state has been attributed to a number of factors. Briefly, these are:

1. The Kievan state was a federation which could only be held together by exceptionally strong rulers.
2. Huge distances, coupled with primitive communications, magnified the difficulties of centralization.
3. The gradual enserfment of peasants and the deteriorating

⁴⁹Hrushevsky, op. cit., p. 93.

position of the urban dwellers resulted in social conflicts that further undermined the unity of the state.

4. With the establishment of new east-west trade routes, Kiev lost her pre-eminent position in the sphere of international trade.
5. The lack of definitive laws of succession led to continuous internal dissension and strife. Pogodin states that eighty civil wars were fought in the one hundred seventy years that followed Iaroslav's death.⁵⁰
6. The countless wars against foreign elements drastically weakened the Kievan state.

Under such circumstances the prosperity of the Dnieper region declined, the decline being accompanied by the cultural and political decay of the main centers of Kievan life.⁵¹

Kiev's successor as the national capital was Vladimir, a minor city in the principality of Rostov-Suzdal. The transfer of the capital to the north-east, however, did not lead to political and social stability. As in Kiev, regional interests took precedence over the need for national unity. Rivalry among the princes and the lack of cooperation between the princes and the boyars weakened the slender unifying bonds of the Russian land. The authority of the veche was curtailed and with the growth of landed estates, increasing numbers of peasants were reduced to the status of serfs or slaves. "Such was the

⁵⁰Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 45.

⁵¹Hrushevsky, op. cit., p. 85.

political and social complexion of Russia when she was faced with the acid test of the Tartar Invasion."⁵²

The Mongols first appeared in north-eastern Russia in 1223 and defeated the Russians and Polovtsy in a battle near the Kalka River.

As the Chronicle records:

. . . This evil happened on May 21, on St. Eremai's Day, and the Tartars turned back from the river Dnieper and we know not whence they came nor where they hid themselves. God knows whence he fetched them against us for our sins.⁵³

Following their victory, they retreated into the steppes. In 1237, however, they returned. By 1240 they had successfully established their suzerainty over the whole of Russia except for the western part that was under control of the Lithuanian state.⁵⁴ The Mongol victory brought the majority of the Russian people under a two-century period of domination and ". . . terminated the preceding cultural, religious, and political development."⁵⁵

Khans of the victorious Golden Horde considered the Russian principalities as provinces of their domain. Princes and Church dignitaries had to be confirmed by a decree issued by the khan though the latter usually approved the candidate who was entitled to the particular office according to Russian customary law. Confusion, however, was great. The primary interest of the Mongols in their conquered lands was

⁵²Florinsky, op. cit., p. 54.

⁵³Stuart Ramsay Tompkins, Russia Through the Ages (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1940), p. 80.

⁵⁴D. M. Sturley, A Short History of Russia (London: Longmans, 1964), p. 20.

⁵⁵Mazour, op. cit., p. 50.

the exaction of revenue. Offers to increase the amount of tribute became the means of obtaining control of a principality. The capital at Sarai became a center of numerous princely intrigues. Consequently, there was ". . . much bloody discord between the princes. . . ." ⁵⁶

To facilitate the collection of tribute, a census of the Russian population was taken. Earlier, the whole clan had paid a fixed sum. The first register of the taxable population enabled the Mongols to levy imposts by tax units (the plough). In Kievan Russia only the rural population paid tribute. The Mongols subjected both the rural and urban residents to direct taxation. For instance, "the Tartar tribute-takers rode through the streets and counted the houses; each house, no matter to whom it belonged paid one and the same amount." ⁵⁷ Failure to meet the impost obligations were met with severe reprisals--". . . massacres which spared neither woman nor child. . . ." ⁵⁸ Even the poorest were not exempt. According to a folk song:

If a man doth money lack,
From him his child they take,
If a man doth children lack,
From him his wife they take,
And if a man doth helpmate lack,
From him his very self they take. ⁵⁹

Revolts against the oppressors were subdued with the same harshness

⁵⁶ Svir, op. cit., p. 46.

⁵⁷ M. N. Pokrovsky, History of Russia, trans. and ed. J. D. Clarkson (London: Martin Lawrence Limited, n.d.), p. 72.

⁵⁸ Svir, op. cit., p. 45.

⁵⁹ A. M. Pankratova (ed.), A History of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1947), p. 99.

that characterized the tenor of the time. Adding to the plight of the masses were the Tartar raids. Between 1236 and 1462, Russia was subjected to forty-eight Mongol assaults.⁶⁰

The destructive influence of the Mongols has been amply recorded. Historical sources relate instances of the complete extermination of towns such as Riazan, Torzhok, and Kozelsk.⁶¹ Further evidence of the devastation caused by the Mongols is provided by Archbishop Carpinir, who crossed southern Russia in 1245-1246. Concerning the invasion he wrote:

. . . They went against Russia and enacted a great massacre in the Russian land, they destroyed towns and fortresses and killed people, they besieged Kiev which had been the capital of Russia, and after a long siege they took it and killed the inhabitants of the city; . . .; for this city had been extremely large and very populous, whereas now it has been reduced to nothing; . . .⁶²

Many of the major cities which had flourished in the preceding period were destroyed. Skilled artisans were often conscripted for the khan's service--a practice which disrupted industrial production. In fact, industries such as enamel work, filigree (ornamental work of fine works), stone cutting, and niello (a black metallic composition with an inlaid design) ceased to exist.⁶³ So thorough was the devastation that industrial revival did not begin until about 1350.

Despite their destructive influence and the fact that they

⁶⁰Florinsky, op. cit., p. 61.

⁶¹Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 79. ⁶²Ibid., p. 79.

⁶³George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (fourth edition; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 78.

maintained effective control over Russia for two hundred fifty years, the Mongols did not interfere directly with the Russian institutions. The conquest was not followed by a period of colonization. The invaders retained their pastoral way of life and exerted no pressure on the conquered to abandon their accustomed beliefs, customs, or occupations. Indeed, they generally limited their interests to the exaction of tribute. Records also indicate instances of cooperation between the Russian princes and boyars and their conquerors. Violent resistance to the 'Tartar Yoke' by the lower strata of the population was checked by the intervention of the Grand Prince. Russian troops participated in the Mongols' military pursuits while the latter are known to have supported the Russians in their struggle against Western enemies. Not only did the Mongols welcome the military aid of the Russian princes and boyars, they also valued the spiritual services of the Christian Church in protecting the lives of the khans against witchcraft. Their tolerance towards Orthodoxy is evident in Mangu Khan's reply to the arguments of Guillaume de Rubriques:

We Mongols believe that there is one God [for all peoples] by whom we live and by whom we die, and toward Him we have a loyal heart; but as God gave the hand many fingers, so He gave men many roads; to you God gave the Scriptures and you Christians do not keep them, while to us He gave diviners and we do all that they tell us. . . .⁶⁴

Not only were they tolerant in religious matters but they acted as virtual patrons of the Church. Members of the clergy were exempt from taxes and other forms of onerous obligations; Church property was

⁶⁴Clarkson, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

declared inviolable; sacred objects were given special protection. Moreover, the clergy was given complete legal jurisdiction over the population that resided on the growing ecclesiastical estates. In many respects this institution became stronger than it had been in the Kievan period. The consolidation and strengthening of the Church, permitted and abetted by the Mongols, exerted an important unifying influence within a land torn by dissension and strife.⁶⁵ Besides giving spiritual advice and moral support to the embittered populace the clergy, at this time, successfully established Christianity among the rural inhabitants. The efforts of the clergy and the growth of religious feelings among the people facilitated the spread of the Christian faith.

The disasters of the Mongol invasions, the internicine princely wars, and the harsh conditions of life contributed to the steady growth of the churches and monasteries. The latter in particular increased rapidly as men escaped to the wilderness to pray and meditate. Monasteries became wealthy as monks received land and money for the recital of prayers for the souls of the contributors. Laymen followed the monks for spiritual consolation. Consequently, villages grew up around these monastic centers; the most important being Saint Sergius Trinity Monastery forty miles north of Moscow. For two centuries after 1350, the monasteries led the way in the colonization of the north-east.⁶⁶ The influence of

⁶⁵Helen Pratt and Harriet Moore, Russia, A Short History (New York: The John Day Company, 1947), p. 26.

⁶⁶B. H. Sumner, A Short History of Russia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1949), p. 40.

these institutions was of great importance. Besides being a spiritual center, the Russian monastery was an inn, a hospital, a school, and, if wealthy, a bank. Many of them had libraries and were centers of learning. Princes and statesmen came to the monks for historical, legal, and religious information. For instance:

The ruling prince, . . . the praiseworthy and victorious great Dimitry, came to Sergius, for he had great faith in the saint. He asked whether Sergius would command him to march against the infidels. The saint gave him his blessing, armed him with his prayers, and said: "My Lord, it behooves you to guard the worthy flock entrusted to you by God. You must march against the infidels, and with God's help you shall defeat them and return unhurt to your native land, and you shall merit great praise."⁶⁷

Throughout this period, education in general, fell to a level below that attained during the Kievan epoch. The devastation that accompanied the Mongol invasions and the isolation and poverty of the age had a negative effect upon culture and learning. To insure the punctual receipt of revenue, the Mongols made it impossible for the population to resist by destroying the large centers of population. "This is why the Tartars were such great foes of the towns and why Baty's onslaught seemed to the townsmen-chroniclers the crown of all imaginable horrors."⁶⁸ Since Kievan culture was essentially urban, the decline of the cities and towns contributed to the retrogression of cultural and educational standards. However, the cultural development that did take place during this period indicates that some learning and skills

⁶⁷ St. Epiphanius, "The Life of St. Sergius," excerpts, cited by Thomas Riha, Readings in Russian Civilization, Thomas Riha (ed.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), I, p. 130.

⁶⁸ Pokrovsky, op. cit., p. 70.

remained.

Throughout the Mongol period the Church continued to be the major contributor in the field of literature and arts. Sermons, hagiographies, and biographies of princes constituted the principal literary works of the period. The writing of chronicles, which stopped after the invasion, was resumed in the fourteenth century. The clergy's leading role in literature is exemplified by the fact that the most famous poem of the period, "Deeds Beyond the Don," was written by a priest. Accompanying the religious revival in Russia was the growth of church art.

Religious paintings in the form of frescoes and icons were further developed. In the appanage period, when the vast majority of the masses was illiterate, pictorial representation was an important means of education. The preservation and promotion of these skills and of learning in general is credited largely to the efforts of priests and monks. "To a greater degree than before the Mongolian invasion, the church and the monasteries directed the intellectual life of Russia.

. . ."⁶⁹

It has already been mentioned that the growing authority and increasing importance of the Church was, to a large extent, a consequence of the Mongol invasion. Another important influence of the Mongol occupation was that it contributed to the isolation of Russia by cutting it off from Byzantine and, to a large extent, from the West. "It has been suggested that, but for the Mongols, Russia might well have

⁶⁹George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (first edition; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 50.

participated in such epochal European developments as the Renaissance and the Reformation."⁷⁰ Though the claim remains unsubstantiated, there is no doubt that the isolation furthered the development of parochial and xenophobic (hatred of foreigners) attitudes which left their imprint upon the Russian mentality.

Scholars of the Eurasian school attribute even greater importance to the role of the Mongols in Russian history. Centering their attention on the political sphere, they

. . . Present the Muscovite tsar and the Muscovite state as successors to the Mongol khan and the Golden Horde, and emphasize the influence of the Mongols in transforming weak and divided appanage Russia into a powerful, disciplined, and monolithic autocracy. Institutions, legal norms, and the psychology of Muscovite Russia have all been described as a legacy of Jenghiz Khan.⁷¹

Proponents of this school overlook the fact that the rise of absolutism in Russia was paralleled by similar developments in other European countries. Furthermore, they fail to recognize that the Mongol states rather than being well-organized were relatively unstable and short-lived.⁷² This instability was apparent as early as the fourteenth century when internal dissension began to disrupt the Golden Horde. Struggle for leadership weakened the authority of the khan over the vast domain and encouraged the establishment of separate Mongol kingdoms. Minor secessions occurred in the middle of the fifteenth century. In 1445 the kingdom of Kazan was formed. A year later the Crimean kingdom was established. As the authority of the Horde weakened, the

⁷⁰Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 79. ⁷¹Ibid., p. 81. ⁷²Ibid.

principality of Moscow grew in strength. A factor that contributed to Moscow's ascendancy was its close alliance with the Church.⁷³ Hence, particularly after the transference of the metropolitan see from Vladimir to Moscow (1328), the latter became important as a center of Russian life. The growing strength of the north-eastern principality culminated in revolt against the Mongol overlords. In 1380 Dmitrii Donskoi, Grand Duke of Moscow, defeated the Mongols in a battle at Kulikovo. Though psychologically significant, the victory was not decisive and the authority of the Horde over Moscow continued for another century. Finally, in 1480, Ivan II renounced his allegiance to the khan. Efforts to re-establish Mongol authority over Russia failed. Later, Russian territorial expansion absorbed the successor states to the Golden Horde--the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimea.

The victory over the Mongols and the reign of Ivan III marked the beginning of a new era in Russian history. After the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, Ivan began referring to himself as Tsar of all Russia, sometimes adding the title of Autocrat. At this time the title had none of its later meaning of absolutism; it signified merely that Ivan owed no allegiance to any overlord and paid tribute to none. Eventually these titles implied much greater prestige. "'Ivan, by the Grace of God, Sovereign of All Russia' reflected the new religious basis to the Tsarish power."⁷⁴ From Kievan times the Russian

⁷³Florinsky, op. cit., p. 88.

⁷⁴Ian Grey, Ivan III and the Unification of Russia (London: The English Universities Press, Limited, 1964), p. 39.

Church had given ideological support to the princes who had attempted to unify the Russian lands. In opposition to the pagan view that the prince was a mere leader of a druzhina, the Church upheld the idea that he was a ruler by divine right. Borrowed from Byzantine, this concept was further developed by Orthodox prelates; for example, in the letters of Philotheus. Hence, the Church was an important factor in changing the myth of the tsar.⁷⁵

This myth or social force played a vital role in the life of the Russian people. The masses accepted the idea of a pious or true tsar; a tsar who was a combination of a benign grandfather and messianic deliverer and who was to be the true benefactor of his children. This concept ". . . implied that the ultimate ruler of the system was its only possible redeemer."⁷⁶ The ubiquitous acceptance of this belief precluded the possibility of the Russian masses objectively evaluating the existing social conditions. Such an evaluation, necessary for the rational solution of the problems that beset Muscovite Russia, was not forthcoming. Because their perceptions of the world were based on a myth, the masses were not motivated to search for empirical knowledge. This ethos, then, contributed to the fact that there was no felt need or demand for popular institutionalized or formal education.

Also significant to the history of Russia were Ivan's successes in 'gathering the lands of the Rus'. Though his predecessors had increased the territory of the Muscovite principality from six hundred

⁷⁵ See pages 53-54. ⁷⁶ Billington, op. cit., p. 198.

square miles at the time of Ivan I to fifteen thousand square miles near the end of Basil II's reign, it was Ivan III who annexed the powerful rivals of Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov, and who established a single rule in the area that was formerly appanage Russia.⁷⁷ His ambitions, however, were not restricted to the remaining Russian appanages for he considered all the former Kievan lands his patrimony.⁷⁸ This included the territories that, following the collapse of Kiev, had come under the suzerainty of Lithuania. Conflict between the two states over this territory culminated in hostilities in 1494 and again in 1500. Successful Russian campaigns resulted in the acquisition of parts of Smolensk, the Polotz area, and much of the former principality of Chernigov. In the peace treaty of 1503, Lithuania formally recognized the Russian claim to these conquered territories. Another treaty, signed in the same year, ended the war between Moscow and the Livonian Order--a war in which Moscow successfully defended the recently acquired principality of Pskov.

Ivan's foreign policy had important implications for the internal affairs of the land. The annexation of new territories created the need for integrating diversified administrative and judicial practices into a co-ordinated system. This necessitated changes in the Muscovite form of government. Consequently, a single charter defining the obligations of the people to the state officials and the tsar was promulgated in the form of the Sudebnik (legal code) in 1497.⁷⁹ Article fifty-seven of the

⁷⁷Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 113. ⁷⁸Ibid., p. 116.

⁷⁹Grey, op. cit., p. 147.

Sudebnik regulated the rights of the peasants to migrate freely.⁸⁰ In effect, the consequences of article fifty-seven were the beginning of a series of future developments that virtually tied the peasant to the land and his landlord. Hence, the Sudebnik is viewed as a decree that formally inaugurated serfdom in Russia.⁸¹

Though the Sudebnik was an important step towards providing a single administrative system to the whole country, it did not apply to the patrimonial estates or to Church lands. This was an anomalous situation because the princes, even after swearing allegiance to Ivan, continued to exercise sweeping authority over the people on their personal estates. The fact that these princes and their domains stood outside the tsar's authority was considered by Ivan as an affront to his policy of unification. However, he proceeded cautiously, making no direct attack on the patrimonial immunities. Instead, he sought to remedy the situation and at the same time meet the growing demand for troops by establishing landholding based on service, ". . .creating the pomestie in place of the patrimonial estate, the votchina."⁸² In the newly acquired territories, Ivan dispossessed the boyars. None of the new estates were granted on a full ownership basis. Also, large tracts of state land were converted into pomestie and the population of such estates were, for the first time, put under the direct control of a lord.

⁸⁰See page 105.

⁸¹George Z. F. Bereday, William Brickman, and Gerald Read (eds.), The Changing Soviet School (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 23.

⁸²Grey, op. cit., p. 148.

According to Platonov, the spread of the pomestie form of tenure was one of the factors that facilitated the establishment of serfdom in Russia.⁸³

The expansion of serfdom during Ivan III's reign and in the subsequent centuries resulted in a steady decline in the position of the peasants who formed the major proportion of the population. To meet the increasing state obligations, the gentry landlords ". . .squeezed what they could from the peasants."⁸⁴ The oppressive conditions of their existence had a debilitating effect upon the economic, political, and social development of Russia. Serfdom contributed to the inefficient use of labor, resisted changes in productive practices, and led to rural over-population. Above all, under conditions of human bondage, the serfs lacked incentive and initiative. For centuries economic development was severely hampered by the social structure and institutions of Russia.

In the political sphere, the influence of serfdom was equally apparent. From the early Muscovite period the government promoted the interests of the gentry at the expense of the other classes--a policy which inevitably led to the extension of serfdom. In the centuries that followed, this basic social process continued. Accompanying the expansion of serfdom was the gentry's ascendancy to greater power and

⁸³S. F. Platonov, History of Russia, trans. E. Aronsberg (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 121.

⁸⁴Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 175.

the concomitant decline in the position of the serf. In the reign of Peter II, they could not escape their bondage by volunteering for military service. Laws decreed by Empress Anne abrogated their right to purchase real estate, establish mills, or enter into government contracts. After 1736, serfs could not seek temporary employment without their master's permission. A law decreed by Elizabeth gave the gentry the right to exile delinquent serfs to Siberia. In 1741 they were not required to swear allegiance to the new ruler. Moreover, the criminal code of 1754 lists them simply under the category of property of the gentry.

Economic pressures, the effect of custom, and the needs of landowners and the state were responsible for the fact that approximately one-half of the peasant population became serfs between 1500 and 1700.⁸⁵ This increase in the number of state peasants who were transformed to serfs meant that more and more people were losing ". . . those institutions of self-government--limited and imperfect though they were--. . ."⁸⁶ that they had formerly enjoyed. The remaining half of the peasants were state peasants. This social group, particularly in the northern regions, maintained a limited degree of autonomy and prosperity though in many cases their lot was no better than that of the serfs.

The deplorable condition of the whole country led to numerous uprisings and a number of major revolts. Yet these movements failed to

⁸⁵B. H. Sumner, Survey of Russian History (second revised edition; London: Duckworth, 1947), p. 150.

⁸⁶Florinsky, op. cit., p. 216.

bring about any economic or political improvement in the peasant's condition. In fact, the Russian peasant not only failed to acquire political power of any consequence but also saw his position in this sphere deteriorate in the centuries that preceded the Emancipation.

The impact of serfdom was also felt in the social sphere of Russian life. Enduring the oppressions that marked the passing centuries--devastating foreign invasions, fratricidal princely wars, recurring famines--the peasant accepted patient suffering, a phenomenon he always understood. Because the peasant believed in the 'suffering that atones', he, in general, passively accepted oppression and grief. Richardson Wright, describing Russian life in the early decades of the twentieth century, found that the peasant still clung to the idea that to follow in Christ's footsteps, to attain eternal salvation, one must endure the podvig, the suffering that atones. A poem at the bottom of a Russian war picture states:

The podvig is in battle,
The podvig is in struggle,
The highest podvig is in patience,
Love and prayer.⁸⁷

Because the majority of peasants was constantly engaged in a desperate struggle for food and shelter, their goals were concrete and immediate. "Where people toil from sunrise to sunset for a bare living, they. . .dream no dreams."⁸⁸ Faith in reason and in man's ability to master the world were alien concepts to the Russian people. Yet these

⁸⁷ Richardson Wright, The Russians in Interpretation (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1917), p. 113.

⁸⁸ Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 27.

attitudes are factors that motivate societies to establish popular institutionalized educational systems. This absence ". . .of enlightenment, of personal energy, or self-reliance,. . .rendered difficult the task of reforming Russia to a European model."⁸⁹

Nor was the lack of personal energy and self-reliance characteristic only of the lower stratum of Russian society for eventually the upper classes too displayed similar qualities. These qualities are well-described in Nikolai Dobrolyubov's essay, "What is Oblomovism?" In his article, Dobrolyubov states that the apathy, characteristic of the Russian upper classes, was caused by the gentry's external position of being born a 'gentleman' and ". . .partly in the manner of his mental and moral development."⁹⁰

He became accustomed to lolling about at a very early age because he had people to fetch and carry for him, to do things for him. Under these conditions he lived the idle life of a sybarite even when he did not want to. . . .The effect this position of the child has upon his entire moral and intellectual development will be understood. Its internal strength necessarily "wilts and fades." Even if the child tests that strength sometimes, it is only in whims. . . .When he grows up he becomes an Oblomov, possessing the latter's apathy and spinelessness to a greater or lesser degree, under a more or less skillful disguise, but always with the same invariable quality--a repugnance for serious and independent activity.⁹¹

Historical works tend to support the validity of Dobrolyubov's claims. For example, Riasanovsky, writing about the gentry after the

⁸⁹Maxime Kovalevsky, Russian Political Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), p. 98. ;

⁹⁰Nikolai Dobrolyubov, "What is Oblomovism?" Readings in Russian Civilization, Thomas Riha (ed.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), II, p. 344.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 344-45.

emancipation of the serfs, states:

Deprived of serf labor and forced to adjust to more intense competition and other harsh realities of the changing world, members of the gentry had little in their education, outlook, or character to make them successful. . . .A considerable number of landlords, in fact, preferred to live in Paris or Nice, spending whatever they had, rather than face the new conditions in Russia.⁹²

Though Dobrolyubov is writing about the gentry of the nineteenth century, there is little doubt that the Oblomov he describes is but the end-product of a social process that began in the preceding centuries. Hence, the institution of serfdom fostered the development of psychological attitudes, at all levels of the social structure, that severely hampered the economic, political, social, and intellectual development of Russia.

Credited with rapidly accelerating this ruinous institution is Ivan III. His motives, however, for inaugurating serfdom were of a practical nature--to politically unify the Russian appanages and to consolidate his position as Grand Prince of all Russia. It is unlikely that Ivan could have foreseen the pervasive effects serfdom was to exert upon Russia's future development. In fact, Ivan ". . .was aware of the cultural and industrial retardation of his country."⁹³ Certain events, however, that occurred during his reign helped overcome some of this retardation. One of these was his marriage to Sophia Paleologue, niece of the last emperor of Byzantine and a refugee of the pope of Rome. Not only did the marriage elevate the position of the Muscovite

⁹²Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 470.

⁹³Bereday, op. cit., p. 23.

grand prince, it also re-established cultural contact with European centers of civilization. When Sophia came to Moscow in 1472, she brought with her a retinue of Greek and Italian craftsmen. In addition to these, Ivan's agents engaged experts from Italy and Greece. Foreign influences soon were apparent in the Russian diplomatic service, architecture, art, handicraft, and engineering. During Ivan's reign ceaseless building went on in Moscow, transforming the city into a capital worthy of a powerful tsar.⁹⁴

The policies of Ivan III were continued by his son, Basil III, who ruled from 1505 to 1533. Basil annexed the remaining Russian appanages and advanced the Muscovite borders at the expense of the Lithuanian state and the khanate of Kazan. During his reign cultural contact with foreign countries increased as Basil established relations with the Holy Roman Empire, the papacy, Turkey, and even with India. As in the preceding reign, foreigners were invited to enter into Russian service. In the reigns of Ivan III and Basil III a whole foreign settlement appeared in Moscow. This furthered the influx of Western ideas into Russia.

The reign of Ivan IV (1553-1584) brought further importation of engineers, physicians, and skilled craftsmen. As early as 1547 Ivan sent an agent to Europe to recruit specialists into Russian service. Eventually over one hundred twenty doctors, teachers, artists, and technicians accepted the invitation. However, they were refused passage

⁹⁴Grey, op. cit., p. 38.

to Muscovy by the authorities of the Hanseatic League and the Livonian Order. Poland and Sweden also used every pretext for not letting foreigners into Russia ". . .hoping to prevent her using western techniques for her aggrandizement."⁹⁵ An 'iron curtain' was thus built along Russia's western frontier. Most of the foreign specialists who did come to Muscovy during Ivan's reign came from England after diplomatic relations were established between these two countries.

Russia's cultural contact with England dates back to the middle of the sixteenth century. In the winter of 1553-1554, an English vessel, under the command of Richard Chancellor, arrived in the Bay of Saint Nicholas in the White Sea. The ship was one of the three fitted by "The Governour of the Mysterie and Company of the Merchants Adventurers of the Cities of London"⁹⁶ to discover a new trade route to the East through the Arctic Ocean. Upon landing on the shore of northern Muscovy, Chancellor made his way to Moscow. He was warmly welcomed by Ivan who was anxious to establish diplomatic relations with western powers. After spending thirteen days with the tsar, Chancellor departed for England with the sovereign's friendly reply to the ". . .letter of introduction with which the leaders of the expedition had been provided."⁹⁷ In the following year, Chancellor returned to Russia as the representative of the Muscovy Company. The agents of this company:

⁹⁵ Vernadsky, A History of Russia, fourth edition; p. 102.

⁹⁶ Tompkins, op. cit., p. 129.

⁹⁷ K. Waliszewski, Ivan the Terrible (London: William Heinemann, 1904), p. 274.

. . .Were to take care that all their fellow-countrymen carefully obeyed the Russian laws; they were to open counting houses and shops in Moscow and other principal towns; they were to notice the kinds and qualities of merchandise likely to find a good market. . . .⁹⁸

By agreement of 1555 England received great commercial advantages. For example, they paid no dues and could maintain a separate organization under the jurisdiction of their own factor.

In 1556 a Russian envoy, Nepieia, was sent to the English court to establish formal diplomatic relations. Nepieia obtained certain reciprocal privileges for his country--free trade with England and the right to engage artisans, engineers, and medical doctors for his sovereign's service. Ivan's requests, however, were only partially met by the English government. After twenty years of negotiations, Ivan sent the English ambassador from his court and broke off diplomatic relations. Taking advantage of England's failure to profit from the Muscovite advances, Dutch traders founded trading companies in northern Muscovy and sought to establish a monopoly on the White Sea trade.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, English merchants remained active in Russia for the next two centuries. Commerce with Europe stimulated the domestic market. Traders were attracted to the Urals for furs, and nautical expeditions were equipped to search for sable hunting grounds.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the extension of political and commercial relations with leading European countries encouraged the introduction of elements of foreign culture.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 275. ⁹⁹ Tompkins, op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁰⁰ Pankratova, op. cit., p. 172.

Also significant to the social development of the country were the financial and administrative reforms of Ivan IV. Up to the middle of the sixteenth century, the administration of the provinces was carried out by appointed governors who collected taxes, administered justice, and retained as their remuneration part of the revenue they collected.¹⁰¹

The new code prepared in 1550 and approved by the Church Council in 1551 attempted to define more precisely the relations between the governors and the populace and to limit the powers of the former. Moreover, the financial administration of some districts was transferred from the governors to elected officials. Most important was the fact that certain police and judicial functions were relegated to elected officials.

The Church Council of 1551 also sought to eradicate some of the evils prevalent within the Russian Church.

The questions submitted to the council, as well as its decisions, present an indictment of the clergy and the monasteries, a picture of illiteracy, abuse of power, callous indifference to the sufferings of the poor, drunkenness, debauchery, neglect of ecclesiastical duties, ignorance of Church canons and services, indifference to . . .pagan practices.¹⁰²

The Council ordered the revision of books, demanded the opening of homes for the poor, and the establishment of schools. It also sought to eliminate the gross defects in the administration of ecclesiastical practices and issued decrees on the religious and secular education of children who were to be trained as clerics. The decisions of the

¹⁰¹Forinsky, op. cit., p. 192. ¹⁰²Ibid., p. 197.

Council, however, did not result in any marked improvement in the situation.

Because schools were rare, the home continued to be the primary institution responsible for inducting the youth into the adult world. The principles and procedures of educating the children were formally articulated in the Domostroi--one of the notable literary works of Muscovite Russia. This book does not correspond to any particular epoch but is a work of compilation that has been attributed to Daniel Sylvester. "It contains a set of instructions. . .covering a large range of subjects, religious, moral, and domestic."¹⁰³ The most salient feature of the book is its portrayal of the materialism that pervaded the domestic and social life of the period. Education of the children was largely restricted to teaching them to dread their God, to obeying the head of the family, and to performing manual tasks. By combining the evangelical ideal, that of humility and love, with the Biblical ideal, that of the power of the family, the Domostroi provided a blueprint which detailed the religious, moral, and practical life patterns to be followed by the family. As a whole, the book ". . .reflects the ritualism, piety, severity, and patriarchal nature of Russian society."¹⁰⁴

Other works of educational significance were the Azbukovnik (ABC of Knowledge) and the Tcheti-Minei (readings for every month). The

¹⁰³Nicolas Zernov, The Russians and Their Church (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1945), p. 57.

¹⁰⁴Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 224.

ABC of Knowledge was an encyclopedic dictionary of useful knowledge designed

. . .To invest with authority the system of knowledge and opinion obligatory for the right-thinking reader--all proceeded from full reliance on the religio-political and moral principles of Moscow, the "third Rome". . . .There could be no questioning or critically revaluating these principles in the slightest degree but only of lifting the general structure and everyday routine of life to the ideal norm which had been prescribed once and for all in hard and fast sacrosanct traditions.¹⁰⁵

The Tcheti-Minei, written by Metropolitan Macarius, included spiritual readings for every day of the month appropriate to the memory of the saint listed in the calendar for that particular day. However, it was more than a collection of instructions. In the Tcheti-Minei, a work consisting of twelve volumes, Macarius collected all the available religious literature of his country. Besides the daily readings, it contained commentaries on the Bible, hagiographies, sermons, and descriptions of journeys. For twenty years the metropolitan worked on this project--a project that inaugurated a literary movement that soon spread all over Muscovy. "The lives of the newly-canonised Saints were composed, the history and geography of Russia written, and all these books were adorned with large numbers of finely executed illustrations."¹⁰⁶

During the time that the above works were compiled, Ivan IV established a printing press in Moscow. It is generally assumed that the first Russian printed book appeared in 1564. Slavonic books had been printed earlier in Cracow and Venice but the fear of heresy and

¹⁰⁵N. K. Gudzy, History of Early Russian Literature, trans. Susan W. Jones (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 347.

¹⁰⁶Zernov, op. cit., p. 59.

the existence of numerous copyists hindered the acceptance of this technique by the Muscovites. However, there were factors that facilitated the acceptance of this process. The acquisition of Kazan, the growing administrative demands of a society becoming more and more complex, and cultural developments in general created a demand for more books and encouraged the development of printing.

Thus, by the command of the Orthodox Tsar and Prince Ivan Vasilevich of all Russia, and with the blessing of the most holy Metropolitan Makary, the art of book printing began to be studied, in the sixty-first year of the eighth millenium. In the thirteenth year of his reign, the Orthodox Tsar ordered a house to be fitted from his own funds to set up the printing shop;. . .The first books to be printed were the Acts of the Apostles, with the Epistles of the Councils and the Epistles of St. Paul.¹⁰⁷

The first printing press, however, was in operation for only a brief time. In those days the masses believed that the printing of books was the work of the devil. Therefore, it was relatively easy for zealous copyists to incite a mob to wreck the printing press that was established in 1563. Undaunted by his first failure, Ivan IV set up a new one in Alexandrovo where the first Russian secular book was printed (1570).¹⁰⁸

The establishment of the printing press made possible the publication of books and several literary and didactic writings, especially publistic literature. The character and content of the latter reflected the struggle between the rising nobility and the boyars whose political and economic decline was followed by the loss of former

¹⁰⁷Postface to the "Acts of the Apostles" (1564), cited by Marthe Blinoff, Life and Thought in Old Russia (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1961), p. 107.

¹⁰⁸Pankratova, op. cit., p. 174.

social privileges.¹⁰⁹

The outstanding ideologist for the nobility during Ivan IV's reign was Ivan Peresvetov. In his publicistic tales and petitions to the tsar, produced in the early 1540's, Peresvetov revealed himself as an apologist for the autocratic state. In the Legend of the Emperor Constantine he supports imperial terror:

When an emperor is mild and gentle with his empire. . .its wealth declines and his fame decreases. When an emperor rules in terror and wisdom, his empire broadens and his name is known in all lands.¹¹⁰

It is interesting to note that Peresvetov wrote in plain Russian almost entirely free from Church Slavonic and without the quotations from the Bible that characterized the writings of his contemporaries.

The publicist who wrote in defence of the boyars was the well-educated Prince A. M. Kurbsky, author of History of The Great Prince of Moscow and letters to the tsar. The History of the Great Prince of Moscow, a book written in defence of the boyars, is sharply critical of Ivan IV. Similarly, Kurbsky's epistles to Ivan accuse the sovereign of cruelty to the boyars. The literary significance of Kurbsky's letter and his pamphlet history

. . .Reside in the striking originality of his style, revealing him as a skilled orator and a dialectician capable of combining language emotional to the point of passion with harmony and strict formal logic of structure.¹¹¹

Ivan's letters to Kurbsky reveal that the tsar himself ". . .was

¹⁰⁹Gudzy, op. cit., p. 333.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 335.

a writer of no mean gifts."¹¹² Though Ivan has no style at all, he invests his arguments with spirit, vehemence, and energy--". . . phrases that hit the mark like an arrow from the bow."¹¹³

You, however, for the sake of your body have destroyed the soul and for the sake of short-lived fame have scorned imperishable glory, and having raged against man; you have risen against God.¹¹⁴

All the above efforts, however, did not bring about any substantial change in the educational standards of Muscovite Russia. Literacy, among the masses, was poorly developed. The only educated people in the sixteenth century came from the ranks of the boyars and members of the clergy. Dr. Giles Fletcher, a British observer who visited Russia in 1588-1589, reported the prevalence of widespread ignorance in the country. In his book, Of the Russe Commonwealth, published in 1591, Fletcher stated that the tyrannical government exercised severe oppression over the 'minds and wits' of the people, thus stifling their natural aptitudes for learning.

For the qualities of their people otherwise, though there seemeth to be in them some aptnesse to receyue any art (as appeareth by the naturall wittes in the men, and very children) yet they excell in no kinde of common art, much lesse in any learning, or litterall kinde of knowledge: which they are kept from of purpose, as they are also from all militarie practise; that they may be fitter for the servile condition, wherein now they are, and have neyther reason, nor valure to attempt innovation. For this purpose also they are kept from traveling, that they may learn nothing, nor see the fashions of oúther Countries

¹¹²Pankratova, op. cit., p. 174. ¹¹³Waliszewski, op. cit., p. 233.

¹¹⁴J. L. I. Fennell (ed. and trans.), The Correspondence Between Prince A. M. Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia 1564-1579 (Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 19.

abroad.¹¹⁵

With reference to the priests, Fletcher claims:

They are men utterly unlearned, which is no marveile, forasmuch as their makers, the Bishops themselves. . .are cleere of that qualities, and make no farther use at al of any kinde of learning, no not of the scripture themselves, save to read and sing them.¹¹⁶

Despite Ivan's political and social reforms and his effort to raise the educational standards of Russia, it is evident that the negative aspects of his rule are the most important. Ivan's rule with its political turmoil, its remodeling of the social structure, and its continuous wars exhausted the country's resources and created acute social conflicts. At the end of his reign every social class nursed grievances. The old aristocracy and the boyars had lost their patrimonial estates, witnessed a marked decline in their political and social status, and had been enrolled in the service of the state. In addition to this, they were confronted with economic ruin as a result of the depopulation of their estates. Dvoriane (landholders subject to obligatory military service) were faced with a similar problem. Their economic situation, though, differed as widely as their social status. The size of their landholdings varied from large estates to small plots of land frequently farmed by the dворянин himself. Most important, however, was the deteriorating position of the peasant. With the rapid growth of the service gentry, more and more land came into their possession through the

¹¹⁵Giles Fletcher, Of the Russe Commonwealth 1591 (facsimile edition with variants; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 48.

¹¹⁶Ibid., pp. 85-86.

domestic system. To meet the state obligations, the gentry made increasingly burdensome demands upon their peasants. Hence, many of the latter attempted to escape to newly acquired areas. Muscovite authorities, acting in the interests of the gentry and the state, attempted to stop the depopulation of the estates by banning legal migration and by severely curtailing the peasants' right to move. Yet the peasants continued to flee despite all prohibitions.

In urban centers the progress of commercial activities was hampered by the government's fiscal policy which tried to centralize trade activities in order to facilitate the collection of taxes. Towards the end of Ivan's reign, a degree of stratification developed among those engaged in commerce and industry.¹¹⁷ Wealthy merchants were appointed to collect taxes and to represent the government in matters concerning trade. The task was not directly remunerated. Instead, the appointees were granted special privileges. For example, they were exempt from the jurisdiction of ordinary courts and were not obliged to pay taxes. Such privileges acted to the detriment of the majority of merchants who were neither wealthy nor exempt from taxation.

The social conflicts that appeared during Ivan's reign, however, were but logical culminations of preceding events. Ivan III and Basil III had unified the country but had suppressed all independent political force and ancient legal and social institutions. This process was completed by Ivan IV. "Torn by irreconcilable social and economic

¹¹⁷Florinsky, op. cit., p. 217.

antagonisms. . . , Russia was steadily moving towards a major political crisis."¹¹⁸

Such were the social, economic, and political conditions in Russia when Theodore I ascended the throne. Physically weak and limited in intelligence, Theodore left the administration of the country to his advisers. In the meantime, the palace intrigues and struggle between the rival boyar groups, which had been kept in check by Ivan IV, were resumed. Although many aspects of this conflict are unknown, it appears as if the rivalry was between the nobility of ancient lineage and the new nobility such as the Romanovs and the Godunovs. The attempt of the ancient families to regain their former authority and status failed. From the beginning of Theodore's reign, the tsar's brother-in-law, Boris Godunov, asserted himself as the real ruler of Russia and it was not long before he eliminated any serious challenge to his position.

Florinsky declares that, "Fedor slipped through the fourteen years of his reign like a shadow, effaced without leaving any imprint on the course of events."¹¹⁹ Even the extraordinary event that occurred during his reign--the establishment of a patriarchate in Russia in 1589--has been credited to Boris Godunov's diplomacy. The termination of allegiance to the patriarch at Constantinople marked the beginning of the autocephalous period in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church. Following this development, the church hierarchy was enlarged and its organization strengthened. Both of these factors proved to be of great

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 208.

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 219.

importance in the Time of Troubles (1598-1613).

With the death of Theodore in 1598, the Riurik dynasty came to an end. The people of Moscow at that time are pictured as possessed of a purely animal grief. Men sobbed because the dynasty was dead. A whole people asked: "What will happen to us now that the family of the grand dukes and the tsars have perished?"¹²⁰ A new tsar had to be found. A specially convened zemskii sobor elected Boris Godunov as the new sovereign. Godunov, who officially ruled from 1598-1605, continued to be an intelligent and capable leader.¹²¹ Peaceful relations were maintained with foreign countries and trade agreements were concluded with England and the Hanseatic League. With regard to domestic affairs, Godunov ". . . had some grandiose cultural and educational plans for his country."¹²² His plans included the establishment of a university in Moscow--a plan he had to abandon because of the clergy's opposition. He did succeed in sending a large number of Russians to study in France, England, and Germany and in obtaining scholars and scientists for state service.

The period dating from Boris Godunov's ascension to the election of Michael as tsar is referred to as the Time of Troubles--a period characterized by dynastic, national, and social problems. The dynastic issue emerged because of the absence of a legitimate heir; the national issue resulted from the centuries-old Russian conflict with Poland and

¹²⁰Stephen Graham, Boris Godunov (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), p. 109.

¹²¹Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 176. ¹²²Bereday, op. cit., p. 25.

Sweden. However, it was the social disorganization and strife that made the dynastic issue significant and the Muscovite state vulnerable to foreign invasion.

During this period social and economic antagonisms were exacerbated by the famine of 1601-1603. The disaster brought untold suffering to the populace. Profiteering by merchants and landlords increased the hardships. "Dead people lay in the streets of Moscow with their mouths full of chaff or grass. Many of these died of panic, which in time of famine causes more deaths than actual starvation."¹²³ Adding to the misery of the country was the plague that swept across Russia in the wake of the famine. Altogether, it has been estimated that in the early years of the Time of Troubles, a third of the population of Great Russia perished as a result of the interrelated devastations of war, plague, and famine.¹²⁴

Ever since the late years of Ivan IV's reign, Muscovy experienced political uncertainty and ideological confusion. To a large extent, Ivan broke the sense of continuity with the past and the solidarity between sovereign, church, and family which formed the basis of Muscovite civilization. At this time of moral collapse and general suffering, the Church remained the sole unifying element within the country. At its center stood the monastic community which actually gained stature during the Time of Troubles--a period characterized by a fervent religious revival. Bequests and pilgrimages to monasteries increased and new

¹²³Graham, op. cit., p. 146. ¹²⁴Billington, op. cit., p. 119.

cloisters and churches were built. Those who built and worshipped in the churches were imbued with a mixture of spirituality and xenophobia.¹²⁵ Holy Russia was viewed not only as suffering to attain purity but also as a victim of the Poles, Lithuanians, and Jews. Common enemies and a common faith made possible the political revival of Russia in the second decade of the seventeenth century. However, it was the Church that played the most important role in the revival. "In the absence of a tsar and because of the impotence of the boyar дума. . .the Church headed the national rally."¹²⁶ Largely as a result of Patriarch Hermogen's religious and national appeals, the Russian masses were aroused and a national army was formed. Social antagonisms within the corps, however, led to internal dissension and the disbanding of the gentry army. Yet the Russians did not collapse. Instead, they staged a second rally and in September, 1612, captured the Polish garrison in Moscow, freeing the capital of the enemy. In 1613 the victors summoned the zemskii sobor which elected Michael Romanov as tsar, thus establishing a stable and legitimate government in Russia.

In the years that followed, internal disorder, foreign invasion, and financial difficulties continued to plague Muscovy. Within three years, however, the government made concessions to the rebellious Cossacks, amnestied all bandits providing they would join the army to fight the Swedes, and destroyed the remaining opponents to centralized authority. International relations were also stabilized. Peace .

¹²⁵Billington, op. cit., p. 126. ¹²⁶Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 187.

treaties concluded with Sweden in 1617 and with Poland in 1618 checked foreign aggression. Restoring the national economy proved more difficult to attain. Despite the variety of measures taken to raise money, financial difficulties remained to plague Tsar Michael's successors.

In the reign of Michael, diplomatic relations with England, France, Austria, and Denmark were resumed. Realizing the need for the military and industrial techniques of Western Europe, the Muscovite government encouraged foreigners to come to Russia. As early as the sixteenth century--during Ivan IV's reign--Western European immigrants settled near Moscow. Their settlement was designated as the German Quarter probably because most of its dwellers were from Germany. After the ascension of Michael, the influx of foreigners increased rapidly. Many of these newcomers settled within the walls of the capital itself. In time, the juxtaposition of the immigrants with the native Russians gave rise to feuds and riots. To avoid these disturbances, the government, during Michael's reign, issued a ukaz, which forbade the Europeans to settle within the metropolis. In 1643 foreigners were evicted from the city and forced to settle on an area along the River Yauza. "Thus there arose a new German or Foreign Quarter which quickly developed into a large well-built suburb. . . ." ¹²⁷ This German settlement came to be the intermediary between Russia and the West.

The technical experts, capitalists, and military officers whom the Government engaged for external defence or the industrial requirements of Muscovite domestic existence brought with them to

¹²⁷ Kluchevsky, op. cit., III, p. 279.

Moscow not only their military and industrial skill, but also the comforts, the amenities, and the conveniences of life as lived in Western Europe, and it is curious to note the eagerness with which the leaders of Muscovite society leapt at foreign and imported delights, though, in so doing, they broke with their own rooted customs, prejudices, and tastes.¹²⁸

Tsar Michael also sent young Russians to study in England. Evidence of this is seen in his correspondence with King James I. On June 17, 1621, Michael wrote to the English king:

Whereas about 17 years past, . . . there was wnt into your Majesties Dominiones fower young gentlement of our Kingdome by name Mekepher Alphery, Soffone Kosuchove with others, to trayned upp in the English and Lattin tongs and soe to be retorned againe and delivered to the Lordes of our Counsell.¹²⁹

Also of interest to the development of education at this time was the founding, in 1615, of the Orthodox Fraternity of Kiev. The primary aim of this school was to combat Catholicism. In this respect it was but an extension of a social movement that originated in the preceding decades--a movement that was the outgrowth of a series of historical events.

From the time of Iaroslav's death, internal strife, foreign invasions, and the loss of a pre-eminent position in the sphere of international trade were factors that undermined the stability, unity, and prosperity of the Kievan state. In addition, rival princes from the north-east territories challenged Kiev's supremacy. Towards the latter part of the seventeenth century, Bogoliubskii not only sacked

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 280.

¹²⁹S. Konovalov, "Anglo-Russian Relations, 1620-24," Oxford Slavonic Papers, S. Konovalov (ed.) (1953), IV, p. 104.

Kiev but also transferred the seat of the grand prince to Vladimir. Finally, in 1240, the once glorious state was completely destroyed by the Mongols.

In the years that followed, Muscovite rulers brought a large part of the former Kievan territory under their authority. Another large part of the Kievan state was eventually annexed by the grand prince of Lithuania. Beginning with Mindovg's reign (1240-1263), the Lithuanians expanded eastward, particularly along the Dneiper Valley. At first this movement was gradual, but, because the Russian power of resistance was extremely low, the Lithuanians accelerated their advances. In 1319, Gedymin, the true founder of the Lithuanian state, captured Kiev, the ancient capital of Russia. Olgerd, Gedymin's son, continued the work of his father and brought under his authority the Russian lands of Volynia, Kiev, Chernigov, and Smolensk. During his reign the ". . . Lithuanian sway spread from the Baltic to the Black Sea."¹³⁰

Lithuanian domination, however, did not represent foreign rule. In fact, some historians speak of a Lithuanian-Russian state. To a certain extent their position is justifiable. For instance, two-thirds to three-quarters of the population of this vast territory was Russian. Moreover, little social dislocation took place. The Orthodox Church was treated with respect and many of the Lithuanians were converted to Eastern Christianity. Some of the princes even became ardent patrons of learning. Gedymin, for example, built schools and churches where

¹³⁰ Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 148.

Orthodoxy and the Slavic language were taught.¹³¹ Vilna, his capital, ". . .with its many Orthodox churches and monasteries, looked a typical Russian city."¹³² Also,

. . .The Russian boyars and the Orthodox Church kept their high positions and extensive privileges; Russian princes continued to rule in different appanages next to Lithuanian princes, all subject to the Lithuanian grand prince; and intermarriage between the two aristocracies was quite common.¹³³

Indeed, Riasanovsky considers the Lithuanian state an heir to the Kievan state rather than an imposition of a foreign rule upon Russia.

After the dynastic agreement of Kreivo in 1385, Jagiello, Olgerd's son, married Queen Jadwiga of Poland, thus becoming the sovereign of both states. Though the states remained distinct, Poland exercised an increasing influence on Lithuania after 1385. To marry Jadwiga, Jagiello was obliged to convert to Catholicism. Many of his pagan subjects followed his example. Since the clergy of this faith came to Lithuania from Poland, the Catholic Church became an important agency for presenting Polish cultural elements.

Education followed religion. The first schools were cathedral or monastic schools whose teachers were chiefly members of the clergy. For higher education the Lithuanians had to go to Cracow--the famous Polish university. Hence, Lithuanian education and religion felt the impact of the Catholic Church.

Its influence was also evident in economics and politics.

¹³¹Zernov, op. cit., p. 32. ¹³²Ibid.

¹³³Riasanovsky, op. cit., pp. 148-49.

Church estates grew, and they remained exempt from general taxation. The bishops sat in the council of the grand prince, while many clerics, highly esteemed for their education, engaged in the conduct of state business.¹³⁴

In time, the principality of Lithuania came into the Polish political sphere. Finally, in 1569, the Union of Lublin merged the two states into a commonwealth with Poland being the senior partner. The Lithuanians accepted the conditions of the union only after the Polish sovereign, Sigismund II, seized large Russian territories from Lithuania. The latter was granted vast autonomy but Poland besides keeping the lands she annexed also had a predominant majority of representatives in the newly established common diet. Overall, the Union of Lublin represented a decisive victory for the Poles.

Poland's annexation of the southern areas of the Lithuanian principality meant that the Russian people were no longer in a state that continued the ancient Kievan traditions. Instead, they were now under foreign rule--Polish and Catholic. The Polish seizure of the bulk of the former Kievan state opened a new era in the history of the Ukrainian people. Furthermore, foreign domination of this territory had important consequences for the cultural development of Great Russia.

Because the culture of Poland at this time was almost the complete antithesis of Muscovy, the direct confrontation with Polish culture represented the first conflict of ideas with the West. In the loose republic of Poland-Lithuania, the cosmopolitan population included Catholics, Orthodox believers, Calvinists, and Jews. The mystical piety

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 150.

and folklore of Muscovite society stood in sharp contrast to the Latin rationalism and Renaissance literature that dominated Poland. Furthermore, in contradiction to Russian Orthodox practice, Poland used painting and music for profane purposes, used illustrations for propaganda purposes, and composed instrumental and polyphonic music.¹³⁵

More important, however, was the fact that during the reign of Sigismund III, Poland represented the vanguard of the Counter-Reformation. For years the Jesuits had tried to convince the Vatican that Catholic losses in Western and Northern Europe could be recouped in the East. This Order had encouraged the formation in the western part of Russia of the Uniat Church--a church that retained Eastern Orthodox rites and the use of the Slavonic language but recognized the supremacy of the pope and accepted the Latin formulation of the creed. In 1596 they also helped in securing its formal recognition by the Vatican.

During Ivan IV's reign, Jesuit zealots and leaders of the newly formed Society for the Propagation of the Faith entertained the idea that Russia might be converted to Catholicism. In the first decade of the seventeenth century, the Jesuits attempted to realize their ambitions.

Capitalizing on the confused Muscovite hopes that a "true Tsar" was still somewhere to be found, the Jesuits helped the Poles to ride to power in the retinue of the pretender, Dmitry. . . . Capitalizing on the religious reverence accorded icons in Muscovy, pictures of Dmitry were printed for circulation to the superstitious masses. Anxious to secure the claims of a new dynasty, a Catholic marriage for Dmitry was staged within the Kremlin.¹³⁶

The new ruler and his entourage upset the Muscovites. Dmitrii failed to observe the established traditions. For example, he did not

¹³⁵ Billington, op. cit., p. 104.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 105.

attend church service. The Poles proved to be even more disturbing. They despised the Russians who in turn looked upon the foreigners as heretics. Open conflict between the two groups became increasingly frequent. Finally, the boyars staged a coup and after denouncing Dmitrii as an imposter put him to death along with two to three thousand other Russians and Poles.¹³⁷ The military defeat of Poland resulted in the defeat of Catholicism among the Eastern Slavs. However, in pushing back the Polish armies, Muscovy absorbed many elements of Latin culture, particularly in the literary and artistic fields.

The Vatican-supported Polish offensive against Orthodoxy stimulated the ideological and national rally in Muscovy which drove out the Poles and eventually united Russia. Subsequent writing about this period reflects the fact that in the attempt to establish its authority over the Russian Church, the Roman Catholic Church succeeded only in increasing Russian xenophobia towards Catholicism and the Poles. The struggle against Catholicism was also waged in Eastern Poland, where the Counter-Reformation had come relatively late. Here, the Orthodox cause was strengthened ". . .by the Orthodox community of White Russia and the proximity of Orthodox Muscovy."¹³⁸ In their struggle against forced Catholicism, Orthodox and Protestant minorities joined forces. One consequence of this alliance was the adoption of Protestant organizational and polemic techniques by the followers of Orthodoxy--a trend which was accelerated following the formation of the Uniat Church. Thus,

¹³⁷ Riasanovsky, op. cit., pp. 180-81.

¹³⁸ Billington, op. cit., p. 106.

in organizing their resistance to Catholicism, Orthodox communities relied increasingly on regional brotherhoods--a close knit form of organization that originated among the neighboring Czech dissenters.

The anti-hierarchical bias, close communal discipline, and emphasis on a program of religious printing and education in the vernacular among the Orthodox brotherhoods are reminiscent of . . . Calvinist practice.¹³⁹

Initially, the brotherhoods were philanthropic organizations. Towards the end of the sixteenth century they began directing their efforts towards raising the standard of literacy of the Orthodox community.¹⁴⁰ The schools and printing presses they established in White Russia were the first instructional media that appeared among the Orthodox Eastern Slavs. At first only reading and writing were taught in these parish schools. By the end of the century, the curriculum was extended to include the teaching of languages--Greek, Slavonic, Latin and Polish--grammar, rhetoric, dialectics, theology, and other sciences.¹⁴¹ A higher school called the School of Hellenic-Slavonic and Latin-Polish Learning was founded in Kiev in 1594.

Brotherhood presses made further contributions to the enlightenment of the people. The press at Vilna published the first two Church Slavonic grammars in 1596 and 1619 and the establishment at Lvov published more than thirty-three thousand basic alphabet books between 1585 and 1722. At Ostrog, the school taught Latin and Greek and

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 107.

¹⁴⁰I. Shakhnovski, A Short History of Russian Literature, trans. from the Russian (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Company, 1921), p. 30.

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 31.

sponsored the printing in 1576-70 of the first complete Slavonic bible.¹⁴² These brotherhood schools increased rapidly in the early, seventeenth century, as Orthodox communities sought to fight the extension of Catholic influence.

The theological struggle in Eastern Poland between the Orthodox community and Polish Catholics was complicated by political considerations. Polish domination after 1569 of the former Kievan territories meant not only the increasing pressure of the Catholics on the Orthodox people but also the granting of exclusive rights to the gentry at the expense of the peasant masses. The religious, social, and political issues became more intense after 1596--the year that marked the Union of Brest and the establishment of the Uniat Church. Because the Jesuits promised them equal political rights and a considerable degree of episcopal autonomy, most of the Russian bishops favored the Unia.¹⁴³ However, the vast majority of the clergy and laity were opposed to it. In the year that the Uniat Church was founded, Sigismund III of Poland, an ardent Roman Catholic, declared that the opponents to the union were rebels against Church and state. A regular persecution followed; Orthodox churches were closed, priests were arrested, and the laity was forced to endure humiliation and insult. Despite these repressive measures, Eastern Orthodoxy survived, while the Uniat Church failed.

The Roman Catholics looked down on it as an inferior form of Christianity; the Orthodox treated it as an apostate body. The Uniat bishops were never admitted to the Senate, and those Russians and Lithuanians who wanted to get on in Polish society preferred

¹⁴² Billington, op. cit., p. 108. ¹⁴³ Zernov, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

to join the Latin Church and thus obtain full political rights, an honour which was never bestowed upon the Uniates.¹⁴⁴

Thus, instead of establishing a link between Eastern and Western Christians, the Unia intensified the animosity between these two factions. A protracted struggle between the Orthodox adherents and the Polish state followed. That Eastern Orthodoxy survived this conflict is attributed to the spiritual support it received from the lay brotherhoods and the political protection it received from the Cossacks.

The role the brotherhoods played in opening schools in all parts of the country to prepare leaders to defend Orthodoxy has already been mentioned. One of the newly trained leaders, Mileti Smotritski, in 1610, published a book that so vividly portrayed the miserable state of the Orthodox that public opinion in Poland began wondering whether the persecutions would lead to rebellion.¹⁴⁵ However, the oppressive policy was continued.

Admidst these calamities a new force appeared--the Cossacks. Since the time of the Tartar invasions the southern steppes had been a no-man's-land where the danger of sudden attack by nomadic tribes made the area too dangerous for settlement. Yet these steppes attracted men who preferred these risks to serfdom and oppression. "These freedom-loving men, known as Cossacks, formed a number of self-governing communities."¹⁴⁶ In their early history, there is no suggestion that they would ever be champions of the Orthodox Church. Yet in the early seventeenth century they assumed this role since they resented

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 87-88.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 88.

the increasing power and privileges of the upper classes who were predominantly Catholic. The Union of Brest further widened the gap between the gentry and the lower elements of Eastern Poland. Hence, the conflict that ensued, being a class war and a national rally, took on the religious coloration of a crusade.

Assured of military support, the Orthodox leaders organized a new center of resistance. The center of this movement was the Theological Academy of Kiev, founded in 1615. Feeling secure that the Cossack army would protect them, ". . .the members of the college started an energetic campaign in defense of their Church. . . ." ¹⁴⁷ Under the leadership of Peter Mogila (1596-1647) the Academy reached the zenith of its importance. Convinced that the Orthodox Church needed men of the same intellectual calibre as the Catholic Church had, Mogila changed the whole system of instruction in the Kievan Academy.

His reform consisted in adapting for use by the Orthodox the programme of training devised by the Jesuits for their own colleges. Even the language of instruction was changed to Latin, and students had to listen to Latin lectures, to read Latin books, to preach sermons in Latin. This was a striking departure from tradition. . . . ¹⁴⁸

Evidently, Mogila, though he firmly rejected the authority of Rome, was strongly influenced by the Jesuit theology. So great was the latter's influence upon the former, that Mogila's writings were approved by the Orthodox Church Council only after considerable revisions were made by a Greek prelate. Yet, despite the fact that he latinized Orthodox thought and worship, Mogila gave the Orthodox Church a clergy that could hold

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 90.

their own in theological disputes with the Catholics and Western Protestants. His passion for elevating the educational standards of the Russian hierarchy is apparent in the letter he wrote to Tsar Michael in 1640 in which he urged the tsar to establish a special school in Moscow ". . .where his pupils could teach Orthodox theology and classical languages to the Muscovite nobility."¹⁴⁹

Mogila's reforms marked the breakdown of any hope of solving the conflict between the Eastern Orthodox and Catholic Christians under Polish rule. The Roman Church could not annihilate the Orthodox, yet the Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy and the Polish state officials were not willing to tolerate the Eastern Christians by granting them the status of equality. Both sides began to prepare for the armed conflict which occurred during the early years of Tsar Alexis' reign.

Alexis was only sixteen years old when he was elected tsar by the National Assembly. Personally, he was an attractive man, warm-hearted, free from malice, and genuinely devout. As a ruler, however, Alexis was weak and relied heavily on relatives and advisers. This reliance opened the door for selfishness, greed, and corruption on the part of the new members of the government. Indeed, their abuses became so flagrant that rebellions broke out in Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, and other aggrieved cities.

After suppressing these up-risings, the government took steps to restore order and justice to the country. Of major importance was

¹⁴⁹Billington, op. cit., p. 128.

the formulation of the Ulhozenie of 1649--a new legal code that was approved by a specially convened zetskii sobor. Some of the new enactments were the following:

The clergy was. . . forbidden to acquire more land; the boyars and clergy were forbidden to settle their peasants and serfs in special suburbs near towns, and to accept fictitious transfers of land. . . the urban communities were given the right to reclaim land that had fictitiously gone out of the mir: the nobility was allowed to reclaim fugitive peasants without any limit of time; foreigners were not allowed to trade anywhere in Russia outside of Archangel.¹⁵⁰

The lesser nobility and the urban population benefited from these laws while the clergy, the boyars, and the mass of common people lost out. Thus, the new laws, though enthusiastically acclaimed by the middle classes, only embittered the lower stratum of Russian society.

The new code, known as the "Code of the National Assembly" or Sobornoie Ulozhenie, was printed in 1650. Twenty thousand copies were published for distribution. The widespread dissemination of a code written in a language close to the contemporary vernacular broke the monopoly of Church Slavonic as the written language of Muscovite culture and played a major role in the development of the modern Russian language.¹⁵¹

Despite the improvements in administration and justice, brought about by the new legal code,¹⁵² conditions in Russia remained critical. Faced with desperate financial difficulties, the government attempted to improve the situation by debasing the coinage. This led only to

¹⁵⁰Platonov, op. cit., p. 177. ¹⁵¹Billington, op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁵²Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 197.

inflation, further financial dislocations, and the copper coin riot of 1662. But the most serious rebellion of the reign occurred in 1670-71 under the leadership of the Cossack, Stenka Razin. By insisting that he was loyal to the tsar and that his movement was directed against the boyars, landed nobility, and merchants, Razin won the sympathy and support of the common people and many of the soldiers of the tsar's army.¹⁵³ As his army swelled, the Cossack revolt grew into a nationwide rebellion. Yet, like preceding lower-class uprisings, Razin's revolt lacked the organization and discipline necessary for overthrowing the established order. By 1671, Razin's army of rebels was defeated and he was turned over to the Muscovite government by the Cossacks.

The most important event of Alexis' reign, however, was the extension of Muscovite jurisdiction to the Ukraine in 1654. After 1569, that land found itself under Polish domination. Religious, social, economic, and political issues, mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, led to a series of Cossack and peasant revolts against the Polish overlords. These were brutally suppressed and by 1638, the Poles firmly established their authority. Yet this forced obedience was to last only a single decade. In 1648, the Ukrainians rose again. Under the leadership of Cossack Bogdan Khmel'nitski, they defeated the Polish army and forced King Casimir to grant among other concessions, wide autonomy to the Orthodox people. The victory, though, was short-lived. Peace was broken and this time the Polish army delivered

¹⁵³Platonov, op. cit., p. 181.

a crushing defeat to the rebels. In despair the Ukrainians turned to Moscow for assistance. After much deliberation, Tsar Alexis, acting on the advice of the zemskii sobor, decided to assist the Orthodox in the Ukraine. Consequently, war between Poland and Russia broke out. After thirteen years of fighting, peace was finally concluded. By the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667), all the land on the left bank of the Dneiper became part of the Muscovite state while the territory on the right bank, with the exception of Kiev, remained under Polish control. The failure of the Cossacks to secure autonomy for the Ukrainians profoundly affected Russia.

By incorporating people who had lived under Western influence for two centuries, Russia received a powerful current of new ideas. The stronghold of Orthodoxy, hitherto closely guarded against the outside world, was forced to open its gates. Its inhabitants at last, painfully realised their inferiority in military and technical matters. The Moscow Government was obliged to plan a number of reforms, but these were so strongly resented that a serious split occurred inside the nation and Church.¹⁵⁴

The drive for reform that culminated in the split known as the Great Schism was given impetus by the more learned Ukrainian clergy. As early as the mid-forties, there began an increasing influx of priests to Moscow. "These priests brought with them an emotional opposition to Catholicism and a doctrinal antipathy to Protestantism."¹⁵⁵ By 1653, Ukrainian priests trained by Mogila set up in Moscow two centers of translation and theological instruction. The most prominent center was the monastic school founded by Fedor Rtischev who devoted his life to scholarship.

¹⁵⁴Zernov, op. cit., pp. 91-92. ¹⁵⁵Billington, op. cit., p. 129.

. . . Rtischev was. . . one of the first to urge the amendment of liturgical and religious books, agitate for a system of national education and stress the need for establishing a proper welfare organization in the country.¹⁵⁶

In the school that he founded in 1649 Rtischev commissioned monks to translate foreign works and to instruct Russians in the classical and Slavic languages, philosophy, the sciences, and rhetoric. Another of his achievements was to commission a monk, Epiphane Slavinetski, to compile a Greek-Russian dictionary that was to be used in the theological school. Later, Slavinetski and two other monks translated a variety of geographical, medical, scientific, and educational treatises.

The importance of religion and religious functionaries in Russian society became evident in the schism that arose in the middle of the seventeenth century. This split--a colmination of preceding ideological controversies involving politics, aesthetics, and personal beliefs--was the direct outcome of the confrontation of two principal religious factions within Russia that offered a different answer to one common central question: "How can religion be kept at the center of Russian life in the radically changing conditions of the seventeenth century."¹⁵⁷ In a sense, the different answers represented the continuing struggle of Muscovite and Western forces.

Partisans of the theocratic solution, the monastic clergy from which the episcopal hierarchy of the Russian Church was drawn,

¹⁵⁶Zinaida Schakovskoy, Precursors of Peter the Great, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn from the French (London: Jonathan Cape, 1964), p. 44.

¹⁵⁷Billington, op. cit., p. 127.

. . . Sought to strengthen the ecclesiastical hierarchy, increase central control of Russian monasteries, and increase both the discipline and educational level of the clergy by editing and printing systematic catechistic and devotional manuals. In fact, they sought to elevate the spiritual estate over the temporal by greatly increasing the power of the Moscow Patriarch.¹⁵⁸

To a limited degree, some of these objectives had been attained in the preceding decades. For instance, Philaret had created a strong patriarchate during Michael's reign and the Orthodox clergy was theologically armed through the work of Peter Mogila. The theocrats' position was further strengthened when Tsar Alexis, confronted with domestic and foreign problems, turned in despair for support and guidance to the monk, Nikon. So impressed was the tsar with the monk, that in 1651 Nikon was elevated to the rank of patriarch. During the following six years, he became the virtual ruler of Russia.

Besides using the episcopal hierarchy and the printing press to extend ecclesiastical authority, Nikon sought to strengthen the position of the Church by brining order and uniformity to Russian worship. With the assistance of the Greek and Ukrainian prelates, he not only changed the liturgical texts but also introduced modifications in the ritual and vestments, and tried to impose a more austere artistic style in religious paintings and architecture. "All of this was accompanied by a determined effort to heighten the power of the patriarch. . . ."¹⁵⁹

A different answer to the common central question was proferred by the fundamentalists whose leading spokesman was Avvakum. Like the

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 133.

views of Nikon, Avvakum's position was a summary of the attitudes that had been developing for over a century. Represented primarily by the parish priests, or white clergy, the fundamentalists reflected the conservatism or superstition of the Eastern frontier. This faction advocated a strict adherence to the past and pressed for decrees against Western innovations such as tobacco, hops, instrumental music, representative art, and Frankish icons. In addition, they objected to Nikon's authoritarianism and strongly opposed the slightest change in the traditional form of worship.¹⁶⁰

The turning point in the religious crisis was the Church Council of 1667. This body approved Nikon's reforms, excommunicated the fundamentalists, and banished some of their leaders. Yet their decision did not result in a complete victory for Nikon. On the contrary, the leader of the theocrats was deposed and exiled for attempting to gain supreme political power.

One of the results of the schism was that the ruling state circles, remembering that the patriarch had tried to raise himself above the tsar, ". . .decided by common consent to accord it no real share in the administration of the state."¹⁶¹ By putting an end to the 'old-time political' role of the Church, state officials weakened a powerful force that had for centuries impeded the diffusion of Western ideas to Russia. Moreover, the schism rendered a direct service to Western influences by breaking down ". . .the attitude of suspicious hostility

¹⁶⁰Platonov, op. cit., p. 188. ¹⁶¹Klūchevsky, op. cit., III, p. 329.

to the West which was so widely diffused throughout the Russian community."¹⁶²

Even among the ruling circles who were peculiarly susceptible to the Westernism native antiquity had not yet lost the whole of its magic force; and this factor had long given pause to the reform movement, and weakened the energy of the innovators. The schism, however, shattered the authority of that antiquity by raising, in antiquity's name, a revolt against the Church, and, consequently, against her ally the State. The greater portion of the Russian Church community now perceived the evil feelings and tendencies which antiquity could foster, . . .; wherefore the directors of the reform movement, though still wavering a little between native antiquity and the West, were enabled to go their way with an easier conscience, and with boldness and decision.¹⁶³

A secondary outcome of the schism was of particular importance to education. The old-believers had condemned all Western ideas and western science; the official Church excommunicated the fundamentalists en bloc. Therefore, it was logical that the official Church would express a more tolerant attitude towards learning. Hence, the Church Council of 1666-67, which deposed Nikon and anathematized the old-believers, issued a decree that directed the priests to teach their children to read and write. This directive was primarily concerned with the children of the clergy because, by this time, the priesthood had become largely hereditary. But even this modest request was not fulfilled for over a hundred years later many of the clerics were still illiterate.¹⁶⁴

More important, however, was the fact that a number of higher Church officials, as well as Greek and Western-European savants,

¹⁶²Ibid., p. 330. ¹⁶³Ibid.

¹⁶⁴Florinsky, op. cit., p. 298.

recognized that one of the major causes of the schism was the low educational level of the Russian people. Expressing the view of the Orthodox hierarch, Paisius Ligarid, metropolitan of Gaza, declared that ". . .the fundamental cause of the schism was the absence of schools and libraries."¹⁶⁵

A consequence of this awareness was a renewed effort to establish new schools. For example, in 1667, the parishioners of the Muscovite Church of Saint John expressed the desire to add to their church,

. . .A school, yet not a mere parish educational establishment, but rather a general educational establishment for the imparting of "cunning in letters, and the Slavonic, Greek, and Latin tongues, and other free teachings." To this end a petition was forwarded to the Tsar. . .¹⁶⁶

Though there is no evidence to show that this school was actually opened, a new theological school was founded near Moscow in 1666, with Simon Polotski as director. The curriculum of this school, known as the School for the Teaching of Letters, included grammar, Latin, and other liberal subjects. In 1668, the school was discontinued. Nevertheless, the venture was significant because it represented the first official recognition for the need of higher education.¹⁶⁷

The cultural-educational situation near the end of Tsar Alexis' reign has been well summarized by Kliuchevsky:

. . .Moscow came to feel the necessity of assimilating, firstly European arts and comforts, and, in later days, European scientific erudition. Beginning with foreign officers and German artillerymen, she ended with German ballets and the Latin Grammar.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵Ibid. ¹⁶⁶Kliuchevsky, op. cit., III, p. 289.

¹⁶⁷Florinsky, op. cit., p. 299. ¹⁶⁸Kliuchevsky, op. cit., III, p. 291.

At first only a few accepted Western ideas and customs. As powerful advocates for cultural reform made their appearance, for example, Rtischev, the society of Moscow gradually began to adopt new customs and ideals.

Thus, while the upper circle of Muscovite society were borrowing of the foreigner his "diverting crafts" and "specious devices," those same circles also developed an intellectual love of knowledge, an interest in scientific erudition, a willingness to think upon subjects which had not yet come within the ordinary purview of the ancient Russian, or within the daily round of his requirements. For instance, at Court in particular there arose an association of influential amateurs of Western European comfort and culture.¹⁶⁹

As is evident in the above excerpt, Western ideas affected only the upper segment of Russian society. For almost two centuries a similar situation prevailed for as late as the 1850's, Russian culture was essentially gentry culture.¹⁷⁰ Consequently, the coming of Westernization only widened the gulf between the privileged stratum of Russian society and the masses at the bottom. Moreover, the cultural development overbalanced the educational. For instance, though by 1673 Moscow had succeeded in organizing an academy of drama, she ". . . had not yet compassed elementary schools for the teaching of letters. . . ." ¹⁷¹

Yet, though lagging behind the cultural transformation, developments in education continued. The schism had given an indirect impetus to scholastic enlightenment. Greek and Western-European savants, convinced that one of the causes of the schism was the low level of education in Russia, directed their attention to the problem of regular

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 284. ¹⁷⁰ Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 380.

¹⁷¹ Kluchévsky, op. cit., III, p. 283.

schools. But the question arose as to what type these schools were to be. By the end of Theodore's reign (1676-1682) a struggle emerged between the advocates of Latin and Greek. In 1682, Medvedev, a disciple of Polotski and a supporter of Latinism, organized a school in Moscow on the Kievan model. Simultaneously, the partisans of Hellenism opened a printing press and established a school devoted to the study of Greek.

The antagonistic movements, however, were both opposed to the Reformation which was beginning to make converts in Moscow. To strengthen their position against Protestantism, the two schools merged in 1687 to form the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy; ". . . which became not only the center of higher learning' but also the all-powerful arbiter in education and religious matters."¹⁷²

This Academy, directed by two Greek-born brothers [monks] . . . was granted monopolistic privileges in teaching foreign languages, approving foreign-language teachers, admitting foreign scholars to Russia, enforcing religious orthodoxy and rooting out all forms of heresy.¹⁷³

Rigid adherence to Byzantine tradition and zealous detection of Latin heresies characterized the intellectual climate of this academy. It is little wonder, then, that the academic standard of this institution deteriorated and that the academy went through a protracted period of decadence.

In general, little was done under the first Romanovs toward advancing education. Yet the period was not entirely unproductive.

¹⁷²Florinsky, op. cit., p. 299.

¹⁷³Bereday, op. cit., p. 29.

Though the Church remained the primary component of civilization, the seventeenth century witnessed a new phenomenon—the appearance of lay scholars. A considerable number of boyars, merchants, and even peasants learned to read and write despite the abhorrence of the majority toward formal education.¹⁷⁴

The spread of the art of printing increased the output of reading material. A primer first published in 1634 was reprinted several times. Moreover, it was sold at a price even the poorest could afford. Grammar books were also published. To meet the increasing demand for reading matter the Printing Office was enlarged. By 1649 its warehouse contained over eleven thousand printed volumes.¹⁷⁵

Yet other branches of knowledge did not fare equally well. Rhetoric, dialectic, and philosophy were practically unknown except to a number of Polotski's students and other Kievan monks. Mathematics also made no progress. Because the Muscovites used Slavic characters instead of Arabic figures, they seldom ventured beyond addition and subtraction. In fact, not until 1703 was the first arithmetic textbook printed. Some interest was shown in geometry but the science was restricted to the art of measuring land surfaces. Euclidean geometry, rediscovered by Western Europe in the twelfth century, was unknown to the Russians until 1719. In astrology and astronomy the Muscovites also showed little initiative. Discussions in these areas were still based on medieval European ideas and there was nothing regarding the theories of Copernicus, Galilio, and Newton. Similarly, ideas of medicine

¹⁷⁴ Shakhnovski, op. cit., p. 89. ¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 89.

and natural history were drawn from the European treatises of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The humanities, however, showed a tendency toward emancipation. Historical manuals were revised and Russian history was rewritten to portray Russia as a national state. But despite this trend, the majority of the works continued to represent historical events as the eternal conflict between good and evil. Developments in literature surpassed those accomplished in history. Earlier Russian literature had been dominated by dogmatic Christian morals. Seventeenth century literature, though retaining much of the moralizing tradition, provided the reader with lay reading material--tales of adventure, love stories, and other narratives that were intended to amuse rather than educate.¹⁷⁶ The extension of the reading public influenced the evolution of the literary language, an evolution that had its beginning at an earlier period. Two literary styles gradually developed: one used by religious writers and one by lay authors. Though the cleavage between the two styles did not occur until the eighteenth century, the growth of secular literature in the seventeenth century prepared the way for such a development.

As is evident in the preceding paragraphs, seventeenth century Russia, despite the increasing influx of Western ideas, lagged far behind many of the European countries as far as intellectual accomplishments were concerned. To a certain extent, her backwardness was the result of an intellectual isolation that ". . . was the direct outcome of her affiliation to her Byzantine alma-mater."¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶Florinsky, op. cit., p. 301. ¹⁷⁷Waliszewski, op. cit., p. 63.

Out of the 240 writers who appeared in Russia up to the close of the seventeenth century (without reckoning the Catholics of the south-west), 190 were monks, 20 belonged to the secular clergy, and the remaining 30 dealt chiefly with religious subjects. Thus literature and science were almost exclusively Church property. And this Church, . . . was a closed body, shut up in itself.¹⁷⁸

The significant role that religion and Church officials played in education is also evident in the composition of the libraries. An extant catalogue of the library of the Troitsa (Muscovy) in the seventeenth century indicates that the literature therein was represented by 411 manuscripts--a total similar to that reached by the Glastonbury (Somersetshire, England) library in the thirteenth century. But at Glastonbury

. . . The first rank is held by the Roman classics, historians, and poets. At the Troitsa we find 101 Bibles, 46 liturgical works, 58 collections of the Fathers of the Church, 17 books on ecclesiastical law, and one solitary book on philosophy. The works on asceticism are the most numerous of all.¹⁷⁹

Under the influence of Byzantinism and the materialism that pervaded every social class, intellectual life wavered between these two tendencies. "There, an asceticism void of all ideal and a coarse sensuality, were the twin roads that led to general nothingness."¹⁸⁰

In general, Russia's other cultural achievements were unimpressive. Confronted by a changing world, the Muscovite government reluctantly and gradually adopted Western ideas. But the basic problems of the country remained unsolved. Incompetent Michael and timorous Alexis had little to offer for the solution of the issues facing the country other than increasing police supervision and the use of the knout. These were the measures that were applied to social, economic, religious, moral,

¹⁷⁸Ibid., p. 63.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., p. 67.

and educational problems.

The number of hours to be spent in church, personal views on sacraments and religion, and what one should read and how to spend hours of leisure, one's place of residence and occupation--all these and many other questions were "solved" by government fiat.¹⁸¹

But these measures did not achieve their intended purpose. Instead they fostered the development of widespread discontent which frequently found expression in popular uprisings.

Among some of the educated members of the upper class the feelings of dissatisfaction took the form of self-criticism. Prince Khvorostinin, described as the first Russian free-thinker, had nothing but contempt for his native country. Kotoshikhin, a government official who escaped to Sweden, wrote a book about seventeenth century Russia in which he ". . .speaks bitterly of the complete unrestraint, suspiciousness, and above all ignorance of Russian society. . . ." ¹⁸² Similarly, Yury Krizanic, a Croatian scholar who came to Russia in 1659, wrote there some nine books in which ". . .he combined an extremely high regard for Russia. . .with a sweeping condemnation of its glaring defects and, above all, its abysmal ignorance." ¹⁸³ Though these men differed markedly in many respects, they shared the belief that only education and the acceptance of Western civilization could save Russia from impending disaster.

¹⁸¹Florinsky, op. cit., p. 302.

¹⁸²Bernard Pares, A History of Russia (definitive edition; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 183.

¹⁸³Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 231.

The deeply rooted discontent which incited the masses to revolt and made the few liberal-minded men at the top cast envious glances over Russia's western frontier was, probably, among the factors that paved the way for the reforms of Peter I.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁴Florinsky, op. cit., p. 303.

CHAPTER VI

THE PETRINE REFORMS

This thesis is primarily concerned with a socio-historical analysis of the 'revolutionary' Petrine period within the context of Smelser's theory of collective behavior. Essential to the performing of such an analysis, is a basic knowledge of the major innovations that were introduced by Peter. A general historical account of these reforms is therefore given.

With regard to internal affairs during Peter's reign, it is found that historians have taken two extreme and opposite approaches.

On the one hand, the tsar's reforming of Russia has been presented as a series, or rather a jumble, of disconnected ad hoc measures necessitated by the exigencies of the moment, especially the pressure of the Great Northern War. Contrariwise, the same activity has been depicted as the execution of a comprehensive, radically new, and well-integrated program.¹

In many ways, the first view seems historically substantiated. As Kliuchevsky points out, only one year in Peter's reign, 1724, passed without war and no more than thirteen months of peace could be added to the entire period. Thus, practically all of Peter's active reign was spent in aggressive warfare to which he gave almost constant personal supervision. The above facts form the basis for the conclusion, drawn by certain historians, that Peter's reforms can be understood only when considered in connection with their warlike setting and with the

¹Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 251.

consequences of that setting. The rationale of the scholars of this persuasion is exemplified in the following passage extracted from Kliuchevsky's fourth volume of A History of Russia.

First of all, requirements of campaigning gave rise to reforms of the country's military forces; and from these reforms sprang a double series of legislative measures for maintenance of naval and military establishments on a regular footing, and for consolidation of the necessary pertinent means. Next those measures gave rise to changes in relative positions and mutual relations of social classes. . . . And finally, all this being so, and Peter's military, social, and economic innovations being what they were, his administrative staff had to follow suit with a corresponding augmentation and acceleration of its performance of State business, and to grapple with new and complex problems which would altogether have baffled it on the basis of its old organization and composition. And just as an indispensable condition to further reforms was a process of preceding and accompanying current innovations with a step-by-step overhauling, so Peter's workers of State and the popular mentality alike had to be given a certain course of preparation for those reforms' acceptance. . . . Wherefore, taking these factors together, we can understand why Peter began to display an ever-increasing solicitude for popular education. . . .²

Hence, in Kliuchevsky's opinion, the general plan of the Petrine reforms was not the outcome of a consciously formulated program but was the consequence of what he terms ". . . the goad of circumstances played upon the course of affairs."³ Summing up, he says that Peter began his work by reforming the State's defensive resources and only when that objective was completed did he turn to changing the State's internal system. All of the latter measures, he adds, flowed from this main task. In line with the preceding, it has been further argued that Peter was not a theoretician or planner but simply a man of action. This argument

²V. O. Kluchevsky, A History of Russia, trans. C. J. Hogarth (New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), IV, p. 60.

³Ibid.

is intended to corroborate the contention that Peter did not, at any time, have any clearly formulated long-range program for the reordering of Muscovite society.

Undoubtedly, there is a degree of truth to the claim that:

. . . Military considerations repeatedly led to financial measures, and in turn to edicts aiming to stimulate Russian commerce and industry, to changes in the administrative system without whose improvement these and other edicts proved ineffective, to attempts to foster education in whose absence a modern administration could not function and on and on.⁴

The error, however, lies in the fact that some historians have assigned disproportionate significance to the relationship between the war and the military and subsequent reforms. Such an interpretation, it seems, is superficial for it ignores the basic motivation underlying the Tsar's reforming activities. As Ian Grey states:

The goal of his [Peter's] labours was to reform and revive Russia. . . . All his new projects, reforms, assaults on old Muscovy, and military and naval campaigns were harnessed to this objective. It involved him in constant war, and historians have repeatedly stated that it was war that inspired and compelled his reforms. War was certainly the source of many reforms, and in the first decade of the new century it was to dictate or condition most of his legislation. But for Peter war was never an end in itself. . . . War was the unavoidable means to obtaining the access to the Baltic and Black seas essential to his basic policy.⁵

It can further be argued that Peter's innovations were certainly not limited to ad hoc measures to bolster the war effort. As Riasanovsky states:

. . . He wanted to Westernize and modernize all of the Russian government, society, life, and culture, and even if his efforts fell far short of this stupendous goal, failed to dovetail, and left

⁴Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 251.

⁵Ian Grey, Peter the Great (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1960), p. 136.

huge gaps, the basic pattern emerges, nevertheless, with sufficient clarity.⁶

Western nations were the Emperor's model. However, an examination of his specific legislation shows that Peter did not merely copy but attempted to modify and adapt Western customs and institutions to Russian needs and possibilities. It should also be noted that towards the end of his reign, Peter became more concerned with general issues and broader patterns. Also, though he was no theoretician, one cannot deny the fact that the Emperor was something of a visionary who saw a modern, powerful, prosperous, and educated Russia in the future. To the realization of this image, Peter dedicated his boundless energy and, indeed, his life.

This vision of the role that Russia was to play did not come to Peter suddenly during his travels in Europe. His early contacts with the foreigners in the German Suburb had initially stirred in him the idea of transforming his nation.

He had seen that her backwardness was not only due to her inefficient government and her ill-equipped and untrained army, but, more basically, to lack of education among her people and the failure to develop her natural resources, found industries, and expand trade. But, while it did not inspire the policy to which he devoted his life, his experience of Western countries matured and crystallized his ideas. He returned ready for action on a scale that has rarely been undertaken by one man.⁷

Viewing, then, the Petrine reforms from this broad perspective one can now consider the changes Peter introduced to reform and revive Russia so that she would stand as a great power, accepted as an equal

⁶Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 251. ⁷Grey, op. cit., pp. 136-37.

with the Western nations in matters of military strength, trade, industry, government and civilization. Details of his major reforms are presented under the appropriate sub-headings. No attempt is made to trace his measures chronologically for this could give only a haphazard picture reflecting Peter's tactics but "...leaving no coherent concept of the net effect of his reign on the development of Russian history."⁸

I. MILITARY REFORMS

The Muscovite armed force consisted of the dvoriane militia which was summoned only during periods of military emergency and the standing army which was established during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. The earliest regiments of the permanent force were the streltsy and the 'registered' Cossacks. In the wars against Sweden and Poland during the Times of Troubles, the militia proved to be a rather ineffectual force. This experience, together with the appearance in Russia of a substantial number of foreign mercenaries at the beginning of the seventeenth century, led to the expansion of the standing army and the formation of regiments known as the draguny or soldaty. Enlisted men like the dvoriane received grants of land which they farmed themselves while the pomestii of the dvoriane were worked by tenants and later by serfs.⁹ Individuals comprising the standing army, like those in

⁸Jesse D. Clarkson, A History of Russia (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 196.

⁹Michael T. Florinsky, Russia, A History and an Interpretation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), I, p. 273.

the militia, were also farmer-soldiers but differed from the former in the greater permanency of their organization. In addition to their pomestii, the dvoriane received monetary grants to meet the cost of equipment and to cover expenditures incurred during periods of service. Those serving in the standing army, for example, received a stipulated annual payment. Service in this army tended to be hereditary and passed from father to son though there never was a rigid dividing line between the dvorianin and the professional soldier. Moreover, military service was compulsory for most of the social classes from the dvoriane to the burghers, peasants, and even slaves. For the dvoriane military service was a personal duty justified on the grounds that they derived their living from land granted to them by the State. The other social classes were under no such personal obligation but were required to provide a specified number of recruits for each urban or village community.

As shown in the preceding paragraph:

Attempts at the modernization of Russia's armed force were made in the seventeenth century when the militia of the dvoriane was supplemented by a standing army organized more or less along the lines of the armies of Western Europe.¹⁰

By the end of the century, however, the experiment was by no means successful. Thus, in the first Azov campaign of 1695 the bulk of the army consisted of the old militia--the majority of which assembled for campaigns and disbanded when the campaign ended. It is little wonder, then, that they were poorly organized, technically deficient, and generally of low quality. Even the streltsy, which had expanded to

¹⁰Ibid., p. 355.

contain twenty-two regiments, were at best a semi-professional force and a doubtful asset to the State. Only the Preobrazhensky and the Semenov-sky regiments of the guards, which had evolved from the Tsar's playmates, made a comparatively reasonable showing in combat but were numerically insignificant to play a decisive role on the battlefield. Such was the composition of the thirty-five to forty thousand man army with which Peter began the war against Sweden. "The low quality of this human material and the inadequacy of their training were convincingly proved by the catastrophe of Narva" (1700).¹¹

This humiliating defeat convinced Peter that his army was nothing more than a horde of untrained peasants. Yet the magnitude of the disaster did not depress or deter the Tsar. Instead it ". . .whipped him into a frenzy of activity"¹² as he set himself to the task of raising, equipping, and training an efficient standing army. Though this project took ". . .fifteen years for full accomplishment. . .long before that he had achieved the essentials."¹³

The first step the reformer took in reorganizing and modernizing his army was to institute general conscription. Since the formation of the Muscovite state, the gentry had been subject to personal service but

. . .Under Peter the Great this obligation came to be much more effectively and, above all, continuously enforced. Except for the unfit and those given civil assignments, the members of the gentry were to remain with their regiments for life.¹⁴

¹¹Ibid., p. 356. ¹²Grey, op. cit., p. 182.

¹³B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London: English Universities Press Limited, 1950), p. 57.

¹⁴Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 252.

Nor were the other classes exempt from the draft. With the exception of the clergy and members of the merchant guild, soldiers were conscripted by levy after levy on the peasants and townsfolk. These too were to serve for life.

After obtaining a large number of men, Peter proceeded to mold them into a modern, efficient, fighting force. New training, new discipline, and new tactics were evolved. Previously, the only infantry manual published in Russia was an adapted version of a German manual of 1615. In practice, however, the troops of foreign formation were trained according to the views of their foreign officers. "Their tactics had been based on the antiquated versions of the experience of the Thirty Years' War. . . ." ¹⁵ Since that time Western armies had been revolutionized by the introduction of the flintlock, the bayonet, and by improvements in artillery. As has been mentioned, Peter personally introduced an up-to-date manual, adopted the flintlock and the bayonet, and brought about enormous improvements in the field artillery. Novel ideas were also put into effect.

A wholly new innovation was introduced: the bayonet was to be used as an attacking weapon, instead of, as hitherto in the West, in passive defence. The great tradition of cold steel in the Russian army was due to Peter. ¹⁶

For those in the armed forces, Peter sought to set the example of dedication and service. He personally became proficient in every weapon, learned to command units from the smallest to largest and insisted that every draftee work his way from the bottom up. Incentive for good

¹⁵ Sumner, op. cit., p. 58.

¹⁶ Ibid.

performance derived from edicts which assured promotion on the basis of merit rather than on social standing. But such decrees were of little practical value. The generally low quality of the human material making up the military personnel left the dvoriane the only possible source from which effective officers could be drawn. Unsuccessful efforts were made to guarantee the serviceability of the latter by decreeing that their real estate must pass undivided to a single heir. Thus, the law of majorat completed the fusion of hereditary tenure and service tenure.

It should not be assumed, however, that Peter's efforts to fully utilize the nobility in the service were as successful as he had planned. All sorts of abuses developed. A prime example is the 'entry' of new born babies into service so as to assure them seniority when they eventually were drafted. Survivals of mestnichestvo also hampered his efforts to reward individuals on the basis of merit. Faced with such obstacles, Peter, in 1722, established a new order of precedence, the "Table of Ranks" with civilian, naval, and military service subdivided into fourteen parallel grades. Service rather than birth was the basis of the new system.

Henceforth membership in the best senior nobility (dворянство) in all its dignities and advantages, even though they be of low birth, was accorded to anyone who had succeeded in rising into the first eight ranks.¹⁷

Perhaps the most notable accomplishment of the "Table of Ranks" was that it confirmed the rise of the дворянство at the expense of the old feudal boyarstvo.

¹⁷ Clarkson, op. cit., p. 200.

Changes were also made in the cavalry. For years the weakest element in the army, this unit was transformed into an effective fighting force under the leadership of Menshikov. Also, a new type of light corps was devised by combining cavalry, infantry, and light artillery.

With reference to the navy, it can properly be regarded as Peter's own creation. Early experimentation on the Yauza, Lake Pereiaslavl, and at Archangel were followed by serious naval construction at Preobrazhenskoe and Voronezh. In vain were sacrifices made to build a fleet for the Black Sea because Azov itself had to be abandoned to the Turks after the Russian defeat on the Pruth in 1711. Shipbuilding activities at Archangel in the summer of 1702 were also unrewarding. Following the conquest of Ingria and the founding of St. Petersburg (1703), navy yards were established on the Svir River. The next year, Russian ships made their first appearance on the Baltic Sea. "By the end of his [Peter's] reign the Baltic fleet comprised some 800 vessels of various types, not a few built abroad, manned by 28,000 sailors."¹⁸ Though the Russian fleet played an important part in the war against Sweden, Peter's dream of Russian naval greatness was never fulfilled and the bulk of her external trade continued to be transported in foreign vessels.

¹⁸Grey, op. cit., p. 136.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

When Peter personally assumed the reigns of power in 1696, he showed no inclination to alter the traditional boyar дума, the complicated central bureaus (prikazy), or the rapacious provincial governors (voevody). Following his return from Europe, however, Peter's concern with military problems and the concomittant financial implications resulted in an increased tendency to do away with the deliberations in the дума. The process was accelerated by the establishment of the Privy Chancellery (1699), an organ of administrative and financial control. "The дума, reduced in numbers, became a mere executive committee, implementing the will of an often absent monarch."¹⁹

The bureaucratic system had always been plagued by the complex confusion of the prikazy, some of which were concerned with certain types of affairs throughout the state, while others dealt with all types of duties within a specified area. Adding to the confusion was the lack of a clear line of demarcation between their administrative, financial, and judicial responsibilities. During the early years of his personal reign, the situation was worsened by the creation of a number of new prikazy.

Peter's first significant administrative reform was the granting of a measure of self-government to urban communities. In 1699 the commercial population of Moscow was given the right to judicial autonomy

¹⁹Clarkson, op. cit., p. 211.

and the right to elect burmistry who were to be responsible for the collection of taxes. Other towns, communities of free peasants and court peasants were also given the opportunity to escape the vexatious exactions of the governors on the condition that they pay a tax double the rate of the old assessment. Since few towns were willing to accept autonomy on such terms, they were, in the same year, given this privilege without paying the double tax but were made subject to the authority of the Ratushi. The jurisdiction of these frequently cut across and confused the authority of the prikazy. In 1708, matters were again confounded when Peter attempted administrative decentralization by dividing the realm into eight and later into twelve gubernii (governments) each headed by a gubernator (governor). Four years later these gubernii were subdivided into forty-five and later into fifty provinces. Voevody were appointed to each new province--officials who were responsible

. . . For the details of quartering troops, administering justice, collecting taxes, organizing police, promoting commerce, and supervising the hospitals, orphanages and schools which, however, did not exist outside the larger cities.²⁰

The provinces, in turn, were subdivided into uezdy (districts) administered by commissars and a council of two to four members attached to the voevoda. All of these officials were to receive a salary, thus putting an end to the old Muscovite practice of kormleniia (feedings). Peter the Great went beyond his Swedish model by assigning to the

²⁰ Clarkson, op. cit., p. 212.

the provincial bodies the responsibility of looking after local health, education, and economic development. As in other instances, the above illustrates the fact that Peter did not intend to merely imitate foreign institutions but constantly sought to adapt them to the needs of the Russian situation. Yet despite his efforts, in the case of local government, Peter's innovations ". . .proved to be premature and unrealistic."²¹

In 1711, on the eve of the campaign of the Pruth, the Tsar created the Senate. Originally intended to govern the country during the absence of the Tsar, it became a permanent body after his return. Composed of nine members, the new institution had most extensive powers.

It was to insure justice in the tribunals, to watch over the expenditure of the Government and prevent all that was unnecessary, "to collect as much money as possible, for money is the artery of war," to enroll young nobles to fill vacancies as officers, "especially those who try to conceal themselves," to see to the exact fulfillment of contracts made with the Government, to manage the salt monopoly, to farm out trade with China, to increase trade with Persia, to attract Armenians into the country, and to institute a service of fiscal agents in every department of the Government.²²

Summarizing their position in the state bureaucracy, Schuyler states, "As the Council of Boyars had insensibly passed into the Privy Chancery, so now the Senate took the place of this body."²³

To insure efficient and regular communications between the Senate

²¹Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 256.

²²Eugene Schuyler, Peter the Great Emperor of Russia (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884), II, pp. 147-48.

²³Ibid., p. 147.

and the provinces, the Governors maintained commissaries at Moscow. Even this provision did little to abet the slowness of the Governors. Referring to the procrastinations of the latter, Peter, in a letter to Menshikov dated February 17, 1711, wrote: "Up to now God knows in what grief I am, for the Governors follow the example of crabs in transacting their business. . . ." ²⁴

Between 1718 and 1722 the central government was transformed by changes in the Senate, the creation of the procuratorship-general and the colleges in place of the unwieldy prikazy. From seventeenth century Muscovy, Peter had inherited the council of magnates and a large number of departments of state. The former was already replaced, to a large extent, by departmental ministers and special confidants, while the latter continued to lumber along ". . . with various regroupings and new creations, such as the admiralty." ²⁵ As already mentioned, the pressures of war added to the confusion at the apex of the administrative hierarchy and it was to remedy this situation that Peter set up the privy chancellery and decided, in 1708, to take certain measures in the direction of decentralization. The only result of the latter was that the central departments were deprived of any effective power. ²⁶

"It proved impossible to continue thus for long, and the Senate was employed to fill the resultant void at the centre." ²⁷ But this too failed to resolve the problem for the senate became so overburdened with

²⁴ Ibid., p. 148.

²⁵ Sumner, op. cit., p. 123.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 124.

²⁷ Ibid.

work that it could not help but function badly, even disregarding the limitations of its constituent members. These, then, were the failures that motivated Peter to experiment with the overhaul of the government and taxation.

Influenced by the example of Sweden and probably the advice of Leibniz, Peter the Great, in 1717, and in the years immediately following, established collegia or colleges. Convinced that government by boards would prevent arbitrariness and promote regularity, the reformer established nine such agencies: the colleges of foreign affairs, war, navy, state expenses, state income, justice, financial inspection and control, commerce, and manufacturing. The colleges of mining, estates, and town organization were added later. A president, vice-president, four councilors, four assessors, a procurator, a secretary and chancellery constituted the personnel of each agency.

A positive effect of the colleges was that they introduced a ". . .much more practical and rational division of labor at the centre, even though there still remained considerable overlapping of functions and numerous loose ends."²⁸ Despite these imperfections they were a vast improvement on the antiquated departmental system as is reflected by the fact that they lasted for almost a century before being replaced by ministries in the reign of Alexander I.

In 1722, Peter instituted the office of procurator-general which was to serve as the link between the Senate and the Monarch. This 'eye

²⁸Ibid., p. 125.

and attorney of the state' became the most powerful single post in the empire. Though not a member of the Senate, the procurator-general was to preside over that body in Peter's absence, to regulate its proceedings and to control its actions. Disputes between this official and the Senate could only be settled by the Monarch.

Peter's reform of the government paralleled changes in the organization of the Church and the creation of the Synod (1721) in place of the patriarchate. On the eve of the battle of Narva, Patriarch Adrian died. Ailing and spiritless for sometime, the Patriarch had only weakly opposed the Tsar's innovations, showing, therefore, that he was a poor champion of the traditions sacred to old Muscovy. "On the other hand, he was an obstruction in the way of Peter, who could not tolerate limitations upon his power even when imposed in the name of the Church."²⁹ Realizing that the Church, represented by the patriarch, was the most formidable opponent of his reforms,³⁰ the sovereign resolved that no new patriarch should be chosen very soon. It would have been possible to find a patriarch who favored progress in the Ukraine but the appointment of an individual from this region to the highest ecclesiastical office in Russia would have aroused suspicions of leanings toward the Roman Church. Consequently, Peter kept the office vacant for twenty years. As a temporary measure, he issued a decree on December 16, 1700 giving the charge of the Russian Orthodox Church to Stephen Yavorsky, the

²⁹ Stephen Graham, Peter the Great (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1929), p. 130.

³⁰ Oscar Browning, Peter the Great (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1898), p. 136.

metropolitan of Riazan and Murom, with the title of Exharch and Administrator of the Patriarchal See. This was the position of acting patriarch.

Stephen Yavorsky was formerly a Roman Catholic who later embraced Orthodoxy. He was

. . .An excellent orator, the author of many sermons and a treatise, "The Rock of Faith," which refuted Protestant teachings in defense of Orthodoxy, though betraying occasional Roman Catholic proclivities.³¹

As a well-educated Ukrainian monk, Yavorsky represented the Church in the Ukraine with its higher cultural standard which had already been influencing the Church in Muscovy for the past four decades. For a number of years, Peter and the Exarch worked well together but over a period of time the men grew farther and farther apart. The final break came when Yavorsky made no attempt to conceal his sympathies with the tsarevitch, Alexis.

A more cooperative collaborator and more influential leader for the Church was found by the Tsar in the person of Theophan Prokopovich. Son of a tradesman, Prokopovich graduated from the Kievan theological academy then went to Poland where he took the holy orders in a Uniat monastery. The next three years were spent in Rome as a student in the College of St. Athanasius. In 1702, he returned to Russia, was converted to Orthodoxy, and received a chair in the Kievan Academy. Though he first met Peter in 1706, his real influence did not begin until 1709 when, in the presence of the Tsar, he delivered a panegyric upon the victory at

³¹Anatole G. Mazour, Russia Tsarist and Communist (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1963), p. 122.

Poltava. In 1711, he joined Peter during the Turkish campaign and was then appointed rector of the Kievan Academy. Seven years later he was made Archbishop of Novgorod, a position he held until his death.

Probably the best educated Russian of his time, Prokopovich assembled a library of some 30,000 volumes, was a patron of the arts and sciences, and kept an open house, the earliest Russian approximation of a literary salon. He was the first among the Russian theologians to accept the views of Copernicus and Galileo who were anathema not only to his contemporaries. . .but also to writers of later generations.³²

Though a dramatist and poet, Prokopovich was above all a publicist who was severely critical of scholasticism. With zealous eagerness he fought the forces of reaction and provided an apology for every measure taken by Peter's government.

He branded as "papalism" the claim of the clergy and monasteries to a privileged position in the state, and maintained that the acceptance of such doctrines was incompatible not only with the rights of the sovereign "by the grace of God" but also with his duties for in Prokopovich's opinion, the monarch must closely regulate the activities of his subjects in every field. . . .³³

Such a theory of state was, indeed, pleasing to the Tsar and consequently the theologian was given the opportunity to embody his ideas in legislation. Thus, in 1721, the Spiritual Reglament, written primarily by Prokopovich, established a new organization and outlined a comprehensive program of educational activities. The new organization, the Holy Synod, consisting of ten and later twelve clerics, replaced the patriarch. Organized along the same lines as the other colleges, the Holy Synod was composed of members drawn from the rank of the clergy including the 'black clergy' or monks. A manifesto, proclaimed at the same time,

³²Florinsky, op. cit., p. 412. ³³Ibid., p. 413.

explained why the collegial form of administration had been adopted.

A spiritual college would be less likely to fall into errors of prejudice and bigotry, its pronouncement would have more authority than those of one man; from collegial government the fatherland has no need to fear revolt and disturbance such as arise from the spiritual government of a single man, for the simple people do not know how to distinguish the spiritual power from that of the autocrat, but struck by the glory and splendor of the highest pastor, they think that he is a second sovereign with like powers, or even with greater powers, and that the spiritual rank is a different and higher state. . . .³⁴

The Synod was given the responsibility of rooting out ignorance and superstition, of up-grading the educational level of the clergy, and of spreading information about the law of God.

On March 11, 1722, the Holy Synod was put under the supervision of a chief-procurator. The occupant of this post was a layman whose duties were similar to the procurator-general's of the Senate. In this fashion, Church administration became a bureaucratic department at the mercy of a civil administrator enabling the state to exercise effective control over church organization, possessions, and policies. "The Holy Synod and the domination of the Church by the government lasted until 1917."³⁵

Another means by which Peter sought to undermine the pervasive authority of the Church was through elaborate buffoonery. Though himself deeply religious, Peter mocked the Church as a means of revealing to the masses its conservatism and incompetence, and the power wielded by its hierarchy.

This mockery took the form of a drunken assembly with its own patriarch, metropolitans, archimandrites, deacons, and priesthood,

³⁴ Grey, op. cit., p. 399. ³⁵ Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 257.

who wore ecclesiastical vestments and performed special rites. He established this "All-joking, All-drunken Assembly," as it was called, sometime after the consecration of Adrian as Patriarch. Peter's old tutor, Nikita Zotov, as president, or "Prince-Pope" of the assembly, took charge of the drinking bouts. . . .³⁶

In conjunction with the Synod, Peter initiated reforms designed at enforcing ecclesiastical discipline, overhauling the monasteries, and improving the standards of the secular clergy. In 1700, there were over fourteen thousand monks and over ten thousand nuns in the five hundred and fifty-seven monasteries and nunneries. Generally speaking, these institutions were wealthy, possessed vast estates and many serfs, but they grossly mismanaged their affairs.

It was easy to find instances of great laxity in many of the smaller monasteries, as well as in some of the larger. Their contribution to education and learning was small. Their charity, in Peter's eyes, had too often degenerated into the upkeep of swarms of ne'er-do-well vagrants, who incurred the special wrath of Peter, "hale and lazy beggars. . . enemies of God. . . useless hands."³⁷

No attempt was made to confiscate their estates, but Peter did demand efficiency in their management. To achieve this end, he revived the Monastery Office in 1701 appointing the layman Boyar Mushin-Pushkin to administer their affairs. Efforts were also made to eliminate waste, corruption, and luxury by limiting monastery expenditure and by doing away with a large number of small monasteries by decreeing that these were to be used as schools or churches.

Because the Church had, on the whole, always worked with the State, no collision ensued between these two institutions as a result of Peter's

³⁶Grey, op. cit., p. 73.

³⁷Sumner, op. cit., pp. 148-49.

reforms. Over the centuries the Church generally acknowledged the authority of the tsar who convoked the Church councils, accepting or disregarding their advice. The Tsar also selected or at least confirmed those appointed to high office. Therefore, Peter's incursions into Church affairs did not arouse indignant popular resistance.

III. FINANCIAL MEASURES

The expenses of Peter's wars far exceeded his revenues and so the financing of the ever-growing military and naval establishments remained throughout the entire reign, one of the Tsar's principal preoccupations. War expenditure which increased from about two million rubles in 1701 to about three million rubles in 1710, kept increasing at an alarming rate. This is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that from 1701 to 1708, military expenditures consumed eighty per cent of the total revenue. By 1725, three-fourths of the total receipts were allocated to the maintenance of a peacetime military force. "To meet the rising tide of expenditure and prevent the unbalancing of the budget, the government found itself forced to evolve a novel financial policy. . . ." ³⁸ The first measure taken by the government was to debase the currency by reducing the amount of silver in the money in circulation. Though this means provided an important source of revenue, it inevitably led to the depreciation of currency. During Peter's reign the purchasing power of the ruble declined approximately fifty per cent. In conjunction with the debasement of currency, the

³⁸Florinsky, op. cit., p. 358.

basis of taxation was broadened. Suggestions for new taxes were encouraged—

. . . A practice that led to the creation of a special service of prebylshchiki, literally "profitmakers," whose duties consisted in devising new sources of revenue and usually also in administering the new taxes they had invented.³⁹

Motivated by the opportunity for personal aggrandizement, the ingenuity of the prebylshchiki resulted in an exceptionally large number of new taxes.

Thus the clergy were called upon to pay a Dragoon tax which was earmarked for the purchase of cavalry horses. Then a funeral tax was levied. . . . There was a tax on marriage, for, as Peter remarked, "Marriage is a bit of a luxury."

There was a new tax on horse-collars and one on the wearing of leather boots. There was a hat tax. The beard tax was systematized. Those who wished to wear beards must also keep to old-fashioned attire, and there was a tax on that too.

Ten per cent was collected on cab fares. There was a bed tax, a bath tax, a milk tax, an inn tax, a tax on kitchen chimneys, on melons and cucumbers and various provisions. Sectarians had to pay double. Impositions were difficult, almost fantastic. . . .⁴⁰

Another method employed to raise money was by trade monopolies. The salt monopoly resold salt at a profit of one hundred per cent. In 1705, the sale of tobacco was brought under government control. Other items which became government monopolies included tar, chalk, fats, fish, oil, potash, caviar, bristle, and oak coffins. Because many of the new monopolies did not provide the expected income, a decree issued in 1719 permitted merchants to trade in all commodities, with the exception of tar, potash, and tobacco, after paying certain duties.

³⁹Ibid., p. 359. ⁴⁰Graham, op. cit., p. 150.

The first balance sheet, prepared in 1710, showed that the revenue for the previous year had been 3,026,128 rubles while the expenditures totalled 3,834,418 rubles.⁴¹ Faced with the prospect of another substantial deficit, the government reconsidered the question of direct taxation. From early Kievan times the principal direct tax was the household (podvornaia) tax which was computed by multiplying the number of taxable households by the tax rate. In the beginning years of Peter's reign, the number of households was determined according to the outdated census of 1678. A new census, taken in 1710, though undoubtedly imperfect, revealed a distressing depopulation of the country. "The average decrease in the number of households for Russia as a whole was 20 per cent, rising to 40 per cent in the northern provinces and reaching in some of the smaller territorial subdivisions 52, 56, and 57 per cent."⁴² Thus, the number of households had fallen from 791,000 in 1678 to 637,000 in 1710. Since this would have meant a decrease in revenue, the government ignored the later census which meant that ". . .the surviving households had to pay the share of those that had vanished as a consequence of the government's 'direct' and 'indirect' action or from 'natural causes'."⁴³

The manipulation of statistical data could not provide a solution to the financial problems. New direct taxes were imposed and there was a further debasement in the currency but both methods proved ineffective.

⁴¹Schuyler, op. cit., p. 137.

⁴²Florinsky, op. cit., p. 361. ⁴³Ibid., p. 362.

Another census taken in 1716-1717 showed a further decrease in the number of households leading the authorities to believe that at least part of this decline was the result of the merging of two or more households to avoid taxation. It seemed, therefore, that the logical thing to do was to change the basis of assessment. Acting on the suggestion proffered by some of his unofficial advisers, Peter substituted a poll tax for a tax on households. Subsequently, a decree, issued by the Senate on November 26, 1718, ordered a census of the entire male agricultural population.

The census, which began in January, 1719, proved a cumbersome affair, new complications arising from wholesale frauds and evasions and from the government's repeatedly expanding the scope of the census by including within the taxable class various ill defined groups of people not formerly liable to the household tax.⁴⁴

The foregoing is an example of how the military innovations necessitated other reforms--for example, changes in the taxation structure. Again, it must be stressed that this does not mean that all of Peter's reforms stemmed from the exigencies of the Great Northern War.

IV. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

The period from 1700-1724, the years during which the reformer remodelled so much in the church and state, was also the time he left his most enduring marks on the social and economic development of Russia. Toward the close of the seventeenth century, Russia was primarily a land of serfdom. At the end of Peter's reign, the same was generally true

⁴⁴Florinsky, op. cit., p. 363.

because the Tsar, rather than changing this institution ". . .clamped it down more firmly on the peasantry."⁴⁵ But at the same time he set unprecedented demands of service to the state on the landowners.

The landowners must not only fight, they must know how to. Peter's adoption of western military technique and his creation of a fleet involved a completely new training and the learning of the very rudiments of new skills. He and his subjects--above all the landowners, the officers and directing class--must go to school to the West. They must learn from foreign experts brought to Russia, and they must learn by going abroad to train.⁴⁶

From the time of the 'great embassy' of 1697, Peter was continually sending young Russians to the West to learn the military or naval sciences. Nor were their studies exclusively with the military arts for from the very beginning apprenticeship abroad involved some learning of foreign languages. Most of these men were young and predominantly from the landowning class. Such individuals were paid small sums by the state.

Besides sending members of the nobility abroad to study, Peter successfully enforced their compulsory service. Old service registers were revived, frequent musters were held, and severe punishment was meted out against those who tried to evade their obligations. As part of his plan to drive the landowners and burghers to service was an edict issued in 1714 ". . .whereby immovable property of all kinds could not be sold and was to be inherited by one son, or, if there were no sons, by one daughter or one relative."⁴⁷ Loopholes for evasion were readily found and the decree remained largely ineffectual.

⁴⁵ Sumner, op. cit., p. 151. ⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 151-52.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 154-55.

The failure of his entail law stands in marked contrast to his success in restructuring the service conditions of the noble class through a hierarchy of military and civil ranks known as the Table of Ranks. This table drew a clear line of demarcation between the civilian and the military service and all officials in these two branches were rearranged in hierarchical order in fourteen classes. Every officer or civil servant was to start his career in the lowest class with promotion being awarded according to length of service merit. "Those of non-gentry origin who reached the fifth step became members of the gentry for life, and those who attained the ninth step acquired hereditary membership in that class."⁴⁸

While Peter reorganized the landowning class on the basis of compulsory service, he laid additional exactions on the already overburdened peasantry and extended the bonds of serfdom. His tax legislation, in particular, led to the elimination of the difference between serf and slave, thus merging the landlords' peasants into one bonded mass.⁴⁹ Though conditions of the latter were, as a result, somewhat improved, the state gained because the slaves were liable to taxation and military service. State peasants too were subjected to conditions that amounted to serfdom as new obligations were added including compulsory seasonal work in the new factories and mines.

Though many of Peter's decrees were but legalized expressions of common practice, his reign marked a further stage in the subjection of

⁴⁸Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 260. ⁴⁹Ibid., p. 259.

the serfs to the will of their masters. This was compatible with his conception of state service where the landlord was tied to service, the townsman to his trade, and the peasant to the land. Peter's decrees strengthened the position of the nobility making them virtual rulers of their estates with rights of jurisdiction, punishment, and control over the movement of the serfs. Thus, he was the originator of the passport system. Another lasting imprint made upon the peasantry and townsfolk was effected by his new recruiting regulations⁵⁰ and the implementing of the poll-tax.

While the effect of Peter's actions and legislation did much to shape the social structure of the peasantry and landowners, it did little to raise the low productivity of Russian agriculture. In contrast with his continuous and decisive impulsion of industry, mining, and commerce, his efforts to improve agriculture were intermittent, sporadic, and ineffectual.⁵¹

What little was accomplished in the field of agriculture was achieved primarily by means of compulsion. As Peter himself wrote in his instructions on scythes: "You know yourself that anything that is new, even if it is good and useful, will not be done by our folk without compulsion."⁵²

Force and compulsion recur again in Peter's industrial and commercial policies but in these fields his accomplishments were much more substantial. Subscribing to an economic policy usually referred to as mercantalism, the Tsar promoted high import duties, bounties, privileges, and monopolies. Again it was the needs of war that directly stimulated Peter's energies on promoting Russian industry. The net

⁵⁰See page 200. ⁵¹Sumner, op. cit., p. 161. ⁵²Ibid., p. 162.

result of twenty-five years of effort was a large scale new heavy industry, a greatly developed textile industry, and several new branches of manufacturing. Most of the new industries were owned and operated by the state. For example, between 1695 and 1709, approximately seventy-five per cent of the new manufactories were state works most of which were designed to produce materials required by the army and navy. In the years following 1710, when the war needs were no longer so urgent, the factories concentrated less on military needs.

. . .Silk, velvet, and ribbon manufactories were started; china, glass, and brick-works made their appearance. A number of state factories were handed over to private operation, and Peter pressed forward the opening of new works by individuals or companies. . . .⁵³

Industrial development during Peter's active reign exemplified novel features. New industrial centers appeared at St. Petersburg and the Urals many of which were considerably larger than those before his time. New types of products were manufactured and the assignment of peasants to industrial plants was also new. However, his manifold activities in the industrial and commercial fields were not entirely successful. The companies and craft guilds he established were complete failures and his ultra-protectionist tariff of 1724 has been counted against him.

Yet, taken in all, Peter inspired the economic life of Russia with a new impetus. . . .He gave canals to Russia. . . .Russia's foreign trade quadrupled in value under Peter, with a large active balance in her favour. . . .The staple exports continued to be the same as in the seventeenth century, but they were greatly expanded; the one addition, iron, originated with Peter. He found Muscovy as an economic power underdeveloped; he left Russia stronger and more developed. . . .⁵⁴

⁵³ Ibid., p. 166. ⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 170.

V. CULTURAL CHANGES

Peter the Great's reforms were perhaps most dramatic in the domain of culture. Under his leadership Russia, without experiencing the epochs of scholasticism, Renaissance, and Reformation, was abruptly set on the path that led to the Age of Reason. In bringing the civilization of the West to his native country, the reformer attempted to introduce Western dress, manners, and customs. Often introduced by fiat, his changes were met with a great deal of hostility although open opposition to his will or any resistance, which Peter thought would impede the effectual accomplishment of his plans for Westernization, were suppressed with terrible severity. Some of the greatest difficulties he encountered arose from opposition which the people made to changes he tried to introduce in the dress that they wore and in the customs and usages of common life. One such custom was the wearing of long gowns similar to those once worn by Oriental nations. Peter was determined to change this, not only because of the inconvenience such dress caused both to soldiers and to those engaged in everyday vocations, but also because apparel of this type was strongly associated with many ancient national traditions which the Emperor wished to abolish. Peter the Great felt that Western sartorial attire would not only be more convenient but would also exert

. . .A great influence in disenthraling the minds of men from the influence of old ideas and associations. It would make . . .them feel at once as if they were new men, belonging to a new age--one marked by a new and higher civilization than they had been accustomed to in former years.⁵⁵

⁵⁵Jacob Abbot, Peter the Great (Akron: The Superior Printing Company, n.d.), p. 155.

To bring about the desired change in dress, Peter sent patterns of the coats worn in Western Europe to all parts of the country and had them displayed in conspicuous places where everybody could see them and required everybody to imitate them. To abate the encountered resistance, Peter had officers of the customs stationed at the gates of the towns

. . . To stop every man who wore a long dress and compel him to either pay a fine of about fifty cents, or kneel down and have all that part of their coat or gown which lay upon the ground, while they were in that posture, cut off with a pair of big shears.

Still, such was the attachment of the people to their old fashions, that great numbers of the people, rather than submit to this curtailing of their vestments, preferred to pay the fine.⁵⁶

Besides compulsion, the Tsar resorted to the use of ridicule in his efforts to break the traditional attachment to absurd fashions in dress.

It happened that one of the fools or jesters of the court was about to be married. The young woman who was to be the jester's bride was very pretty. . . and the Csar determined to improve the occasion of the wedding for a grand frolic. He accordingly made arrangements for celebrating the nuptials at the palace, and he sent invitations to all the great nobles and officers of state, with their wives, and to all the other great ladies of the court, giving them orders to appear dressed in fashions which prevailed in the Russian court one or two hundred years before. With the exception of some modes of dress prevalent at the present day, there is nothing that can be conceived more awkward, inconvenient, and ridiculous than the fashions which were reproduced on this occasion.⁵⁷

Even the women were required to wear foreign fashions and to discard their ancient costumes. In this respect, the women were less conservative than the men. Perhaps they recognized the opportunity open to them

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 169.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 170.

for greater variety in costume by the adoption of foreign garments. Initiative on the part of the women was encouraged for Peter was determined to emancipate them completely from the terem and insisted that they should play their part in social life. To accustom his people to associating in the manner followed by Western countries, he issued a decree in November 1718, that mixed assemblies should be held frequently and stipulated the rules of procedure to be observed.

A list of hosts was drawn and the host appointed to hold the assembly was obliged to open his house to guests and their wives from 4 or 5 P.M. until 10 P.M., providing rooms for dancing, smoking, cards and forfeits, and conversation.⁵⁸

Along with the wearing of Western clothes and wigs, Peter insisted on the shaving of beards. In his eagerness to adopt the usages of Europe, the reformer chose to consider the beard as a symbol of what was uncivilized and barbarous. Not content with repealing the decree of Alexis and saying that his subjects might shave, he demanded that they shave.

Decrees were issued that all Russians, the clergy excepted, should shave, but those who preferred to keep their beards were allowed to do so on condition of paying a yearly tax, fixed at a kopek (two cents) for the peasantry, and varying from thirty to a hundred rubles (from \$60 to \$200, a ruble being worth at that time about \$2) for the other classes, the merchants, as being the richest and most conservative, paying the highest sum.⁵⁹

A few of Peter's measures show a certain amount of solicitude on the part of the government for popular welfare. In 1706 a hospital was established in Moscow on the bank of the Yauza River. This was, primarily, a training hospital. Next, a military hospital was built in

⁵⁸Grey, op. cit., p. 441. ⁵⁹Schuyler, op. cit., I, p. 339.

St. Petersburg. Anxious to provide medical facilities for civilians as well as for soldiers, Peter decreed (1715) that in all the Russian towns, hospitals were to be built, attached to the churches. Though the number of hospitals that resulted was small, the advance was significant since prior to his ascension to the throne there had been no hospitals in Russia.⁶⁰

Other measures displaying concern for public welfare were also taken. Newborn infants who were deformed or idiots could no longer be killed with impunity. Poisonous herbs and drugs could only be sold by apothecaries. The sale or wearing of sharp pointed knives was forbidden. New laws were issued to protect Moscow against fire and Peter personally drew up certain fire regulations. Municipal administration was made responsible for carrying out inspections of all buildings and for punishing offenders.

Another innovation removed a distinctive barrier between Russia and the Western world. The Russians had begun their new year on September 1, and dated their years from the beginning of the world. On December 20, 1699, Peter decreed that the year was to begin on January 1 and that the year was to be dated from the birth of Christ and not from the creation of the world--that is, the coming year was to be 1700 and not 7208. The misfortune was that the Julian rather than the Gregorian calendar was adopted. This is accounted for by the fact that at that time Protestants and Orthodox were suspicious of the latter,

⁶⁰Grey, op. cit., p. 412.

feeling that it was peculiarly papistical.

Extreme dissatisfaction greeted the reforms of Peter. On the southern and eastern frontiers, protests took the form of dissent, rioting, and brigandage. In the central districts discontent was expressed in violent speech, rumours, and ominous predictions. Though comparatively harmless, they were pursued and punished as every denunciation was followed by a rigid investigation and every investigation by inhuman tortures.

What sort of "unseemly" talk was current we can learn from the abundant record of the tribunal of Preobrazhensky. . . .A peasant, for example, groaned out: "Since God has sent him to be Tsar we have no happy days. . . ."61

Other opponents of the innovations went even further. The dissenters and the religiously disposed peasantry, favorably inclined towards apocalyptic teachings, were convinced that Peter was the true Anti-Christ.

Nevertheless, the changes continued and by the end of Peter's reign, members of the army, navy, civil service, upper classes, and of the middle classes were shaven and wore foreign dress. "Other Western innovations also generally succeeded in winning more adherents with time."62

VI. EDUCATIONAL REFORMS

Along with the cultural changes, Peter's educational reforms ". . . proved to be the most lasting of all, for they pushed Russia firmly and

⁶¹Schuyler, op. cit., II, p. 149. ⁶²Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 263.

irrevocably in the direction of the West."⁶³ These innovations fitted well into the Emperor's general activities for the Tsar, subsequent to his visit to Europe, realized more acutely than ever the ignorance and backwardness of his own people. Evidence of this is seen in the fact that at the end of the seventeenth century, Muscovy had no educational institutions except the two theological academies of Kiev and Moscow and a small number of church schools.

After his return to Moscow in 1699, Peter discussed his ideas for education with the Patriarch. Dissatisfaction was expressed concerning the illiteracy of the priesthood since Peter believed that an educated priesthood was essential to the task of enlightening the people and also to convert heretics within the realm. Strong criticism was also levelled at the Slav-Greek-Latin Academy in Moscow which was founded during Sophia's regency. Initially, the academy had done valuable work but following the death of its founders, its work had seriously declined.

However, even revitalized, it could not alone have satisfied Peter's requirements. He wanted a school with a wider curriculum, where his people could study military science, engineering, medicine, as well as the Gospel, grammar, rhetoric, and other literary subjects. He planned on a wide scale. . . .⁶⁴

Such plans were essential, for Peter realized how necessary education was to his plans for reviving and reforming Russia so as to be equal to the Western powers in all aspects.

Of necessity, Peter's efforts at educating the Russians were

⁶³Ibid., p. 262. ⁶⁴Grey, op. cit., p. 165.

aimed in many directions and dealt with a large variety of fundamental matters. As early as 1700, arrangements were made with an Amsterdam firm for the publication of maps and books in the Slavonic language. In 1707, a typefounder and two compositors arrived from Holland marking the transference of publishing activities to Russia. They also brought with them three specifically designed type faces of the Cyrillic alphabet. Peter studied these types and by giving strength and clarity to some of the characters was able to simplify the old Slavonic alphabet. From this time, the new style was used in all lay publications with the old Slavonic form being retained only for books in use in the Church.

Peter himself was an ardent collector of books and his life-time collection was to provide the foundation of the library of the Russian Academy of Sciences. His personal collection included a wide variety of subjects, including history, medicine, military and naval subjects, science, law, and religion. It was also his intention to increase the number of books in circulation among the public.

The Tessing brothers under their concession had printed books in translation and sold them in Russia at fair prices. But the Russian presses were themselves mainly responsible for the sharp increase in the number of books in Russian and the reformed alphabet, introduced by Peter in 1707, facilitated their work. During the whole of the seventeenth century the output of these presses had amounted to only 374 volumes, of which a mere nineteen were secular works; in the twenty-seven years after Peter's return from his first tour of the West, they produced seven hundred books, of which no less than three hundred were secular.⁶⁵

This includes the first Russian textbook in arithmetic, published at

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 408.

Amsterdam in 1699; Magnetsky's Arithmetic (1703), with examples to serve navigation and trade, issued in 2,400 copies, and the first Russian multiplication table using Arabic numerals (1714). Nor were the publications only concerned with military and naval practices, geography, and mathematics for Peter's policy was not so narrowly utilitarian. Under Peter, the translations published in Russia, ranged from the learned works of Pufendorf and Baronius to Aesop's Fables, Ovid's Metamorphoses, and Varenius' Geography; a number of foreign dictionaries also appeared. Special attention was also paid to history and to explanations of his own policies. The Book of Mars, printed in 1713, portrayed the victories and accomplishments of the Tsar's armies while the Dissertation, published in 1714, explained and justified the Great Northern War. To the above book Peter made a cogent contribution. In fact, eager for his people to know more about their own history, the Emperor commissioned Polikarpov, a printer, to write a Russian history. Dissatisfied with the final product, he directed Makarov, his secretary, to rewrite it. Meanwhile, preparing the ground for future historians, he decreed that historic manuscripts, books, and papers of interest present in the monasteries should be assembled and preserved. Other directives were issued demanding that the history of Europe should be translated and published and Feofan Prokopovich was assigned the task of writing the history of his own reign.

Once the Holy Synod was established, he made it responsible for the translation of books. In 1722, he wrote to this body saying:

The book about the Slav people which Sava Raguzhinsky translated and the other one about the Mohammedan faith which Prince

Kantimir translated, should be sent to me. . .without delay; if not ready, order them to be printed quickly and sent here.⁶⁶

Peter was forever examining books which might be translated that would be beneficial to his cause of educating his native countrymen, broadening their intellectual outlook, and stimulating their curiosity.⁶⁷

Other concrete steps were taken ". . .to drag the Russian out of his isolation and project his vision beyond the limits of his own country."⁶⁸ As a means of attaining this objective, Peter conceived the idea of a newspaper and theatre. Consequently, in the month of January, 1703, there appeared in Moscow, Russia's first-published periodical. Known as the "Vedomosti" (News), it was published every second or third day and contained articles from the journals of the West as well as purely Russian items. It is interesting to note that the monarch himself edited the first issue.

As far as the theatre was concerned, this was not a novel idea since a court theatre, staffed by foreigners, was established as early as Alexis' day. Though the effect of histrionics upon the artistic tastes of the privileged circles is unknown, there is no doubt that even at that period Moscow had many dramatic devotees.⁶⁹ Also, household serfs of the nobility had long been accustomed to celebrating special holidays by performing ". . .droll tales of every sort."⁷⁰ So when Peter returned

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 409. ⁶⁷Ibid., p. 409.

⁶⁸V. O. Kluchevsky, A History of Russia, trans. C. J. Hogarth (New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), IV, p. 246.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 247. ⁷⁰Ibid.

from Narva in 1700 he set out to organize a public stage for which he hired an entire troupe of German actors under the direction of Kunst. As the next step he built, on the Red Square, an open playhouse known as The Mansion of Comedy at which the three weekly performances were provided with an interpreter translating into Russian. Nor did Peter fail to take advantage of the presence of foreign talents as he demanded that the imported artists transmit their craft to the native students.

In a sense, Peter's first educational measure was taken in 1697 when the first groups of Russians were sent abroad to up-date their military knowledge and to learn to become sailors. Soon they were followed by 'the great embassy' which consisted of two hundred fifty Russians headed by Lefort with 'min Heer Peter Mikhailov' travelling incognito. Several months later Sheremetiev, a leading noble, set off for Italy with another large retinue. As Sumner states, "The education of Russia in the Petrine style had begun."⁷¹

From that time onward, Peter was continually sending young Russians, especially from the landowning class, to Western Europe. Mainly, they went to learn seamanship and navigation but many also were sent to learn foreign languages, new trades, and new crafts because the Tsar believed that his subjects could give efficient service only if they had the required education and training. Altogether, hundreds of Russians were sent to study abroad during the reign of Peter. In conjunction with the above, large numbers of foreign officers and experts were engaged to

⁷¹ Sumner, op. cit., p. 34.

serve in Russia. The main duty of the foreigners was to "teach the Russian people without reserve and diligently."⁷² Because the Russians were quick to learn, Peter soon was able to rely on domestic ships, armaments, and other manufactured products.

One of the most vivid impressions which Peter derived from his visit to the West was a sense of astonishment at the fact that such a large number of Europeans received an education which prepared them for the assumption of self-supporting vocations.

And so convinced was he that this represented cause and effect that as soon as ever he returned home he resolved to dower his country with a general university or polytechnic, of some sort. Hence, after exchanging views on the subject with the Patriarch . . . he announced his intention of instituting a "school which shall send forth men for all necessities of service in the Church, and in the State, and in warfare, and in building, and in the physician's and the surgeon's arts," and should help parents desirous of obtaining "free learning" for their sons to dispense altogether with the foreigners.⁷³

And so it was that the first attempt to build a national system of education was made by Peter the Great. Though he valued theoretical knowledge, his first measures in education were utilitarian, reflecting his desire for professional personnel for all the new institutions and offices that sprang up in Russia following his sweeping reforms. One of his dreams was the creation of a Russian navy. But trained sailors were rare, therefore his first step was to establish a naval school in Moscow (1701) called the School of Mathematics and Navigation. The director of the school, Professor Henry Farquharson, was hired by Peter in 1698 while touring England. He was bade to instruct his pupils

⁷²Grey, op. cit., p. 406. ⁷³Kluchevsky, op. cit., p. 248.

primarily in navigation. In consequence of this, it may be said that this savant from Scotland was the real founder of the nautical-mathematical school in Russia. Two other British subjects, Stephen Gwyn and Richard Greas, were the first teachers.

Situated in the Sukharev fortress, the school was a college for sons of the dvoriane and the official world. But it not only furnished officers for the Russian fleet; it also prepared men for public service in general. "The first Russian teachers were also its alumni. Owing to this fact all new lay schools were subordinated to the Navy Department."⁷⁴

In 1711, while at Torgau, the residence of the Queen of Poland, Peter met the German philosopher, mathematician and scientist, Leibniz. Though no account of the meeting has survived, the latter was bound to have impressed Peter. Confirmation of this is seen in the fact that in the following year, Peter appointed him councillor of justice in the Russian service with the special function of advising on educational, legal, and government matters. Leibniz drafted extensive plans for spreading education in Russia and for establishing an academy of sciences to direct education and research. Undoubtedly, he contributed notably to the educational and other reforms that Peter later introduced.

Perhaps Leibniz's influence can be detected in the ukaz Peter issued on February 28, 1714--a ukaz which can be considered as the first educational act of Russia. This act decreed that the sons of the gentry

⁷⁴Nicholas Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964), p. 12.

and of the civil servants were to be instructed in arithmetic and geometry from the ages of ten to fifteen years. "For this purpose, trained pupils of the School of Navigation were sent to all provinces to teach in schools established in every episcopal see and in the greater monasteries."⁷⁵ Education in these schools was gratuitous and compulsory. The penalty for non-observance of the edict was that without a school-leaving certificate, none of them could marry. Because the landowners retaliated with a virtual boycott, Peter had to revoke the decree. On January 18, 1716, a ukaz was issued which exempted the gentry from compulsory attendance.

By this time certain changes had been introduced in the educational structure. In 1715, the School of Mathematics and Navigation, founded by Farquharson in 1701, was transferred to St. Petersburg and renamed the Naval Academy. Only the children of the dворяне were to be admitted to this school. The Moscow school, which continued to function until 1752, admitted only low born students who received a more elementary education than that given the cadets at the Naval Academy. Earlier, in 1711, there was also established a school of engineering and gunnery in Moscow. The latter two ". . . were primarily designed to train young dворяне, although class distinctions in these branches of the service were not so clear-cut as they were in the navy."⁷⁶

Together with the Slavonic-Greco-Latin Academy, an establishment with a theological schedule,

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 12. ⁷⁶Florinsky, op. cit., p. 407.

. . .We shall see that by now there had come into being two chief educational establishments for conferring instruction in general upon a few specified social classes, and three similar establishments for conferring upon the same classes a training of a professional-technical nature. Yet these five institutions must not be misunderstood. . .for all of them received pupils belonging to more than one social grade, and had an elementary curriculum plus, in each case, a single specialty--an example being that the School of Navigation's pupils included both princes and plain dvoriane. . . .⁷⁷

After the decree of January 16, 1716, the mathematical schools were reserved for children belonging to the lower classes. During the year of the decree that excluded the dvoriane from these establishments of rudimentary learning, thirteen ciphering (mathematical) schools were opened.⁷⁸ Others followed as is shown below.

TABLE IV
NEW CIPHERING SCHOOLS FROM 1719-1723

Year	Number of New Schools
1719	1
1720	3
1721	10
1722	15
1723	1

The total number of pupils for the first ten years reached about three

⁷⁷Kluchevsky, op. cit., p. 249.

⁷⁸Several "ciphering" schools existed even before 1714 as private ventures, for instance, in Kazan (Hans, p. 13).

thousand. The composition of the student body, according to origin, is depicted in the following table.⁷⁹

TABLE V
COMPOSITION OF STUDENT BODY IN THE CIPHERING SCHOOLS

Social Origin	Number of Students
Clerical	1,431
Government clerks	374
Private soldiers and Cossacks	402
Nobles	52
Citizens	93
Others	199

In addition to the ciphering schools there existed other lay elementary schools in connection with the Navy Department. According to an official document of 1722, the Admiralty established such schools at Petersburg, Cronstadt, Reval, Kazan, Astrakhan, Tavrov, and Sestroretsk.

As seen in the figures cited above, almost fifty per cent of all the pupils were sons of the clergy. Therefore, when Peter, in 1721, established special schools for the clergy and freed them from compulsory attendance at lay schools, slightly more than half of the ciphering schools were closed because of the absence of any students. That these clerical schools grew quite rapidly is seen by the fact that in 1727, there were forty-six parochial schools with over three thousand students.

⁷⁹Hans, op. cit., p. 13.

Perhaps the most remarkable episode in Russia's dawning scholastic enlightenment was Gluck's Academy. Established in 1705, this state-sponsored institution was a short-lived experiment. Its founder, Ernest Gluck, was the Marienburg Lutheran pastor in whose house Catherine I once worked as a servant. Coming to Moscow as a prisoner in 1702, Gluck soon won the confidence of Peter who, in 1705, instructed him to organize an intermediate college, referred to as the Gymnasium. Heading the list as chief instructor, the pastor offered his students

. . . A breath-taking curriculum, including French, German, Swedish, Greek, Latin, Hebrew, oriental languages, literature, rhetoric, ethics, philosophy, riding, dancing, and even courses in good manners. . . .⁸⁰

Teachers in the gymnasium were all foreigners and in 1706, the number of students was fixed at one hundred. However, since attendance at Gluck's college was voluntary, the number of students declined until in 1715 they numbered a mere five. Consequently, the school closed its doors.

If Gluck's Academy proved to be an ephemeral experiment, then another of Peter's efforts to create a potential centre of intellectual activity was, in the long run, highly successful. Always interested in the promotion of science, especially of geography and geology, with their immediate practical implications, he ordered the establishment of herb gardens and chemical laboratories at St. Petersburg, Moscow, and elsewhere. Fascinated by a visit to the Royal Society at London, assiduous in fostering the development of applied science, and given, perhaps, the idea of establishing a similar institution in Russia by Leibniz, Peter,

⁸⁰Florinsky, op. cit., p. 405.

in 1718, took seriously the idea of founding a Russian Academy of Sciences. On paper, it was established in 1724 though its first meeting took place only after his death.

Its predecessor was a library and Kunstammer, established in 1714 to house his father's [Alexis'] books, with later accessions, as well as a collection of "curiosities" in the form of bones, stones, and other natural phenomena.⁸¹

In addition to establishing state schools, Peter tried to improve and modernize those of the Church. By the seventeenth century, two theological academies had been established; one in Kiev in 1627 by Peter Mogila and the other in Moscow in 1687. During the first decade of the eighteenth century, a number of secondary schools were founded by the local clergy--for instance, in Chernigov in 1700, in Rostov in 1702, and Novgorod in 1706. Until 1721, unlike the Naval Academy, the School of Engineering, and the School of Gunnery, these schools were private and received no assistance from the state treasury. In 1721, however, the reformer issued the Church Statute which stipulated that a secondary school for the clergy had to be opened in every episcopal diocese. These schools came under the jurisdiction of the Holy Synod and were to be maintained by the Church.

Up to 1727, 46 of these schools were established (including 23 elementary schools) with a total of 3,056 pupils. The elementary schools were: 13 in the province of Novgorod with 1,007 pupils, 7 in that of Belgorod (Ukraine) with 1 in Moscow, 1 in Rostov, and 1 in Nizhny Novgorod. The remaining "diocesan schools" only gradually developed into secondary schools with a systematic curriculum and in the first period were also limited to reading, writing, and religion. The exceptions were the two Academies of Kiev and Moscow and the diocesan schools of Novgorod, Chernigov, Belgorod, Rostov, Nizhny Novgorod, and Ryazan which had the full

⁸¹Clarkson, op. cit., p. 218.

programme of a medieval scholastic tradition.⁸²

On the whole, Peter's educational measures have been criticized on a number of counts. First, it is said that his schemes for education bore all the marks of the improviser whose main interests lay elsewhere. Consequently, it is added, his attempt to create a state's system of education for all classes was unsuccessful. In fact, the same historians castigate Peter because they claim that he made no effort to establish schools among the peasant population. (It seems, though, that historians levelling such a charge against the Tsar are judging the educational situation in seventeenth century Russia according to twentieth century standards.) Second, it is claimed that his entire educational program was designed solely for the utilitarian purpose of furnishing educated officials for various government departments.

Yet a balanced judgement has to allow something for a different point of view as well. Even if his educational reforms were not part of a well-integrated plan, they did jolt men towards new ideas and new knowledge. And if he failed to create a state system of education, it was because it was an impractical task. Further, to say that by disregarding the educational needs of the peasantry, Peter split the Russian society in two appears to miss the point.

The reformer had no choice, for he could not bring Western culture to all his subjects at the same time. The gap between the Westernized segment of the population and the masses had to be bridged by his successors. . . .⁸³

⁸²Hans, op. cit., p. 15. ⁸³Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 263.

Finally, the criticism that his educational reforms were designed solely for utilitarian purposes ignores the fact that Peter envisioned a powerful, industrial, and modernized Russia--a feat that could only be brought about by educating the Russian people. Quite possibly Russia was destined to become such a nation, ". . .but Peter the Great cannot be denied the role of the chief executor of this fate."⁸⁴

VII. CONTINUITY IN CHANGE

The reign of Peter is of paramount importance in the study of Russia. "In fact, the eminent historian, Klyuchevsky, went so far as to state that 'the whole essence of Russian history has been compressed into the single question of the significance of the work of Peter'. . . ." ⁸⁵ Nor have accolades been attributed to the Tsar only in retrospect. Contemporaries have also eulogized Peter in superlative terms. For instance, Leibniz stated, "The more I learn of the character of the Tsar, the more I revere him."⁸⁶

Yet the case against Peter is formidable. It is not answered by the liberal argument for progress nor is it advanced by the charge that he destroyed an indigenous culture and disrupted an organic unity of the nation. With the abolition of beards, oak coffins, and other common usages and customs went a debased religious formality; with the common mode of thought which he tried to impose on Russian society went the splitting of Russian society into two nations.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 266.

⁸⁵Grey, op. cit., p. 2.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 12.

The latter point, however, should not be overly emphasized since the cleavage between the rulers and the ruled was not projected upon Russia by Peter by the contrasting symbols of Moscow and the new city of St. Petersburg; it was inherent in the historic order of the Russian state.

The real count against Peter the Great--and perhaps, after all, it overshadows all the rest--is that in attempting the impossible he set a killing pace. He drove his country forward along strange paths with pitiless unconcern, without thought of the sacrifices he demanded or the costliness of his errors.⁸⁷

Despite the ambivalence regarding evaluations of Peter, all agree that his reign marks something of a dividing line in Russian history--a dividing line that marks the emergence of Russia as a powerful, European civilization. In fact, some go as far as claiming that the Petrine period was a revolution which came from above. This, however, is overstating the case, for:

Most of the reforms that he carried through linked on with tentative steps in the same direction made by his predecessors; most of the changes he introduced had their harbingers before him.⁸⁸

On a similar note, Ian Grey says, "By the time of Peter's birth, the road ahead had been sign-posted, and the forerunners had outlined many reforms."⁸⁹ Continuity, then, was a characteristic feature of the social change that occurred during Peter's reign.

Broadly speaking, social change may be discerned as a series of

⁸⁷R. D. Charques, A Short History of Russia (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1956), p. 106.

⁸⁸Sumner, op. cit., p. 2. ⁸⁹Grey, op. cit., p. 35.

movements which seldom, if ever, are rhythmic and regular.⁹⁰ At certain points in a society's history, they are almost imperceptible; other times they are pronounced and sometimes, as in the Petrine era, explosive. Some movements endure only for a short period of time; others are of such long duration that they may be studied over the course of centuries. Some are without specific direction or goals; ". . . others become organized and led in terms of idealized and ultimate objectives projected imaginatively into some future time."⁹¹

Both movements, those of short duration as well as those enduring through decades or even hundreds of years, are forms of collective behavior in that they represent the responses of people to their environment. Each of these

. . . Represent efforts toward more satisfactory personal adjustments or more efficient social organization, but, in the case of the more ephemeral and directionless movements, the efforts are likely to be largely unselfconscious and irrational. In the case of organized social movements, the efforts are more consciously purposeful. Under certain conditions the former type may take on rationally defined goals and thus develop the characteristic features of the latter type. In either case, the former represents tendencies toward change--usually random, sporadic, and oftentimes unpredictable--while the latter shows tendencies to form identifiable trends of change.

By trend is meant a persistent general movement in the direction of some distant goal as yet undefined or only vaguely held. Entering into every major trend are minor trends or tendencies . . . such as recurring types of behavior. As noted above, many behavior responses seemingly manifest themselves without any clear connection with prior or succeeding tendencies; they appear suddenly, . . . and then disappear. . . . Unless such tendencies develop a connection among themselves so they move together in a unilinear

⁹⁰ Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, An Introduction to Sociology (third edition; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 600.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 600-601.

series of causal and effective relations, they do not constitute a trend.⁹²

The discussion cited above, concerning tendencies and trends, is of special import to the analysis of the Petrine reforms in that these concepts enable the student to examine the process of social change that took place in Russia within a generalized, systematic framework. It has already been indicated that Peter's reforms were not truly revolutionary but were continuations of efforts exerted by his predecessors--efforts that did not appear instantaneously but evolved and developed over a long period of time. It would seem logical to conclude, then, that Peter's innovations had their origin in the distant past in the form of tendencies which, in time, developed connections among themselves, thus constituting, in Dawson's and Gettys' words, a trend. The reformer's fame rests largely in the fact that because of the daemonic element in his personality, his violence and cruelty, the unrelenting pace that he set and the ubiquitous burdens that he imposed, he was able to give tremendous acceleration and momentum to this trend. What, in light of the above, were the tendencies that characterized the process of social change manifest in Russia over the centuries and when did these tendencies develop a 'connection among themselves' so as to constitute a trend? An attempt to answer these two basic questions will be made in the following section of this chapter.

From early Slavic times the influx of foreign ideas had determined to a degree, the Russian way of life.⁹³ With the collapse of the

⁹²Ibid., p. 601.

⁹³See pages 107-108.

Kievan State and the Mongol invasion, Russia was cut off from Novgorod, where the German influence was felt, from Kiev and the south-west, where Western ideas were penetrating, and from Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine civilization. These factors contributed to the emerging xenophobia and isolation of Great Russia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Russia was again familiar to Western Europe, transacted commercial and diplomatic business with these nations, borrowed ideas of their enlightenment, and summoned to her aid Western artists, skilled artisans, physicians, and soldiers.

But this was not influence; it was intercourse. Influence appears on the scene when the community by which it is received begins to recognize the superiority of the culture or environment with which it (the community) is being influenced, and also the necessity of studying it, of morally submitting to it, while at the same time borrowing from it not only the amenities of life, but also the very basis of a system of life--views, ideas, and social relations.⁹⁴

The social intercourse that Kliuchevsky refers to are tendencies--general movements in the direction of the distant goal of successful Westernization--which was for centuries held by at least a small group among the Russian elite. Beginning with Ivan III foreign craftsmen from many countries were invited to serve the tsar. Their impact on Russian society was soon apparent. A similar policy was followed by his son, Basil III, who continued to maintain fairly close contact with the West and other foreign countries. For instance, he established diplomatic relations with the Holy Roman Empire, with the papacy, with

⁹⁴Kliuchevsky, op. cit., III, p. 266.

the Turkish sultan, and with the founder of the great Mogul empire in India, Babar. Moreover, it was in the reigns of Ivan III and Basil III that a whole foreign settlement, the so-called German Suburb, appeared in Moscow--an important centre of diffusion of Western ideas and practices.

The ascension to the throne of Ivan the Terrible marked the dawning of a turbulent era on the horizon of Russian history. This eventful though tragic reign has received different interpretations: one emphasizes the Tsar's madness, the other explains his actions on the basis of fundamental Muscovite needs and problems. Though the pathological element of the Tsar's behavior cannot be denied, there appears to be some ground for explaining at least some of his actions in terms of responses to the stimulating conditions of his environment. These responses, though in many respects ephemeral and directionless, represent efforts towards forming a more efficient social organization. Belonging to this category are the Church Council of 1551, the new legal code of 1551, and the reorganization of the army along Western lines. This movement, conditioned by the wishes and attitudes of the Tsar, had its origin in the cultural matrix of Ivan's time.⁹⁵

Additional evidence of social intercourse with the West is apparent in the tragic era of Ivan's rule. His reign which dated from 1553-1584 saw the further importation of foreign engineers, physicians, and skilled craftsmen. Eventually, over one hundred twenty

⁹⁵Dawson and Gettys, op. cit., p. 601.

doctors, teachers, artists, and technicians agreed to come to Russia. Also, cultural contact was established with England when in the winter of 1553-1554, an English vessel arrived in the Bay of Saint Nicholas in the White Sea. Though formal diplomatic relations with England were not concluded at this time, English traders remained active in Russia for the next two centuries.

In the field of education, a number of notable works were compiled. To promote the diffusion of these books, Ivan established a printing press in Moscow. Though the measure was unsuccessful, it demonstrates Ivan's eagerness to encourage the tendencies, supported by an elite group in Russia for hundreds of years, that could have transformed the Muscovite state.

During the reign of Ivan IV's eldest surviving son, Theodore, 1584-1598, Russia enjoyed some measure of peace. Physically weak and limited in intelligence, the new tsar relied on his advisors, especially Boris Godunov. From 1588 he was, in effect, the virtual ruler of Russia and when Theodore died in 1598, Boris ascended the throne. An intelligent and capable ruler, Godunov remained interested in learning from the West. He continued to send young men to study abroad and even thought of establishing a university at Moscow. Peaceful relations were maintained with foreign countries, trade was promoted, and commercial treaties were concluded with England and the Hansa.

Yet the movements towards attaining a more efficient social organization on the Western model consisted, in Dawson's and Gettys' terms, of tendencies without concrete direction or goals, largely

unconscious and irrational. Only attempts to borrow the amenities of life were made; none to incorporate the very basis of a system of life--views, ideas, and social relations.⁹⁶ The net result was that Russia lagged far behind the peoples of Western Europe. Not that they had always lagged behind their Western neighbors for:

In the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, before they had moved northward and established Moscow as their capital, the Russians of Kiev and Novgorod had been closely bound by culture and trade with the countries of the West and had stood as their equals. But then for nearly two-hundred and fifty years (1240-1480) they were under the yoke of the Mongol-Tatar khans; their intercourse with the West had ceased, and they were isolated. They knew nothing of such great movements as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the explorations and the scientific discoveries.⁹⁷

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, the tsars and some of the key men of the court became conscious of the superiority of the West in war, industry, trade, and education. "A sense of isolation and vulnerability" filled this small ruling circle with uneasiness."⁹⁸ The realization that in the seventeenth century their country was farther behind Western Europe than ever before intensified their apprehensions and marked the beginning of Western influence in Russia.

Only with the seventeenth century did Russia manifest such signs in relation to Western Europe; and it was in this sense that I am speaking when I say that Western influence began with the period in question.⁹⁹

"But why did that influence--that mental and moral submission--not begin in the sixteenth century?"¹⁰⁰ Kliuchevsky answers this question

⁹⁶Kliuchevsky, op. cit., III, p. 266.

⁹⁷Grey, op. cit., p. 16. ⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Kliuchevsky, op. cit., III, p. 266. ¹⁰⁰Ibid.

by pointing out that the source of this influence was Russia's dissatisfaction with life and her own position. The close of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth saw the virtual collapse of the existing order. Failure of all attempts to correct it, led to the idea that the very basis of that order was at fault forcing many people to question the nation's creative forces and innate intellect.

Then there began a profound break in men's minds. Both among Muscovite administrative circles and in the community at large men became oppressed with doubts as to whether antiquity had bequeathed a sufficient measure of resources for successful existence in the future; men began to lose their old national complacency, and to look around them, and to seek guidance and instruction at the hands of the alien West, and to feel more and more persuaded both of his superiority and of their own inefficiency.¹⁰¹

The difference between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries arose most probably from the fact that a change had taken place in the relation of Russia to the world of Western Europe. Political centralization and industrialization in Europe led to great progress in the development of administrative, financial, and military techniques, in the organization of armies, in the growth of the theory of state stewardship, and to great progress in the development of economic techniques, in the creation of mercantile marines, in the growth of factories, and in the organization of commerce and credit. Russia, however, took no part in this progress but spent her resources in external defence, and in the upkeep of a court, a government, and of privileged classes which did nothing for the economic or spiritual growth of her people. "For this reason Russia was, during the seventeenth century, more remote from

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 267.

the West even than she had been at the beginning of the sixteenth."¹⁰²

The influx of Western influence was a consequence of a feeling of national impotence. What, then, were some of the earliest manifestations of Western influence?

Since emulation of the West was adopted by the government, it developed consecutively and with a gradual extension of its field of action. First, Russia borrowed from the foreigner, military and other technical improvements essential to the defense of the country--a point where inefficiency was felt with particular keenness. As a result, important innovations were introduced in the Russian army as well as in the manufacturing industry. As early as Michael's reign, the government sent out armies composed of native and mercenary troops.

Next, on the supposition that it would be better to learn the military art of foreigners than simply to hire them, the Government began to place its native troops under the instruction of foreign officers, and to raise properly trained and equipped regiments of its own.¹⁰³

This transition of the Russian army to a system of regular formation was undertaken in about 1630 and was consolidated, in the reign of Michael, by an edict by which future Russian soldiers were to be drilled by the foreign military element. In 1647, when Alexis was tsar, this document was published under the title of "The Teaching and Craft of our Warlike Establishment of Foot Soldiers."

The maintenance of a regular army raised the question of arming it. Till this time, armament and artillery equipment were purchased

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 268.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 273.

abroad. This was expensive so Moscow began considering the possibility of manufacturing her own munitions which in turn led to plans for exploiting the mineral wealth of the country. In those days iron was mined at Tula and Ustruzhna and smelted and manufactured into objects of domestic use as well as cannons and matchlocks, but the amount produced was insufficient to meet the demands of the War Department. A vigorous search was begun for both the mines and for native and foreign men skilled in metallurgy. Near the end of Michael's reign, a factory was established near the River Neglinna where foreign artisans cast cannon and church bells and where Russians received an excellent education in metal-founding.

Also, potash, glass, and other factories first became established, and the advent of these metallurgical experts to Moscow attracted thither foreign furriers, weavers of velvet, spinners of wire, clockmakers, water-raisers, lapidaries, iron-casters, and portrait painters.¹⁰⁴

Learned men were also invited to come to Russia as is evident by the invitation Adam Olearius--a professor at the University of Leipzig--received from Michael. Also, since it was recognized that the West profited economically through an extensive overseas trade carried in fleets of trading ships, the government began to take an interest in ships, harbours, and maritime commerce. Plans were drawn for hiring Dutch shipwrights and sailors to man the ships when built. In 1669, a ship was actually built by foreigners in the service of Russia, on the Oka River but, unfortunately, it was burnt in 1670 by the rebel,

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 275.

Stenka Razin.

Amidst this mining and manufacturing, the government began to re-examine its fiscal policies. Until then, the general plan of raising revenue was to calculate the number of registered taxpayers, dividing the sum required among them, and then order the sum to be collected on the pain of severe penalties for non-payment. Closer contact with the West, however, brought new ideas concerning the raising of money--that is, that any raising of taxes should be preceded by an increase in productivity.

These notions constituted the first impressions to be produced upon the Muscovite Government by Western influence. In the community they also awoke an echo. In other words the administrative ferment evoked by these notions, the search for mines, forests of ship-building timber, sites for saltboiling, and spots for the erection of sawyards. . .all of these things aroused the population to visions both of new fields for their labour and of Government pay for information to that end.¹⁰⁵

Thus, both the government and a portion of the Muscovite community came to be consciously aware of the need to adopt the military and industrial techniques of the West.

As mentioned previously, the search for skilled labor attracted a multitude of technical experts, officers, soldiers, physicians, artisans, merchants, and manufacturers. Back in Ivan the Terrible's reign, their numbers were already sufficiently large to comprise the so-called German Quarter (a colony of Western European immigrants who settled on the River Yauza, near Moscow). After Michael's ascension, the influx of foreigners increased still more with the newcomers settling wherever

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 277.

they could. In 1643, orders were given that the scattered foreigners were to settle on the Yauza. Thus arose a new Foreign Quarter which developed into a well-planned suburb. In addition to representing a corner of Western Europe, the German settlement came to be an exponent of Western-European culture.

The technical experts, capitalists, and military officers whom the Government engaged for external defence or the industrial requirements of Muscovite domestic existence brought with them to Moscow not only their military and industrial skill, but also the comforts, the amenities, and the conveniences of life as lived in Western Europe, and it is curious to note the eagerness with which the leaders of Muscovite society leapt at foreign luxury and imported delights, though, in so doing, they broke with their own rooted customs, prejudices, and tastes.¹⁰⁶

External political relations strengthened this leaning towards the West as diplomatic missions from abroad aroused in the empire a desire to be seen in the best possible light before foreign observers. "Thus foreign taste was called upon to correct native coarseness."¹⁰⁷

While borrowing from the foreigners his crafts and social amenities, the Russians also developed a love for intellectual knowledge, an interest in science, and a willingness to think upon subjects once alien to the native mind. At court, there arose an association of influential amateurs of Western culture. Nikita Romanov, the richest man in the empire after the tsar, became a protector and lover of the Germans, a devotee of their music and dress, as well as, to a degree, a free-thinker. Again, Michael Rtischev, a state councillor, and A. L. Ordin Nastchokin, head of the Office of Ambassadors, became zealous

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 280.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 281.

advocates of learning and scholastic education. The latter's successor, A. S. Matriev, was the first Muscovite to start a debating society for the purpose of exchanging ideas and news. "In this way the relation of the Russian community to Western Europe underwent an insensible change."¹⁰⁸ In the past the Russians had viewed Europe as a model for military and industrial techniques but now they saw Europe ". . .as a school wherein a man might learn, not only the handicrafts, but also the way in which a man ought to live and to think."¹⁰⁹

Yet Russia did not borrow Western ideas directly from Western Europe but through an intermediary--namely, Poland. The strong political ties that existed between a large section of the Orthodox Rus and the Polish Monarchical Republic facilitated the diffusion of Western civilization to Muscovy. In addition, Polish Roman Catholicism forced the Russians to apply themselves to scholarship, to literature, and the Latin language to be able to hold their ground in theological disputes. Thus, by the middle of the seventeenth century, Western Russians greatly surpassed intellectually the Eastern Rus, particularly the monks. Hence in 1649, three Kievan monks, Slavitski, Arsenius, and Ptitski, were called to Moscow to translate the Bible from Greek into the Slavonic language. In addition to executing this task, they translated various educational works and encyclopedic compendia such as geographies, cosmographies, etcetera. These books, read by many amateurs of knowledge in Moscow, stimulated the need for book learning and scientific education.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 284. ¹⁰⁹Ibid., pp. 284-85.

Thus it came to be that Moscow

. . . Came to feel the necessity of assimilating, firstly, European arts and comforts, and in later days, European scientific erudition. Beginning with foreign officers and German artillerymen, she ended with German ballets and Latin Grammar.¹¹⁰

Even greater departures from the existing order were made by the youngest of the forerunners of Peter the Great--Prince V. V. Golitzin. In his house, built and decorated in the European style, was a large library of manuscripts and books printed in a variety of languages. This mansion served as a meeting place for educated foreigners who happened to be in Moscow. As successor to Nastchokin in the Office of Ambassadors, he further developed the ideas of his predecessor. The most important points in his program were:

1. Peace and an alliance with Poland.
2. A struggle with Sweden for the Baltic seaboard.
3. A reorganization of the militia.
4. The institution of a poll-tax.
5. The introduction of urban self-government.
6. The emancipation of the serfs.
7. The establishment of schools.

Truly, Golitzin was the precursor of Peter the Great.

From the foregoing discussion it is seen that prior to the seventeenth century, attempts to reform Russia were indeed random, sporadic, largely unconscious and without direction. These varied

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 291.

attempts can be referred to as tendencies--tendencies which, over the centuries, were marked by fluctuations and undulations, and were neither rhythmic nor regular. At times they were feeble and almost imperceptible as during the Mongol domination. Other times they were pronounced as in the reign of Boris Godunov. Still they persisted. With the seventeenth century, however, came the awareness on the part of the government, leading members of the court, and a few outstanding clergymen of Russia's backwardness and isolation. Accompanying this awareness was the realization of the need to transform Russia, to consciously pursue a policy of modernization after the European model. Hence, in the century in question, the previous tendencies developed a connection among themselves so that they moved together in a unilinear series of effective relations, thus constituting a trend. A direct manifestation of this trend was a comprehensive program of reform organized and led in terms of ultimate objectives projected into the future--as for instance, Golitzin's suggested innovations. In conclusion, it is maintained that this trend, Peter the Great greatly accelerated. Hence, continuity, rather than a clean break with the past, marked the Petrine reforms.

CHAPTER VII

A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PETRINE REFORMS

Though the preceding chapter was primarily concerned with presenting a general outline of the major aspects of Peter's innovations, special attention was focused on the element of continuity manifest in his reformative measures. Drawing upon concepts elaborated by C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, it was shown that previous random and largely unconscious tendencies to reform Russia developed connections between themselves in the seventeenth century, thus marking the appearance of a trend.¹ To this trend to revive Russia, Peter the Great gave tremendous acceleration. Hence, though the Tsar's reforms did not constitute a revolutionary break with the past, they displayed, to a degree, revolutionarily qualities.

Viewing then the Petrine era as a period witnessing a social movement in its own right, an attempt will be made to analyze Peter's reforms within the framework of Smelser's theory of collective behavior. First, however, it must be shown that these reforms were indeed a form of collective behavior rather than simply examples of routinely incorporated normative changes. All normative changes can be placed on a continuum ranging from those routinely incorporated to those adopted as a consequence based on a generalized belief.

¹ See pages 242-55.

At one extreme of the continuum is the example of a top business manager who reorganizes the sales department of his company by simply deciding to do so. At the other extreme are outbursts. . . which are replete with hysteria, accusations, exaggerated claims and myths of omnipotence.²

It is indeed tempting to view Peter's momentous reforms as cases of the former (routinely incorporated changes) since all of his innovations were initiated by a ukaz or by the Tsar resorting to compulsion and force. By establishing state policy and control, where formerly individual choice and chance prevailed, the great reformer introduced the beginning of a new era in Russia. This meant that not only amenities of life were borrowed from the West but also the basis of a system of life which involved changes in attitudes, norms and values. While such changes could not have been brought about by decrees, by compulsion and force, it is highly probable that these changes were the consequence of an organized movement toward such a goal ". . . led in terms of idealized and ultimate objectives projected imaginatively into some future time"³ or in Smelser's terms ". . . mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action."⁴

As the definition indicates, collective behavior is guided by a variety of beliefs such as assessments of the situation, wishes, and expectations as well as the belief in the existence of extraordinary forces such as threats and conspiracies. Assessments of the situation,

²Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 271.

³Carl A. Cawson and Warner E. Gettys, An Introduction to Sociology (second edition; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1935), pp. 600-601.

⁴Smelser, op. cit., p. 8.

wishes, and expectations had already been explicitly expressed in the seventeenth century when both the Muscovite administrative circles and a considerable portion of the community began to doubt

. . .Whether antiquity had bequeathed a sufficient measure of resources for successful existence in the future; men began to lose their old national self-complacency, and to look around them and to seek guidance and instruction at the hands of the alien of the West, and to feel more persuaded both of his superiority and their own inefficiency.⁵

By Peter's time this same group was consciously aware of the fact that "the people of Muscovy were lazy, corrupt, servile, drunken, and immoral."⁶ Assessment of the situation was indeed made. Thus, the Petrine period manifested the first defining characteristic of collective behavior. Similarly the era in question displayed another characteristic of collective action--the belief in the existence of extraordinary forces such as threats and conspiracies and the belief that extraordinary consequences will follow if the collective attempt to reconstitute social action is successful. With reference to this second defining characteristic, the Tsar was convinced that threats and conspiracies endangered his personal rule and his plans for reform. Witness the severity of the punishment meted out to the revolting streltsy and the tsarevitch Alexis, both of whom Peter suspected of reactionary tendencies and contumacy. Concomitantly, there was a belief that prepared Peter and the other participants of reform for action--the generalized belief that

⁵ V. O. Kluchevsky, A History of Russia, trans. C. J. Hogarth (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Limited, 1913), III, p. 267. See also the present author's discussion on page 248.

⁶ Ian Grey, Peter the Great (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1960), p. 24.

Russia could be transformed only by the adoption of Western forms of trade, industry, government, and civilization.

The third defining characteristic of collective behavior, according to Smelser, is that it is not institutionalized behavior. Under favorable conditions a social movement may terminate in the form of a lasting organization and become established as institutional forms. Of the institutional forms of behavior, the following may be said:

. . . First, each institution can be located in a spatial arrangement; second, each institution provides for a minimum of the biological and/or psychological needs of a certain proportion of its members; third, in each institution, the interaction of individuals produces consensus as to goals and the means of achieving those goals which are expressed in the folkways, mores, ritual, and more formal organization; fourth, each institution provides well defined and socially sanctioned roles for its members, those roles being mutually adjusted so that persons engaged in the institutional behavior can best contribute to the functioning of the institution as a whole; and fifth, the institutional patterns of behavior are interrelated with those of other institutions in the social system of the society so as to ensure the adequate functioning of the society as a whole.⁷

Peter's reforms were, in many instances, designed to change the institutional structure of the Russian society as, for example, the 'revolution' they produced in the Church--". . . a revolution of customs and institutions. . ."⁸ which were quickly absorbed into the life of the Church and of the nation. Other efforts came to naught as was the case with regard to local government where his sweeping thought found little or no application in Russian life.⁹ Such attempts, however,

⁷Dawson and Gettys, op. cit., p. 249. ⁸Grey, op. cit., p. 402.

⁹Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 256.

inevitably disrupted the traditional institutional organization yet did not provide a well-integrated, workable substitute. Consequently, during this dynamic period there was no definitive institutional spatial arrangement, again evidenced in the Tsar's failure to effectively bring about a separation of judicial and administrative power by his administration reform of 1719.

Nor did the reforms result in the institutions providing a minimum of psychological needs for the members of the Russian society. Instead, they were confronted with compulsory service in the army and navy, compelled to work on canal projects, the building of St. Petersburg, on building a fleet, and were faced with an increasing number of new taxes which the fiscals dreamed up. Such measures shocked the complacent Muscovite populace. Little wonder, then, that armed rebellion broke out among the Bashkirs and the Cossacks of the Don and Dneiper region. Others seeking to escape the tax-gatherer, the recruiting officer, and oppressive toil resorted to flight.

Persistently, they sought to escape. Penalties were savage and runaways were hunted mercilessly, but still they fled in hundreds. In 1699, 330 families vanished from the Voronezh district. Villages in other parts of Russia fell deserted as peasants made their way southwards.¹⁰

Still others, while they did not rebel, complained incessantly. Complaints were frequently embroidered with rumours and fantastic predictions. A few examples are cited below.

"Since God sent him to be Tsar," the peasants muttered, "we have seen no bright days--the village is burdened with paying rubles and

¹⁰ Grey, op. cit., p. 254.

half-rubles and with providing horses and carts; rest for us peasants, there is none." The son of a boyar cried out, "What kind of a Tsar is he? He has dragged us all into the army, and taken away our people and peasants for recruits. . . ."11

When behavior is institutionalized, there is consensus regarding the goals society values which, in turn, are expressed in the folkways, mores, the ritual, and in more formal organization. In Peter's day such consensus was lacking. On the one hand, there was a small, though increasing, progressive group with eyes focused on the West, striving to emulate their foreign neighbors and encourage the diffusion of Western European cultural elements. On the other hand, was the chorus ". . . of smocked peasants and kaftaned merchants moaning for 'the happy days of old' when they could sleep on stoves and scratch themselves on benches."12

Under such circumstances it was quite impossible for each institution to provide well-defined and socially sanctioned roles for its members. From Peter's point of view, the one role that all Russian subjects should enact was service to the State. Working against this were centuries-old habits of irresponsibility, laziness, and ignorance. Even a more serious obstacle to reform was the corruption against which Peter fought all his reign.

Bribery and corruption were common practices in Europe at this time, but in Russia they were carried to such extremes as to cripple the national life. Russians looked on service as a means of profit. Public officials were unpaid or received a nominal salary; they got their living by speculation and bribery, and those who were clever grew rich. It was accepted that everyone who could robbed

¹¹ Ibid., p. 257.

¹² Harold Lamb, The City and the Tsar (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), p. 229.

the state; it was no matter for shame or disgrace.¹³

Another barrier prohibiting each institution from providing well-defined roles for each of its members was the ambiguity and ambivalence that was so characteristic of the age. To this state of affairs Peter contributed his share. Throughout his reign, ukaz after ukaz was issued frequently on the same matter. Often the net result was widespread confusion as was evident in the decrees concerning the census of 1718. At other times edicts were proclaimed only to be rescinded several years later, for instance the ukaz (1714) concerning compulsory education for the sons of the landowners. Even in matters of faith, the Tsar perplexed his subjects as he ridiculed by means of extravagant buffoonery the time-honored institution, the Orthodox Church.

Generally speaking, Russia of Peter's time was in a state of dynamic flux. Though the seeds of many of the changes had been planted long before his reign and if given time, might of themselves borne fruit, Peter could not wait and plunged his people into 'revolution'.¹⁴ In periods of dramatic change, when institutions themselves are experiencing extreme transition, it is difficult for the institutional patterns of behavior to become interrelated with those of other institutions.

In light of the above, it is seen that the Tsar's reformative program stimulated forms of interaction that showed little resemblance to institutionalized behavior. Thus the third and final defining characteristic of collective behavior also characterizes the behavior

¹³Grey, op. cit., p. 390.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 136.

manifested by the reformer (and his supporters) of Russia. The important point is that the efforts to reform Russia approximate the requirements of Smelser's definition. If this definition is accepted as valid, then the analysis of the Petrine era as a period of collective behavior is a logical step. The question that arises now is what type of collective behavior occurred during the Petrine period? Recall that Smelser, after considering the external and internal divisions of the field, derived the following typology:

- Value-oriented movement - Behavior mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief envisioning a reconstitution of values.
- Norm-oriented movement - Collective action mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief envisioning a reconstitution of norms.
- Hostile outburst - Collective behavior mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief which attributes the undesirable social condition to some agent or agents.
- Craze and panic - Behavior based on a generalized redefinition of situational facilities.

Bearing the above in mind, it is contended that all the types of collective behavior listed by Smelser occurred during Peter's reign. Examples of each of the rudimentary forms will be briefly explored while the major portion of this chapter will center on those of the higher level, namely the norm-oriented and value-oriented movements, since these were

of much greater consequence to the history of Russia.

The first type of collective behavior that will be examined is the mass flight of peasants that took place during Peter's reign. The new census of 1710, taken for the purpose of ascertaining the increases in the number of taxpayers revealed a distressing picture of depopulation of the country.¹⁵ The census of 1710 showed a decrease of 19,000 households out of the total of 154,000. According to official figures, 37.2 per cent of the former figure migrated as a result of severe government exactions. Later census showed ". . . added increases of taxpayer shrinkage--Kazan alone being reported by the Senate to have lost 33,000 dvori since 1710, or nearly a third of that year's registered assessable inhabitants!"¹⁶ In all, hundreds of thousands of peasants fled the country to Poland, to the southern steppes, and to the wooded wilderness of the north-east where one could still hope to escape the landlords, the recruiting officers, and tax collectors.

One difficulty in analyzing this mass movement of peasants within Smelser's theory is that Smelser does not specifically deal with such a phenomenon. Consequently, the following analysis will require some degree of adaptation as far as categorization of type is concerned. However, his definition of a craze, which is of necessity broad, includes a basic characteristic that makes it, to a degree, analagous to mass flights. Smelser defines craze ". . . as mobilization for action based

¹⁵ See pages 216-17.

¹⁶ Kluchevsky, op. cit., IV, p. 129.

on a positive wish-fulfillment belief."¹⁷ Though the massive migrations of the Russian peasantry to frontier areas are difficult to classify, it seems that within Smelser's typology such behavior could be considered a craze. This is the position adopted here. Hence, this phenomenon is examined by employing the value-added approach and considering the six determinants of collective action. The analysis is presented in the following paragraphs. Before proceeding, the reader should be reminded that though the value-added logic implies a temporal sequence, any or all of the determinants may have existed for an indefinite period before activation.

The first determinant to be considered is structural conduciveness since the absence of this determinant precludes the possibility of the occurrence of any form of collective action. This determinant will be discussed under three headings:

1. The possibility of strain.
2. The possibility of withdrawal from strain.
3. The possibility of communication.

Some kinds of strain such as floods, earthquakes, storms and droughts lie beyond the realm of human control. Other types accrue as a result of particular modes of institutionalization. Such was the case in the Russian situation since the autocracy and the entire administrative system, which relied heavily on military governors, contributed to the emergence of strain. In addition, structural conduciveness must include the possibility of withdrawal from strain. During Peter's

¹⁷ Smelser, op. cit., p. 171.

reign, as well as in the centuries that preceded and followed his rule, this was possible since the Russian peasants could escape to outlying areas where the control of the central authorities was not consolidated. Finally, structural conduciveness must permit the possibility of communication. Again, the Russian situation facilitated the easy exchange of ideas because large numbers of peasants lived in close proximity either in communes or on the landholdings of their lords.

Given the conditions of conduciveness just outlined, a number of types of strain must operate to produce mass movements or flights. These are:

1. Ambiguity as to the level of rewards expected from the existing allocation of resources.
2. Ambiguity as to the level of rewards to be expected from alternative modes of allocation.
3. Ready availability of facilities which permits some line of reallocation.

During the Petrine period there was a high degree of ambiguity concerning the level of rewards to be expected from the existing allocation of resources. Particularly after his establishment of the Table of Ranks, even noble birth was no guarantee of traditional rewards. What is more, the masses were generally convinced that there would be no alternative just rewards--only greater and greater exactions. There was, however, the availability of facilities which permitted some line of reallocation and this was by moving to frontier areas.

Before collective behavior can occur, there must be some kind of

belief that prepares the participants for action. Such a belief becomes significant as a determinant in the value-added process only when conditions of structural conduciveness and strain are present. Given these conditions in the first decades of eighteenth century Russia, a generalized belief arose to reduce the ambiguity created by the conditions of structural strain. This belief, which was the basis for the collective action of mass flights, is referred to as a wish-fulfillment belief. Such a response--that migration would enable the peasants to escape the vexatious demands of the government--guaranteed a positive outcome in an uncertain situation by empowering some force (flight) with generalized potency to overcome the possibly harmful consequences. Table VI shows the value-added process involved in the creation of a wish-fulfillment belief.

TABLE VI
VALUE-ADDED IN THE CREATION OF WISH-FULFILLMENT BELIEFS^a

	-Facilities	+Facilities
Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3
Strain giving rise to ambiguity	Anxiety: the world of generalized threats ↓ (short-circuit) ↓ Stage 2a Possible negative outcomes	Generalized forces to counter potential or actual threats ↓ (short-circuit) ↓ Stage 3a Positive outcomes

^aNeil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 95.

"The major function of such beliefs is to give structure to ambiguous situations."¹⁸ Turning to conditions in Russia in the first two decades of the eighteenth century, we see that strain created by the oppressive demands of the government¹⁹ gave rise to ambiguity. That is, there was a high degree of uncertainty among the peasantry regarding means of meeting the exactions imposed by the state. Moving up the facilities series, ambiguity results in the emergence of anxiety--a vague and uncomprehensible uneasiness involving a negative generalization.

It is negative because it is limited to the disturbing, harmful, or threatening possibilities of an ambiguous situation. It is generalized because these negative possibilities are envisioned as boundless powers, forces, or causes at work.²⁰

Popular discontent was widespread²¹ and the world of generalized threats took the form of apocalyptic teachings. A specimen of such teachings, cited below, is to be found in an old manuscript from the Solovetsky Monastery, preserved at Kazan.

The Apostle says first comes a falling away, then is revealed the man of sin, the son of perdition, the Anti-Christ. First came the falling away from the holy faith by the Tsar Alexis in the year 666,²² the number of the beast, thus fulfilling the prophecy. And after him there reigned on the throne his first born son Peter, from his second and unlawful marriage. He was consecrated to the throne of all the Russians by the Jewish laws from head to foot, showing that he is the false Messiah and the false Christ. . . .²³

¹⁸Smelser, op. cit., p. 95. ¹⁹See pages 214-18.

²⁰Smelser, op. cit., p. 89. ²¹See page 262.

²²It is very common in old Russian books to find the first figure of dates omitted. The year 666 meant 1666, the date of the Council of Moscow and the armed attack on the Solovetsky Monastery.

²³Eugene Schuyler, Peter the Great (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884), II, p. 153.

The wish-fulfillment belief is then short-circuited to the concrete situation which envisions possible negative outcomes. Thus, the belief that the Russians must conceal themselves in the deserts ". . . just as the Prophet Jeremiah ordered the children of God to flee from Babylon. The years of the Lord have passed; the years of Satan have come."²⁴

The corresponding positive generalizations up the same series guarantee a positive outcome in an uncertain situation by empowering some force with generalized potency to overcome the possibly harmful consequences.²⁵ This would be Stage three of the positive facilities, short-circuited to the positive outcome implied in flight.

"However, conduciveness, strain, and a generalized belief--even when combined--do not by themselves produce an episode of collective behavior in a specific time and place."²⁶ Some dramatic event or events must occur to precipitate the outburst of collective action. A number of such events did take place. Peter's return from his first tour of Europe was followed by the introduction of Western customs and ideas--a policy that the peasantry strongly opposed. Then, in 1700, he declared war upon Sweden--a conflict that was to result in the imposition of strenuous demands upon the public. Again in 1710, when the Tsar was informed that there remained no funds with which to meet the anticipated annual deficit, old taxes were increased and an amazing variety of new ones were superimposed on the old. In Kliuchevsky's words:

²⁴Ibid., p. 154. ²⁵Smelser, op. cit., p. 94.

²⁶Ibid., p. 16.

As from an evil sieve new taxes were strewn on the heads of Russian taxpayers. . . .Not only possessions and occupations were subjected to taxation, but even religious beliefs as well--not merely property but conscience.²⁷

The major fiscal innovation, however, was the soul tax collected by the military on the new per capita basis. Apart from the psychological shock of imposing a material value on the human soul, the rough methods by which the tax was brought into being, and the additional sums thus extracted from the peasantry, produced a drastic lowering of Russia's material prosperity.²⁸ In addition, by registering the taxable population, Peter completed the tendency implicit in the Ulozhenie of reducing the mass of the population to one common denominator, the bound people--bound not to the land but to a master. Unwittingly, Peter gave serfdom a tremendous, almost revolutionary extension. These, from a historical perspective, were the events that helped precipitate the mass migration.

"Once the determinants just reviewed have been established, the only necessary condition that remains is to bring the affected group into action."²⁹ This point marks the onset of collective action. In this process of mobilization, the role of the leader is very important. As far as the mass migrations of Peter's time are concerned, no specific leader came upon the scene. Leadership in this respect came to the masses only in indirect form--that is, the example set by the Cossacks. This group, first mentioned in the Chronicles of 1444, represented virtually free societies of adventurers ". . .that began to emerge along distant

²⁷ Kluchevsky, op. cit., IV, p. 165.

²⁸ Jesse D. Clarkson, A History of Russia (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 203.

²⁹ Smelser, op. cit., p. 17.

borders and in areas of overlapping jurisdiction and uncertain control."³⁰ Combining military organization and skill, the spirit of adventure, and a hatred of the Russian political and social system, and linked socially to the masses, the Cossacks acted as exemplars and in a sense leaders for those who sought to escape from the heavy yoke and many burdens imposed upon the people.

The final determinant of collective behavior, the operation of social control, arches over all the others. This control usually consists of two broad types:

1. Those controls which minimize conduciveness and strain.
2. Those controls which are mobilized only after a collective episode has begun to materialize.

With reference to the period in question, the government's actions aggravated rather than minimized conduciveness and strain. Once it became aware of the extent of the mass flights, severe measures were taken to arrest this trend.³¹ The final step in this direction was the introduction of the pass-port system in 1722. But Peter's preoccupation with the Great Northern War, the absence of an efficient administrative system, inadequate communication, the vastness of the empire, and the prevalence of areas of uncertain jurisdiction prohibited the government from effectively arresting the migratory trend. Hence, the value-added process was completed by the short-circuiting back to the world of specific outcomes (see Stage 3a, Table VI, page 267).

³⁰ Riasanovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 176. ³¹ See page 262.

The mass migrations, dealt with in the preceding pages, represent in Smelser's hierarchy, one of the lower forms of collective behavior that materialized during Peter's reign. Attention will now be focused on a higher level of collective action--the hostile outburst. Though the Petrine period was replete with such outbursts, only one instance will be subjected to analysis--that is, the revolt of the Don Cossacks (1705-1709) led by Kondraty Bulavin. Again, the value-added approach will be employed.

Beginning with structural conduciveness, three aspects of this determinant will be examined:

1. The structure of responsibility in situations of strain.
2. The presence of channels for expressing grievances.
3. The possibility of communication among the aggrieved.

"The structure of responsibility in a situation of strain and the growth of hostile outbursts are closely associated"³² as is seen by the fact that "under conditions of strain, those perceived to be responsible are expected to take remedial steps."³³ So it was in the South and South-east section of Russia for the masses believed that the imposts placed upon them by the government and the vexatious demands of the fiscals could be eliminated or corrected by direct action on the part of the Tsar.

Referring now to the presence of channels for expressing grievances, it is necessary to consider the opportunities the aggrieved have to express hostility. Though this overlaps with the problem of

³²Smelser, op. cit., p. 228. ³³Ibid.

social control, it is possible to distinguish between the structure of the situation and the actions of the controlling agencies after the collective episode has begun.

In this particular instance, Peter the Great was unable to prevent the hostile outburst. The machinery of authority was certainly present but at this time the Monarch was preoccupied with the Great Northern War. Negotiations for an alliance with England had achieved no result; Augustus of Poland had capitulated; and Peter's attempt to place on the throne of Poland, Rakoczy, leader of the Hungarian rebels, confounded his relations with the Emperor. Meanwhile, civil affairs were in a strenuous disarray, finances were chaotic, and among the landowners there was constant shirking of service, much disaffection, and endless tirades. Moreover, the hotbed of dissent was hundreds of miles away from Moscow--another factor that mitigated the government's attempts to prevent the outbreak of revolt.

Another aspect of structural conduciveness essential to the occurrence of a hostile outbreak is an adequate medium of communication. "Persons who cannot understand one another; whose background of experiences differ greatly or who have different prospects upon life do not readily mold into crowds."³⁴ No such problem existed in the Don region. Rather, the Southern and South-eastern frontier, where Cossacks and nomadic tribes lived in the neighborhood of each other, served as a refuge for deserters of all kinds. Here lived the elements of society

³⁴ Smelser, op. cit., p. 240, citing Gault, Social Psychology, pp. 156-57.

that had run away from their masters

. . .Where they could be rid of the tax collector and the recruiting sergeant, and the constant interference of official authority, where they could live as they pleased, serve God according to the dictates of their conscience and freely dispose of the fruits of their labour. The more stringent the measures to enforce the laws, the more anxious were the lower classes to escape from them, and the greater the hatred of the common people towards the nobility. . . .Where communications with the Cossacks were easier. . .the state of things was much easier.³⁵

Because these emigrants shared a common background and common attitudes and because they inhabited the same general geographic area, the interchange of ideas took place with comparative ease.

From the foregoing it is evident that the three conditions of conduciveness essential for the occurrence of a hostile outburst were prevalent in the early years of the eighteenth century in Russia. But conditions of conduciveness are extremely general, indicating the possibility of hostile outbursts regardless of the kind of strain that confronts an aggrieved group. What, then, were the strains that gave rise to this particular form of collective behavior?

A number of these strains were institutionalized; they followed lines of political, class, and religious cleavages. The political cleavage stemmed from the fact that the inhabitants of the south-east region were intrepid Cossacks and peasants who had migrated to this frontier area in search of freedom. Encroachments upon their freedom were viewed as attacks on inherent privileges. Such was the reaction to Peter's demand that the Cossacks surrender the deserters and fugitives

³⁵ Schuyler, *op. cit.*, II, p. 160.

and demolish the new settlements of the Dissidents. As far as class cleavage is concerned, this group represented the lower levels of the social hierarchy--a group that expressed great hatred towards the nobility, the bureaucracy, and the foreigners. Religious cleavages were also present since a substantial number of the colonists were Dissidents. Such were the institutionalized strains.

Another determinant that must be present if a hostile outburst is to occur is a generalized hostile belief. Like the wish-fulfillment belief,

. . .The hostile belief is a compressed belief resulting from the process of generalization and short-circuiting. Hostility extends beyond the Facilities Series alone, however. It marks a qualitatively new type of compression; it compresses not only many levels of the same component (Facilities) into a belief, but also two separate components--Facilities and Mobilization. Hostilities involves not only a redefinition of generalized forces in an ambiguous situation, but also an identification and modification of persons thought to be agencies of these forces. The modification is to be effected by destroying, injuring, removing, or restricting a person or class of persons considered responsible for the evils at hand.³⁶

The paradigm below illustrates the value-added process involved in creating a hostile belief. By referring to the paradigm, it is possible to trace the logic of the value-added approach with reference to the Bulavin revolt. The conditions of conduciveness and of strain which led to ambiguity have already been discussed. Also indicated is the fact that some kind of generalized belief must be present to prepare the participants for action. In the South-east, this generalized belief took concrete form in the identification of the men around the Tsar--bad

³⁶ Smelser, op. cit., p. 101.

TABLE VII

VALUE-ADDED IN THE CREATION OF HOSTILE BELIEFS^a

Stage 1:	-Facilities Stage 2:	-Mobilization Stage 3:	+Mobilization Stage 4:	+Facilities Stage 5:
Strain giving rise to ambiguity	Anxiety	Generalized belief that agents are responsible for anxiety-producing state of affairs	Generalized aggres- sion: the desire to attack and thereby remove, destroy, punish, or restrict responsible agent	Generalized belief in omnipotence
		(Short-circuit)	(Short-circuit)	(Short-circuit)
		Stage 3a: Identification of responsible agent and acceptance of exaggerated stories of "results" of evil- doing.	Stage 4a: Channeling of generalized aggression to particular agent (the scapegoat)	Stage 5a: Exaggerated ability to remove source of evil and exaggeration of results once res- ponsible agent is punished.

^aNeil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 102.

men, the princes and boyars, the revenue men, the Germans--as the responsible agents for the anxiety producing state of affairs. Exaggerated stories of evil-doing were also spread. Thus, in this section of Russia the populace, besides expressing the discontent regarding the Tsar's innovations and oppressive taxes, also believed that

. . . Many people had had pieces of their flesh cut away while their beards had been forcibly shaved, that Rzhefsky [the governor of the province] had kept back part of the pay of the garrison, had levied taxes on baths, cellars, smoke-houses, laundries, and brew-houses, and even on the grinding of knives and hatchets, that he had ill-treated and imprisoned the wives and children of the soldiers who had gone to the Swedish war on account of arrears of taxes, that he had enriched himself by intrigues, extortion, monopolies, and dishonesty of all kinds, that he had compelled the soldiers to render such services in winter that some had been frozen to death, that he had forced the inhabitants to furnish without pay carts and rafts, that German officers had forced the soldiers to eat meat on fast days and had ill-treated their wives and daughters, that even Swedish prisoners, who had been given important posts, had oppressed them, etc., etc.³⁷

Moreover, there was the serious accusation that Peter and his followers had fallen away from Orthodoxy, that they wished to introduce the worship of the heathen god, Janus, because they celebrated the new year on the first of January. All such pernicious rumours were readily accepted by a substantial portion of the inhabitants of the Don region.

In the context of the determinants mentioned above, the precipitating factor--the sending of Prince Dolgoruky with a detachment of soldiers to enforce the Tsar's decrees demanding the surrender of fugitives and the demolition of the new settlements--gave the generalized beliefs concrete, immediate substance thus providing a concrete setting

³⁷ Schuyler, op. cit., II, p. 158.

toward which collective action could be directed. But the precipitating factor by itself could not have resulted in a hostile outburst. The necessary condition that remained was to bring the affected group into action. This point marked the outbreak of hostility. In this process of mobilization of participants for action the emergence and subsequent behavior of leaders were extremely important. Thus, when Dolgoruky proceeded to arrest the fugitives, a band of Cossacks under the leadership of Kondraty Bulavin attacked him. The Tsar's troops were killed to the last man. The Cossacks who remained loyal to the government defeated Bulavin's band. Bulavin, however, escaped. In his early proclamations he had won adherents on the strength of the generalized beliefs mentioned in the preceding paragraphs and by invoking

. . . The name of Stenka Razin, still popular in song and legend, and invited all those who wished to lead a merry robber life, to eat and drink well, to ride on fine horses and to have rich booty. . . .³⁸

Later, he emphasized the appeal to religious feelings.

He spoke of the necessity of rising "to defend the house of God's holy mother and the Christian Church against the heathen and Hellenic teachings which the Boyars and Germans wished to introduce." The poor, the peasants, the prisoners were everywhere, he said, the confederates of the Cossacks, who could reckon also on the Zaporovians and on the men of the Terek.³⁹

Tolstoi, the Governor of Azov, sent his troops against the rebels. But Bulavin's utilization of the prevailing generalized beliefs proved to be efficacious. Many soldiers deserted while the rest fought half-heartedly and consequently were totally beaten. Villages in the Tambov

³⁸Ibid., p. 161. ³⁹Ibid.

and Tula regions were burned and the inhabitants of these large towns were armed for defence.

The final determinant to be considered in the hostile outburst is the operation of social control. As has already been noted, the Tsar failed to prevent the outbreak of violence since he made no effort to minimize conduciveness and strain. His attention was centered on the war with Charles XII rather than on internal problems; law and order were difficult to enforce in the relatively remote regions of the Russian state. The latter two reasons account, in part, for the outburst not being immediately suppressed. Another reason for its duration was the vacillation displayed by the authorities. For example, Peter

. . . Ordered Prince Basil Dolgoruky, the brother of one who had been killed, to march against the insurgents and 'put out the fire once for all', burning villages, and impaling and breaking on the wheel the inhabitants, in order to deter the wavering from rebellion. . . . In another letter written at a cooler moment he recommended Dolgoruky to treat the repentant with clemency, and not to use blind terrorism lest he should be thought to be actuated by motives of revenge for the murder of his brother. Dolgoruky was in great perplexity.⁴⁰

So the rebellion lingered on until troops under Peter Havansky advanced from the Volga and defeated the rebels in a bloody fight in 1709. As usual in such uprisings, the insurgents lacked effective organization and discipline. Following the fate of previous peasant uprisings, the Bulavin revolt came to naught.

The two types of collective behavior discussed in the foregoing pages were not instances of collective action that fall within the purview

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 162.

of the Petrine reforms--rather, they were, to a large extent, reactions to them. The inclusion of these two types of behavior serve the purpose of illustrating how complex the phenomenon of collective behavior was in the dynamic period of early eighteenth century Russia. In contrast to the rudimentary types of collective behavior which had their origins among the masses, were the reforms initiated by Peter, a small group of leading nobles, and progressive theologians. These reforming activities will be considered as instances of collective behavior--specifically as norm-oriented movements.

The norm-oriented movement ". . . is an attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a generalized belief."⁴¹ Any kind of norm--economic, educational, political, religious--may become the subject of such a movement. This appears to be the case in the Petrine era. However, since Smelser's approach treats norm-oriented movements in the same analytical pattern, Peter's military reforms and his educational innovations are arbitrarily selected for analysis. The former are selected because they were among the first changes the Tsar sought to bring about; the latter, because they were fundamental to his entire reformative program. Both of these are considered as normative changes since they involved changes in regulatory principles which are necessary for the attainment of values. Norms, then, are more specific than general values and range from formal, explicit regulations found in legal systems to informal understandings found in neighborhood cliques.

⁴¹Smelser, op. cit., p. 270.

As Smelser points out, norm-oriented movements involve elements of panic (flight from existing norms) and hostility (eradication of someone believed to be responsible for certain evils). Both of these lower-level components appeared in Peter's attempt to change the normative structure of the military establishment. For instance, in response to his decrees regarding military service, thousands of Russians fled to frontier areas to escape the recruiting officers.⁴² Hostility was also evident in the battle of Narva where the Russians, although they stood firm against the enemy, ". . .cried out against the foreign officers and killed several of them."⁴³

The military reforms will now be analyzed under the same set of categories that have already been extensively employed--structural conduciveness, strain, generalized beliefs, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and the response of agencies of social control. Treating the military innovations as a logical accumulation of determinants is similar to the study of the natural history of social movements. While reference will be made to temporal sequences of events, no attempt will be made to formulate generalizations about natural history. Instead, efforts will be centered on generating a systematic account of the activation of events and situations as determinants. Broadly speaking,

. . .The most general condition of conduciveness concerns the possibility for demanding modifications of norms without simultaneously appearing to demand a more fundamental modification of values. If social arrangements permit these more limited kinds of demands, these arrangements are conducive to the development of

⁴²See page 274. ⁴³Schuyler, op. cit., I, p. 397.

of norm-oriented movements; if social arrangements are such that all demands for normative change tend more or less immediately to generalize into conflicts over values, they are not conducive to the development of norm-oriented movements.⁴⁴

In specifying the kinds of social structures which meet these conditions of conduciveness, it is necessary to distinguish between the source of demands for normative change and the kind of reception these demands receive at the political level. G. Almond made the same distinction ". . . in another context in his separation of interest-articulation from the process of interest-aggregation."⁴⁵ The first refers to the structures through which interests or grievances are expressed. These include pressure groups, bureaucracies, and class groups. The second refers to the structures in which the articulated interests are forged into a policy. In the Petrine era, a single organization--that is, Peter and the supporters of his plans--engaged in both the articulation and aggregation of interests.

If this dissatisfaction is to be channeled into a normative movement, interest-articulation must be structurally differentiated to a high degree. In other words, the social basis for conflict must be separate from kinship, ethnic, regional, and religious groups, otherwise any grievance will tend to become a conflict of values. As far as the progressive element of Russia's society was concerned, such differentiation existed. Hence, they did not feel that modifications of the military establishment necessitated concomitant changes in all the other institutions.

⁴⁴Smelser, op. cit., p. 278. ⁴⁵Ibid.

The preceding discussion refers to the broadest conditions of conduciveness. Within such conditions, there must exist channels for expressing dissatisfaction if beliefs are to be disseminated and action is to be mobilized. In this respect control of the media of communication is important. Since Peter was an autocratic tsar, such control was in his hands.

The conditions of conduciveness having been dealt with, it is now necessary to outline the kinds of strain that underlay the military reforms. The discussion of this topic will be organized in terms of the four components of action--facilities, organization of motivation, norms, and values.

At the facilities level, the appearance of new knowledge--new training methods, new discipline, new tactics, new technological improvements--initiated the movement to apply this knowledge. Relying on Weyde and aided by certain other foreigners and a group of Russian commanders, Peter began to transform the ". . .exceeding sorry multitude"⁴⁶ into an effective fighting force.

At the organization of motivation level, strain characterized the relations between the soldiers and the officers. The Russians had no confidence in their foreign superiors who in turn looked upon the former with contempt. As Duke de Croy said, "The devil could not fight with such soldiers."⁴⁷ Though some of the foreign officers served well, most of them proved to be incompetent and had to be dismissed. This stimulated

⁴⁶Kluchevsky, op. cit., IV, p. 63. ⁴⁷Schuyler, op. cit., II, p. 397.

the movement of recruiting such officials from among the Russian courtiers and nobility, especially those who had been sent abroad to study. Beginning in 1700, programs were set up to train these new officers. They showed such promise that Peter exclaimed, "Why do I waste my money on foreigners, when my own subjects know how to do all the same things that they do?"⁴⁸

Regarding strain and norms, "any disharmony between normative standards and actual social conditions can provide the basis for a movement whose objective is to modify the norms."⁴⁹ Attempts at modernizing Russia's army were made in the seventeenth century when the militia of the dворяне was supplemented by a standing army organized along the lines of European armies. Moreover, military service was compulsory for all social classes from the dворяне to the burghers, peasants, and even slaves. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, these innovations were no longer put into effect. At a banquet in 1717, Prince Jacob Dolgoruky ". . .told Peter that his father, Alexis, had shown him how to organize a regular army, but that later on, certain misguided statesmen had undone all his work. . . ."⁵⁰ The norm, then, was that military service was compulsory for all classes but in reality the bulk of the army consisted of irregulars. Peter eliminated this disjunction between the normative standards and the actual social conditions by instituting general conscription and by seeing that this obligation was effectively and continuously enforced.

⁴⁸Grey, op. cit., p. 162. ⁴⁹Smelser, op. cit., p. 288.

⁵⁰Vasili Klyuchevsky, Peter the Great, trans. Liliana Archibald (London: Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1958), p. 78.

Strains may also appear at the value level. Thus, the rise or emphasis of new values frequently creates the basis for defining certain conditions as undesirable--conditions which previously had passed less noticed. Though the grandiose vision of the role that Russia should play did not come to the Tsar suddenly while he traveled in Europe, Peter's experience of Western countries matured and crystallized his ideas.⁵¹ His plans for Westernizing Russia, however, necessitated, in his opinion, obtaining access to the Baltic. To achieve this objective, war was unavoidable. Though ". . . Peter was a builder and reformer; of necessity he became also a conqueror."⁵² Indirectly, then, the emphasis placed upon Westernizing Russia, created strains at the normative level regarding the military structure.

Under the conditions of structural conduciveness and strain discussed in the foregoing pages, generalized beliefs come into play as determinants.

This is not to say that beliefs are created temporally only after conditions of conduciveness and strain have developed. Frequently the belief--or at least some of its components--have existed for generations or centuries. In such a case the conditions of conduciveness and strain actuate what has been latent, and thus draw it into the total value-added process as a determinant.⁵³

For a norm-oriented movement to occur, the generalized belief must include a diagnosis of the forces that are responsible for the failure of the normative regulations. It also involves some sort of program--for example, passing a law. Adoption of such a program will, in the opinion

⁵¹Grey, op. cit., p. 137. ⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Smelser, op. cit., p. 292.

of those committed to the belief, erase the source of strain.

"The norm-oriented belief includes, as elements of itself, a reconstitution (sometimes implicit) of the lower-level Mobilization and Facilities Series."⁵⁴ The total value-added process is depicted in Table II, page 40.

By referring to the above table, it is possible to illustrate the ingredients of the norm-oriented beliefs underlying Peter's military innovations. Stage 1 involves a condition of ambiguity arising from the structural strains that already have been discussed. Stage 2 involves anxiety (-Facilities); Stage 3 and 3a attach this anxiety to some agent. During the last decade of the seventeenth century and in the years immediately following 1700, this anxiety was largely attributed to the nobles who were shirking their military obligations and to the individuals who were responsible for providing armaments. With reference to the latter, the Tsar ". . . had trouble with iron founders, two of whom were experienced and reliable, while the others were always drunk, and heeded neither his pleas nor whippings."⁵⁵ Anxiety was also attached to the officers of the Russian army who still employed antiquated tactics, failed to maintain discipline, and in general, did not serve well.⁵⁶ At this point a new, higher level belief arose (Stage 4)--a generalized belief that the normative regulation of these agents or forces was inadequate (-Norms). This belief was short-circuited (Stage 4a) to a particular set of rules or customs--for example, the system of

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 111. ⁵⁵Grey, op. cit., p. 184. ⁵⁶Ibid., p. 161.

recruitment, the military manuals, the employment of foreign junior officers, and the obsolete equipment.

The next stage involves the belief that the trouble could be overcome by reorganizing the normative structure (+Norms). This in turn is short-circuited (Stage 5a) to a particular kind of normative change which redefines role responsibility and obligations.

This envisioned normative change presumably will immobilize, damage, remove, or destroy those agents deemed responsible for the unwanted situation (Stage 6, +Mobilization), and will have the power thereby to erase the original source of strain (Stage 7, +Facilities).⁵⁷

Returning to Stage 5a, Peter and his supporters strenuously sought to redefine role responsibilities and obligations. As a result, general conscription was instituted and military obligations came to be more effectively and continuously enforced. Furthermore, a new training manual was developed and adopted; Russian courtiers and nobles were trained as officers; military equipment and tactics were modernized; and efforts were made to introduce efficiency into the armament industry.

With reference to Stages 6 and 7, the envisioned normative changes were to a large extent realized as the agents and forces for the unwanted situation were removed, punished or destroyed and as the original sources of strain were erased. This is evidenced by the fact that the once "exceeding sorry multitude"⁵⁸ was transformed into an effective fighting force.

Slowly, . . . in despite of innumerable difficulties, of constant desertion in the rear, of many delinquents among the landowners, of

⁵⁷ Smelser, op. cit., p. 112.

⁵⁸ Kluchevsky, op. cit., IV, p. 63.

much quarrelling and jealousy between the generals, Peter forged his new army, organized in divisions and brigades, serviceably uniformed, well equipped and munitioned, gradually tempered in fighting experience.⁵⁹

With this army, Peter defeated Sweden. The victory and the resulting Treaty of Nystadt (1721) meant ". . .that Russia became firmly established on the Baltic, acquiring its essential 'window into Europe'. . . ." ⁶⁰ The significance of his obtaining access to the Baltic cannot be over-emphasized since this objective was essential to Peter's basic policy of Westernization.

But conduciveness, strain, and generalized beliefs outlined above did not by themselves produce the norm-oriented movement. In this case the precipitating factors gave the generalized belief concrete substance, thus underlining the conditions of strain. What, then, were the underlying precipitating factors? First, the Tsar's early contact with foreigners and later his tour of Western Europe had made him realize that Russia's backwardness was, to an extent, due to her ill-equipped and untrained army.⁶¹ Second, and perhaps more significant as a precipitating factor, was the crushing defeat suffered by the Russian army at Narva in 1700. Sumner, in describing the battle, says,

Charles transferred his troops across the Baltic to Livonia, and after incredible exertions and gross Russian errors suddenly appeared before Narva, threw the enemy into total confusion in a snowstorm and ignominiously routed them (November 30, 1700). The odds against him were more than three to one. The Russians lost

⁵⁹B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London: English University Press Limited, 1950), p. 60.

⁶⁰Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 249. ⁶¹Grey, op. cit., p. 136.

almost all their artillery and numerous prisoners, including many generals. The old-fashioned cavalry and irregulars took to flight without fighting. The new infantry levies proved "nothing more than undisciplined militia," the foreign officers incompetent and unreliable.⁶²

The catastrophe at Narva revealed the low quality of the army and the inadequacy of their training. This stimulated the reorganization of the militia, or as Ian Grey says ". . .whipped him [Peter] into a frenzy of activity."⁶³

The final determinant in the value-added process necessary for the occurrence of a norm-oriented movement is the mobilization of its participants for action. This problem is rather complex and will therefore be discussed under three distinct headings:

1. The role of leaders in organizing the movement for action.
2. The real and derived phases of mobilization.
3. The effect of the movement's overall success or failure on its development.

For all collective action, including the norm-oriented movement, it is possible to distinguish two types of leadership--leadership in formulating the beliefs and leadership in mobilizing participants for action. "Sometimes the same person performs both these functions; in other cases a division of leadership roles appears within a movement."⁶⁴ Concerning the formulation of the beliefs that underlay the Tsar's military reforms, it is evident that these were expressed by leaders prior to Peter's time. Note Dolgoruky's assertion to Peter that Alexis

⁶²Sumner, op. cit., p. 56. ⁶³Grey, op. cit., p. 182.

⁶⁴Smelser, op. cit., p. 297.

had shown him how to organize a regular army. In fact, the belief in the need for reorganizing the traditional militia can be traced back to Ivan IV's time. Nor were attempts at such reorganization lacking. The problem that faced Peter, however, was that by the time he took active control of the government, the Naryshkins and Lopukhins had changed the organization of the army back to the ancient relatively simple Russian system. Consequently, though the belief in the desirability of having an army based on the European model had existed for centuries and though such reorganization had taken place from time to time in the past, Peter was forced to mobilize participants for action to again restructure this institution.

Neither was he the only individual concerned with this issue. Rather, supporters for his program came from many quarters. Menshikov, for instance, was instrumental in making the cavalry, formerly the weakest element in the army, into an efficient force. Weyde and a small group of Russian commanders including Sheremetief and Repnin worked with untiring energy to modernize the militia. Support came even from the theologians. Yavorsky, Prokopovich, and Afanasy, Archbishop of Kholmogory, had, in general, always shown Peter understanding and had given him encouragement. Similar support, which Peter valued highly, came from Mitrofan, Archbishop of Voronezh.

Mitrofan had seen his labour in creating a navy and blessed it. He had urged the people to give all their support to the Tsar. He had gone further, handing Peter six thousand rubles of his own to help the war. In subsequent years he always sent whatever money he had over from his expenses of the church and his own modest needs to Peter or to the Admiralty with the brief message, "for

the troops."⁶⁵

In light of the above, it is evident that a group of individuals worked with Peter, supported his plans for reforming Russia, and also urged the people to accept the innovations.

In the development of this particular norm-oriented movement, one can detect the real and the derived phases of mobilization.⁶⁶ The real phase resulted, broadly speaking, in the successful reorganization of the armed forces. The derived phase, one which the leaders of the movement did not foresee, profoundly affected the organization of society and influenced future events.⁶⁷ The army, for example, became an army of all classes; the haphazard system of recruitment was replaced by a method which would result in regular and well-trained reserves; a complicated administration was created to organize, reinforce, and maintain the regular army; additional burdens had to be imposed upon the populace. The latter factor frequently culminated in collective action, initiated at the lower levels of society, against Peter and all that he stood for.

Norm-oriented movements may also be divided into three temporal phases--the incipient phase, the phase of enthusiastic mobilization, and the period of institutionalization and organization.⁶⁸ As has already been noted, the incipient phase of the military reforms began in the seventeenth century. The enthusiastic phase, characterized by a 'bulge of activity,' occurred immediately following the defeat at Narva.

⁶⁵Grey, op. cit., p. 191. ⁶⁶Smelser, op. cit., p. 298.

⁶⁷Klyuchevsky, Peter the Great, p. 77. ⁶⁸Smelser, op. cit., p. 298.

Finally, the movement declined into day-by-day activity towards the end of Peter's reign.

The third topic to be discussed under mobilization of participants for action is the effect of the movement's overall success or failure on its development. Overall success, though, depends to a large extent upon minor successes. Peter was aware of this, realizing that the fate of his entire plans depended, to a large degree, on the officers and soldiers regaining a measure of confidence in their fighting prowess. Hence, two weeks after the battle of Narva, the Tsar wrote to Sheremetief ". . .to do something to encourage the soldiers and embarrass the enemy."⁶⁹ Acting on these orders, the Russians attacked the Swedish detachment of Schlippenbach in Livonia. "Out of the whole detachment only one captain returned; all the rest were killed or taken prisoners. . . ."⁷⁰ In January, 1702, Schlippenbach was again defeated on the estate of Erestfer. Two weeks later the Tsar made a triumphant entry, having in his train the Swedish prisoners.

This was the first of a series of triumphs for small victories, which were indeed ridiculed by foreign ministers, but which nevertheless, served to keep up the spirits and arouse the patriotism of the people.⁷¹

Minor successes led to major ones such as the defeat of Lewenhaupt at Liesna on October 9, 1709. This, in turn, paved the way for the Russian victory at Poltava--the most decisive battle of the Great Northern War.

In their own right, the victories revealed to the Russians that their enemy was not omnipotent. As Peter himself exclaimed, following

⁶⁹Schuyler, op. cit., I, p. 418. ⁷⁰Ibid. ⁷¹Ibid., p. 419.

the Erestfer battle, "Thank God we can at last beat the Swedes."⁷²

Besides bolstering the morale of the soldiers, the victories--both the minor as well as the major ones--were testimonials to the effectiveness and soundness of Peter's military reforms, thus contributing to the latter's overall successful development.

The final determinant to be considered in connection with Peter's military reforms is the operation of social control. Within the context of Smelser's theory regarding norm-oriented movements, the operation of this control lies in the hands of those agencies that wield political power and authority. Here, it seems that Smelser overlooks the fact that social control, in all but the most primitive communities, is exercised not only by the formal agencies but also by the social forces manifest in a country--that is, the traditional customs, beliefs, and ideas that guide the day-to-day behavior of the members of a given society.

To subscribe to the notion that only formal agencies constitute social control would indirectly exclude the Petrine reforms as cases of collective behavior. Thus, if the model is accepted as valid, then six determinants must be considered in analyzing any instance of collective action. If by definition one of these determinants is only the political authority of social control that reacts and only reacts to instances of collective action, it would mean that all forms of such behavior must originate among the masses--among those who do not

⁷²Ibid., I, p. 419.

constitute the legitimate or recognized authority of the country. But it has already been shown that the Petrine military reforms manifest all the characteristics indicated in the model. The difficulty, if there is one, lies in the final determinant which, if narrowly interpreted, prohibits the inclusion of collective behavior initiated by a group at the top of the legitimate authoritarian hierarchy.

Therefore, it is suggested that the traditional beliefs, customs, etcetera, should not be disregarded as part of the final determinant of collective behavior. The case for their inclusion rests on the effectiveness of their type of control. Note how the iron-founders ignored the pleas and whippings of Peter the Great;⁷³ how the nobility continued to shirk their military obligations despite severe penalties;⁷⁴ how the peasants escaped the recruiting officers in spite of the brutal punishment that was meted out to those who were apprehended.⁷⁵ Logically, then, this type of control should be included in the total value-added process along with the formal agencies of control. Its inclusion permits the analysis of forms of collective behavior initiated at the top of the power structure with reference to all the determinants Smelser includes in his model.

With this proposition in mind, one can explore the patterns of behavior--behavior that was guided by the social forces--displayed by the various segments of society in response to Peter's military

⁷³Grey, op. cit., p. 184. ⁷⁴Sumner, op. cit., p. 60.

⁷⁵M. Florinsky, Russia A History and an Interpretation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), I, p. 424.

reforms. Peter and his supporters initiated the movement--that is, the changes were introduced by the top members of the social hierarchy. Opposition to these reforms came from all segments of the society--from the nobility, the merchants, the clergy, and the peasantry. Steeped in ignorance, lazy, immoral, and corrupt,⁷⁶ they proved to be a mighty obstacle to the desired changes in the military institutions. The advantage that Peter had was that, as an autocratic ruler, he could resort to compulsion and force. Severe and even brutal penalties were imposed on all classes of people who resisted the Tsar's objectives. Yet, there is no question that such resistance, which frequently erupted into hostile outbursts, hampered Peter's cause. It is little wonder that Sumner stated, "The tsar pulls uphill alone with the strength of ten, but millions pull downhill."⁷⁷ That he succeeded to the extent he did, is indeed a tribute to the energy, determination, and vision of this mighty Tsar who was the principal figure in the group that worked for change.

Having dealt with the military innovations, attention will now center on the educational reforms. These too will be analyzed as a form of collective behavior--that is, as a norm-oriented movement--under the same set of categories already employed.

Regarding the first determinant,

The most general condition of conduciveness concerns the possibility for demanding modifications of norms without simultaneously appearing to demand a more fundamental modification of values.⁷⁸

⁷⁶Grey, op. cit., p. 24. ⁷⁷Sumner, op. cit., p. 134.

⁷⁸Smelser, op. cit., p. 278.

Russia of the Petrine era was sufficiently structurally differentiated so that demands for normative changes did not tend to generalize into conflicts over values among those pressing for reforms. The illiterate and ignorant peasantry, on the other hand, were not aware of the ". . . specialization of given kinds of action and the degree to which specialized sanctions were allowed to operate without the intervention of other kinds of sanctions."⁷⁹ Among these elements, normative changes were frequently generalized into conflicts over values. For example, because Peter made changes in the established order of things, they were convinced that he was the true Anti-Christ.

The social structures which meet the conditions of conduciveness also involve the separation of interest articulation from the process of interest aggregation.⁸⁰ The grievances and desires regarding education were made explicit primarily by Peter. For instance:

Soon after his return to Moscow. . . Peter called upon the Patriarch and talked at length of his ideas for education. He began by expressing his dissatisfaction with the illiteracy of the priesthood. . . .⁸¹

Others assisting in this process were the Ukrainian clergy who had lived under Western influence for two centuries. By incorporating these people in the seventeenth century, Russia received a powerful current of new ideas.

Interest-aggregation (the structure in which the interests are forged into a policy) was also engaged in by the Tsar. Here, too, he had

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 175.

⁸⁰See page 282.

⁸¹Grey, op. cit., p. 165.

the assistance of the more progressive theologians, of the philosopher-scientist, Leibniz, of the Tessing brothers, of Kunst, of Gluck, of Farquharson, and others. By 1722, a complete bureaucratic structure, the Holy Synod, was made responsible for the shaping and implementation of educational policies.

"In general, the discontented must have some degree of access to some method of affecting the normative order."⁸² Peter, the principal representative of the discontented, had such access. As an autocratic sovereign, he could issue a ukaz or decree stipulating the changes he desired. The effectiveness of these edicts, however, depended upon the diligence and efficacy of the bureaucratic system and, even to a greater extent, upon social forces prevalent in the Russian society.

Once the determinant just reviewed had been established, a number of types of strain must be present to produce a norm-oriented movement. Again, these will be discussed in terms of the four components of action--facilities, organization of motivation, norms, and values--which were discussed in detail in Chapter III, on pages 26-29.

At the facilities level, strain was the direct outcome of the defeat the Russians suffered at the battle of Narva. Military knowledge and skills were insufficient to avoid the misfortunes of the rout, hence ambiguity existed at Facilities Level 7. In search for solutions to this condition of strain, attention was turned upward. Strains could have been overcome by increasing the military budget and by giving political

⁸²Smelser, op. cit., p. 282.

authorization to various agencies to move ahead quickly. Such movement would have been satisfactory if the Russians had possessed an adequate technology for producing the necessary weaponry. But since such technology was lacking, to merely allocate more funds would not have been enough. It was therefore necessary to move upward along the Facilities Scale to Level 4.

Yet technology itself might not have been enough. A need was felt for the production of utilitarian knowledge itself from which technological knowledge could be built. This meant activity at Level 2 (see page 30) of the Facilities Series and involved the establishment of the Naval Academy, the Gymnasium, the school of engineering, and the schools of mathematics.

One more level of generality goes beyond Level 2. This concerns the desirability of going beyond purely utilitarian programs and creating a new outlook regarding instruction. In response to this felt need, curriculums in some learning were not as circumscribed as is often believed.⁸³ Only after the preceding steps were taken, was it possible to generate knowledge and apply it down the line through technology (Level 3) and investment (Level 4) to the world of operations (Levels 5-7).

Strain was also present in the Mobilization Series--that is, the series that characterize ". . .the generation of human motivation and its channeling into organizations and roles."⁸⁴ At this level, strain

⁸³See page 237. ⁸⁴Smelser, op. cit., p. 54.

involves a relation between responsible performance in roles and the rewards which accrue thereby. Such a situation prevailed in the Russian military structure. As was mentioned earlier, most of the foreign officers proved to be incompetent and failed to inspire confidence in the soldiers. Moreover, the fact that they drew higher pay than the Russians added to their unpopularity. Such factors contributed to the emergence of strain at Level 6 of the Mobilization Scale.

In the effort to resolve this condition of strain, Peter sought to recruit officers from among the Russian courtiers and nobility.⁸⁵ It was to prepare them for the assumption of such roles that streams of young nobles were sent abroad to study. Others, it was hoped, would be trained in the schools at home such as the School of Mathematics and Navigation founded in 1701.

At the normative level, strain existed in the relations among the major social sectors. To a degree, this strain was created by the necessities of war. Following the major defeat at Narva, it became evident that the military forces had to be reformed. Subsequently, two series of measures were undertaken; one establishing the regular army and navy, and one providing for their maintenance. Both measures had the effect of changing the order of, and relationship between, the social classes. Moreover, they made the people work harder to produce more, thereby increasing the state's revenue. From Peter's point of view, the latter was a favorable outcome of the reforms. But there were

⁸⁵Grey, op. cit., p. 162.

negative ones as well.

The military, social, and economic innovations imposed so much urgent work on the administration, and raised so many strange, complicated problems, that the existing machinery of state was incapable of dealing with them.⁸⁶

In other words, a direct consequence of these reforms was the creation of strains at Level 5 of the Normative Scale.

To reduce these strains, the governmental machinery was rebuilt since on these depended the success of the other reforms. However, for the newly created administrative departments to function efficiently, it was essential to have trained executive officers with the necessary knowledge and qualifications. It was also imperative to have a society that would willingly uphold these reforms and that would appreciate and understand their importance.

It was for these reasons that Peter became more and more concerned with the dissemination of scientific knowledge and the foundation of general, professional, and technical educational establishments.⁸⁷

Finally, strain existed at the value level. The increasing emphasis that Peter placed upon Westernization created the basis for defining the existing social conditions as undesirable if not evil, thus creating and exacerbating the condition of strain. In his attempt to resolve this situation, the Tsar embarked upon an educational program on a scale that had not been undertaken prior to his time. However, his efforts to introduce elementary education met everywhere with passive resistance and evasion.⁸⁸ Recognizing that voluntary schools had failed,

⁸⁶Klyuchevsky, Peter the Great, p. 75. ⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Grey, op. cit., p. 406.

Peter then tried to make elementary education compulsory. On January 20, 1714, he decreed that:

. . . Teachers from the schools of mathematics should be sent to all governments to teach the children of landowners figures and geometry, "and the following penalty shall be imposed, that no one shall be allowed to marry until he had learnt this."⁸⁹

In the same year he took steps to make elementary education compulsory for the middle classes by issuing a decree that demanded that the children of clerks, priests, and monastery servants should learn figures and geometry. To attain this objective two teachers were to be sent into each government to establish schools. Broadly speaking, his efforts to introduce compulsory education attained only limited success. "The vast distances of Russia, shortage of teachers, the impossibility of proper supervision, and finally, the evasion of both parents and pupils were insuperable obstacles."⁹⁰

Under the conditions of structural conduciveness, and strain outlined above, generalized beliefs begin to come into play as determinants. By referring to Table VII, page 40, the total value-added process involved in the creation of generalized beliefs underlying the Tsar's educational reforms can be illustrated. As in the case involving the military innovations, Stage 1 involves a condition of ambiguity arising from the structural strains that have already been discussed. Stage 2 involves anxiety (-Facilities); Stage 3 and 3a attach this anxiety to some agent. In general terms, this anxiety was attached to the lack of education among the Russian people.⁹¹ Specifically, it was

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 407. ⁹⁰Ibid. ⁹¹Grey, op. cit., p. 136.

directed at the ignorant peasantry who, in Peter's words, resisted ". . . anything that is new even if it is needful"⁹² and at the nobility, the gentry, and the clergy, amongst whom illiteracy was also common. Perhaps even more significant to the issue of anxiety is not the degree of illiteracy in itself, but the negative attitudes manifest among the populace. Apart from a handful of nobles and churchmen, the Russians gave no thought to their abysmal ignorance. "On the contrary, blinded by religious and national pride, they even protested their superiority over other people."⁹³ At this point a new higher level belief arose (Stage 4) that was short-circuited (Stage 4a) by the identification of flaws in the normative educational regulations.

The next stage involves the belief that the undesirable situation could be overcome by reorganizing the rules and regulations or, in other words, the normative structure of the educational institutions. Short-circuited to Stage 5a, it resulted in the formulation of specific plans to revamp the educational system.

At the level of +Mobilization, it is believed that normative innovations will remove, damage, or destroy the responsible agents. Short-circuited, this leads to the belief that the new norm will result in the punishment of particular agents. A concrete example would be Peter's conviction that the decree demanding compulsory education for the children of the landowners would be successful since not complying with its requirement would disallow the particular offender to marry.

⁹²Sumner, op. cit., p. 162. ⁹³Grey, op. cit., p. 26.

At Stage 7, there emerges the belief that the normative change is omnipotent. At Stage 7a, this involved the belief that basically through education Russia would be transformed and would become an equal to the Western European countries.

But as has already been noted, conduciveness, strain, and generalized beliefs do not by themselves produce the norm-oriented movement. Precipitating factors must occur to give the generalized belief concrete substance. A number of these activated the educational reforms that Peter initiated. His first contacts with foreigners such as Lefort ". . . stirred in him the idea of revitalizing his country."⁹⁴ Another significant precipitating factor was his experience of Western countries which matured and crystallized his ideas. Finally, there was the Great Northern War which impressed upon the Tsar the necessity of undertaking an extensive educational program to insure the success of his other reforms.

"Once the determinants just reviewed have been established, the only necessary condition that remains is to bring the affected group into action."⁹⁵ In this process the behavior of leaders is very important. For the norm-oriented movement it is necessary to distinguish two kinds of leadership--leadership in formulating the beliefs and leadership in mobilizing participants for action. Concerning the educational reforms, Peter performed both of these functions though other prominent individuals also played key roles in each instance. Thus, while Leibniz

⁹⁴Grey, op. cit., p. 136. ⁹⁵Smelser, op. cit., p. 17.

participated in the 'formulation of the beliefs' underlying the educational reforms, a few bishops and foreigners were active in 'mobilizing participants for action'.

Another topic related to the problem of mobilization of participants for action⁹⁶ is the effect of the movement's overall success or failure on its development.

Any movement which crusades under a full developed set of generalized beliefs is bound to fail in one sense. Because its fears and hopes are likely to be exaggerated, through the processes of generalization and short-circuiting, even the adoption of the concrete proposals it advocates does not approach its expectation.⁹⁷

Peter and his clique subscribed to the generalized belief that education was the key to revitalizing Russia. They believed that the Russian people could be led out of ignorance and backwardness by educated individuals. This is exemplified by a figurehead Peter designed for one of his new line-of-battleships--St. Peter piloting a small boat rowed by children.⁹⁸ In the value-added process, this would be Stage 7 in the creation of the norm-oriented beliefs.

Because hopes were exaggerated, even concrete proposals failed to meet Peter's expectations. Evidence of this is seen in the fact that the new schools in Moscow and St. Petersburg and those attached to monasteries in other towns, attracted few pupils. "The new engineering school with

⁹⁶ Mobilization refers to the third component in Smelser's hierarchy of social action. The distinction between the components of social action and the levels of specificity is dealt with in Chapter III, pp. 25-32.

⁹⁷ Smelser, op. cit., p. 305.

⁹⁸ Harold Lamb, The City and the Tsar (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), p. 229.

only twenty-three pupils was typical."⁹⁹ When Peter became aware of this small enrolment, he directed that additional teachers should be engaged and that the number of students should always be between one hundred and one hundred fifty. That he had to repeat these instructions in November of the same year, testifies to the ineffectiveness of his demand.

Since the voluntary schools failed, Peter then changed his tactics and tried to make elementary education compulsory for the children from the ages of ten to fifteen of all landowners and civil servants. The penalty for non-observance of the edict was that without a school-leaving certificate none of them could marry. The landowners retaliated virtually with a boycott. Two years later, Peter accepted defeat and again changed his tactics by revoking the edict. In the same year, he decreed that the children of landowners should go to one of three special schools in St. Petersburg confined to the gentry. "The character and purpose of these schools were evident from their names--Naval Academy, Engineering Academy, and Artillery Academy."¹⁰⁰ This system was more successful in imposing education on the landowning class.

In 1714 steps were taken to make elementary education compulsory for the children of the middle class. For this purpose he decreed that two teachers were to be sent into each province to establish schools which would be administered by the Admiralty College. Again this scheme proved to be abortive and again the Tsar was forced to change his

⁹⁹Grey, op. cit., p. 407. ¹⁰⁰Sumner, op. cit., p. 153.

tactics. Accordingly, towards the end of his reign, these schools were abolished and special garrison and naval schools were established for this class.

The failure of the various tactics employed had its impact on the overall success of the educational reforms. Despite the efforts of the progressive-minded group to found schools, establish libraries and museums, and to translate and print books, the result was very meagre.¹⁰¹ Peter and his supporters remained alone in their desire for education.

Opposing these efforts were the social forces manifest in the Russian social order--the centuries-old attitudes, customs, and norms that guided the behavior of the majority of the people. Broadly speaking, education was viewed as another hated Western innovation. Added to this was the lethargy, the laziness that characterized so many of the students. "Golovin, for instance, shut himself up for four years in his room at Venice, and came home as ignorant of Italian and the navy as when he left."¹⁰² So the evasion of both pupils and parents was, in the final analysis, a serious, and at times insuperable, obstacle to the realization of the Petrine educational reforms.

In the preceding paragraphs, two of Peter's reforms--the military and the educational innovations--have been analyzed as instances of norm-oriented movements. An examination of the other reforms, discussed in Chapter VI, would follow a similar analytical pattern and is, therefore, considered unnecessary. However, it should be mentioned at

¹⁰¹Schuyler, op. cit., II, p. 402. ¹⁰²Ibid.

this time that Peter the Great had more in mind than merely changing the regulatory principles (norms) of social interaction. Fundamentally, the Tsar was interested in changing the value structure--". . .the desirable end states which act as guides to human endeavor."¹⁰³

Thus, in entertaining a grandiose vision of the role that Russia should play, Peter aimed at reforming and reviving his country so that she could stand as an equal with the Western powers in all aspects of development including civilization.¹⁰⁴ The realization of such an objective would have called for drastic changes in the basic values of the Russian people. Superstition and ritualism would have had to be replaced by empiricism and scientific knowledge. This in turn would have necessitated the development of values that stressed the significance of public and secular education. Concomitantly, it would have been necessary to overcome the traditional adherence to other-worldly values which were, by and large, the foundation of the Orthodox Church and bring about a change of outlook that would have resulted in commitment to mundane concerns.

Most important, perhaps, to the realization of his aim, was the necessity of modifying the Russian attitude concerning change itself. Traditionally, the Russian manifested an attitude of arch-conservatism and xenophobia. Blinded by religious and national pride, and by their parochialism, they even proclaimed their own superiority over other people. Any change in the established order of things was interpreted

¹⁰³Smelser, op. cit., p. 25. ¹⁰⁴Grey, op. cit., p. 136.

as undesirable and even evil--the work of the true Anti-Christ. To transform his subjects from individuals who hated or were at least suspicious of everything new,¹⁰⁵ to individuals who would objectively evaluate innovations on their own merits, was Peter's aim.¹⁰⁶

Side by side with the above, was the Tsar's desire to instill in his subjects a moral commitment to efficient and productive work. Here is seen a parallel to the Protestant ethic¹⁰⁷ but whereas the ethic is basically ego-centered, Peter sought to inculcate in his subjects a higher level of commitment--that of state service. In light of the above, it is evident that the great reformer sought to redefine the desirable end states of life itself. This indeed would have called for sweeping value changes. In other words, Peter's reforms had overtones of a value-oriented movement.

But the Tsar perhaps was aware that to directly undertake such a course of action would have been to defeat his own purpose. In the words of Lamb, the Slavic minds ". . .were filled with the imagery of their mysticism, with age-old fears and longings. . . ." ¹⁰⁸ It appears that Peter understood this. It is possible that he even shared these fears and longings.¹⁰⁹ In line with the above, there is evidence that he proceeded with caution and rather than attempting to initiate value-oriented movements, he embarked upon a sweeping program of normative changes. Thus, even the Church reforms were ". . .a revolution of customs

¹⁰⁵ See page 303. ¹⁰⁶ See pages 227-240.

¹⁰⁷ Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1930).

¹⁰⁸ Lamb, op. cit., p. 229. ¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

and institutions, not of doctrine and ideas. . . ."110

Smelser points out that ". . .any redefinition of a component of social action necessarily makes for readjustment in those components below it, but not necessarily in those above it."111 Applying this to the preceding discussion, it would mean, then, that changes in norms do not necessarily entail changes in the values. However, "this is not to say that empirical modifications at the lower levels do not ever constitute conditions of structural strain which initiate higher-level changes."112 In the opinion of this student, the latter phenomenon did occur during the Petrine period. En bloc changes in the normative structure did result in changes in the value system. By the end of Peter the Great's reign ". . .members of the civil service, army, and navy, of the upper classes, and to some extent even of the middle classes . . .were shaven and wore foreign dress."113 Of greater significance is that ". . .other Western innovations also generally succeeded in winning adherents with time."114 Thus, not only were the amenities of life being borrowed, but also the very basis of a system of life--views, ideas, and social relations. It is true that only a relatively small portion of the total population accepted or adopted these changes. But Peter had no alternative since time is an important factor in the acceptance stage of diffusion.

¹¹⁰ Grey, op. cit., p. 402. ¹¹¹ Smelser, op. cit., p. 33.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 34. ¹¹³ Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 263.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

In this chapter historical data from the Petrine period were employed to test the applicability of Smelser's theory of norm-oriented movements as a conceptual means of explaining Peter's reforming activities. Each of the determinants essential to the occurrence of social action was identified and discussed with reference to the period in question and an attempt was made to illustrate how they combined and recombined to produce a particular outbreak of collective behavior. An effort was also made to show that the norm-oriented movements were initiated as a means of transforming the value structure of the Russian social order.

CHAPTER VIII

THE IMPACT OF THE PETRINE REFORMS ON THE SOCIAL FORCES MANIFEST IN RUSSIAN HISTORY

Chapter VII was concerned with the analysis of a number of instances of collective action that occurred during the Petrine period. Special attention was devoted to two episodes of norm-oriented movements. In addition an attempt was made to justify the position that, en bloc, Peter's innovations had overtones of a value-oriented movement.

The above, however, does not cover the entire spectrum of Peter's reforms. A more comprehensive picture of this phenomena can be obtained by examining how the reforms affected or had the potential to affect the social forces that moulded Russian society over the centuries. By exerting an impact upon these forces, the reforms were creating potential seedbeds for further norm-oriented and perhaps value-oriented movements. For this reason, the following discussion is considered relevant to the thesis. What, then, were the actual or potential effects of the reforms on these forces?

With regard to the first force,¹ the reforms--particularly the cultural and educational innovations--were aimed at destroying the superstitious beliefs associated with the force of nature by disseminating scientific knowledge. While it is true that Peter was primarily

¹For a review of the forces see Chapter IV.

concerned with spreading utilitarian knowledge, scientific learning was not overlooked. This is evident in the curriculum of some of his schools and particularly in his effort to establish a Royal Academy of Science.² That the Tsar's efforts were, by and large, unsuccessful is seen in A. S. Rappoport's discussion of the survival of a number of early superstitions among the peasantry as late as the second decade of the twentieth century.

Attention will now be focused on the second major force in Russian history--the force of Eastern Christianity. Following the Great Schism, the Church was clearly subordinated to the state.³ However, despite this subordination, the ecclesiastical hierarchy retained a considerable degree of authority--a situation which constantly caused friction with the throne.⁴ In Peter's time this situation was further exacerbated.

The superstitious attachment to tradition and to the letter of external observance characteristic of Russian Christianity was rudely shaken by the tsar's militant iconoclasm; the resulting feeling of indignation and bewilderment among the clergy and the believers was aggravated by the methods employed, which were such as to overtax the broadest tolerance and understanding qualities in which the Russian hierarchy was wanting. Peter's contempt for court etiquette, his predilection for foreigners, his travels abroad, and the forcible westernization of dress and manners of his subjects scandalized all conservative elements; in their dismay they turned to the Church for protection and leadership.⁵

Such leadership often came from the incumbents of the highest office of the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus, Patriarch Joakhim, who died in 1690,

²See pages 237-38. ³See pages 71-81. ⁴See page 81.

⁵M. Florinsky, Russia A History and an Interpretation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), I, p. 409.

despised the German settlement and Western customs and ideas as much as Peter liked them. The next patriarch, Adrian, who was appointed over the Tsar's objections, did not openly criticize the young ruler but strongly opposed many of his innovations. Consequently, following Adrian's death, Peter, perhaps remembering the conflict between Tsar Alexis and Patriarch Nikon, left the vacancy unfilled and appointed Stephen Yavorsky as keeper and administrator of the patriarchal see.

This step was followed by others directed against the authority and independence of the Church. In 1701, the Church lost control over its vast ecclesiastical and monastic estates, which were transferred to the administration of a secular body--the Monasterskii Prikaz. Though Church properties were not secularized, ecclesiastical dignitaries and monasteries were allowed to retain only a small portion of their former revenue, the balance being used to defray state expenses. Appropriations for the maintenance of the monasteries were stringently regulated and revised downward in 1705. The jurisdiction of the Church courts was also curtailed while that of lay judges of the Monasterskii Prikaz was extended to clerics and residents of Church estates. In 1711, the newly created Senate ruled that, thenceforth, bishops could be consecrated only after that body approved the candidates.

Finally, in 1721, the Church Statute, written by Theophan Prokopovich, established a new organization of the Church which replaced the patriarch--the Holy Synod. By abolishing the patriarchate, Peter and his colleagues hoped to resolve the source of friction between the secular and spiritual institutions for it was believed that:

When the people learn that Church administration is established by decrees of the monarch and decisions of the Senate, it will remain docile and will lose all hope that the clergy will support rebellious movements.⁶

One other measure was taken to destroy whatever political influence the Church enjoyed. In 1722 the Holy Synod was put under the supervision of a chief procurator whose duties were similar to those of the procurator-general of the Senate. Always a layman, this official became the actual head of the Church administration. And so by the reforms outlined above, "the long-drawn-out process of the subjugation of spiritual power by the state reached its culmination during the reign of Peter."⁷

Another social force manifest in Russian history was the influence of the nobility. Having outlined the evolutionary process that changed their status over the centuries in Chapter IV,⁸ attention will now center on how Peter's reforms affected their position in the political, economic, and social sphere.

When Peter assumed actual political power, the center of administration, as in centuries past, was the Boyar Duma whose sessions the Tsar sometimes attended.⁹ The only innovation that was introduced was that the boyars ". . . were no longer to 'deliberate alone', but to 'join in Council'."¹⁰ This situation, however, was not to last long. As a

⁶Florinsky, op. cit., p. 414. ⁷Ibid., p. 409.

⁸See pages 89-107.

⁹V. Klyuchevsky, Peter the Great, trans. Liliana Archibald (London: Macmillan and Company Limited, 1958), p. 182.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 182.

result of the struggles between Court parties, the internecine feuds of the military classes, and the conflict between the impoverished nobility and the parvenus, power came to depend on the position of individuals to the detriment of the institutions of government. When favorites were in power, the boyars in the *duma* were merely spectators.

Thus in 1697, when Peter was preparing to go abroad, all boyars and heads of Prikazes were ordered to wait upon the head of the Preobrazhensky Prikaz, Prince Romodanovsky, and "to hold council with him at his request."¹¹

The state of affairs is well described by Kliuchevsky when he says, "The ancient legislative formula 'the sovereign has ordered, the boyars decreed', could have been replaced by 'Strechnev (or Prince Romodanovsky) has ordered and the boyars remain silent'."¹²

Another change, dictated by necessity, altered the activities and composition of the Boyar Duma. Anxious to know how much money was held by the Prikazes, Peter, in 1699, re-established the Privy Chancellery which was to control all state finance. To the Chancellery all other departments had to forward weekly and yearly statements of receipts, expenditures, etcetera, from which it prepared its complete statement of the accounts. The Duma was primarily concerned with economic problems, and since the Chancellery was concerned with similar business, it became a department of the Boyar Duma.

These changes gradually altered the composition, jurisdiction, and character of the Boyar Duma. From earliest times it had consisted of men of rank, but, with the decline of their power, it ceased to be a

¹¹Ibid., p. 183.

¹²Ibid.

council of boyars. "It was changed into a council of limited size which was no longer recruited simply by birth, and which exercised a different function."¹³ This was in line with Peter's policy of delegating responsibility and awarding promotion on the basis of merit rather than on the basis of social status. The decay of the old Boyar Duma and the Tsar's continual absence led to the abolition of the former and the creation of the Senate (1711). That this move met with no active opposition is in itself indicative of the extent to which the power of the boyars was curtailed.

In the economic sphere Peter took steps which intimately affected the landowner's interests. Basically, this consisted of converting what had been revertible service fiefs into hereditary estates. The reason for this is simple: Peter was only giving legal sanction to what had long been a social reality.

Peter was also successful in enforcing compulsory service for the landowners. Old service registers were revised and frequent musters were held of the young gentry. Drastic measures were taken against those who sought to evade their obligations. The great demand for manpower following the creation of the navy and the increase in the size of the army and the bureaucratic structure was met by recruiting men from all social classes. In the new regiments and in government offices, the nobility found themselves serving side by side with individuals of lowly origin. Throughout his entire reign, the Tsar picked men for multifarious duties without regard to class. With the introduction of the

¹³Ibid., p. 184.

Table of Ranks, Peter ". . .made legislative provision for a wide opening of the door into the privileged ranks of the landowning class . . .".¹⁴ Thus, the social composition of this elite group was drastically changed.

With regard to the force of Westernization, it should be pointed out that a detailed discussion of this topic with reference to his reforms was presented in Chapter VI. In that section, mention was made of the fact that though Peter's policies were continuations of a preceding tendency, he gave tremendous acceleration to this process. Any further treatment of this subject would, therefore, be superfluous.

The final force to be dealt with, the myth of the tsar, was not modified by any particular single reform. But this force, which had for centuries exerted such a powerful impact upon the thought and life of the Russian people was changed by the effects of Peter's entire reformative program and by his overt actions. In the kaleidoscope of the Tsar's reforms, one can identify those which imply a new stage of secularization of the state. Included in these was the abolition of the patriarchate, the establishment of the Holy Synod under a lay bureaucrat, and the law which permitted members of the reigning dynasty to marry foreign princesses who were not converted to the Orthodox faith.

All this was symbolized by the new title--Imperator--which the Senate,. . ., offered to the Tsar upon the conclusion of the victorious war with Sweden. It was perhaps equally symbolized by the consequent elimination of the epithet tishaishii, the "most

¹⁴B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London: English University Press Limited, 1950), p. 156.

gentle," from the liturgy.¹⁵

The change, however, was not instantaneous for Peter, and those around him, employed traditional formulas for traditional actions even when attempting to express new ideas. This is evident in a scene Nepluiev describes between himself and Peter. The former had come to thank the emperor for his appointment as resident to Constantinople. Following the traditional custom, he fell at Peter's feet whereupon Peter raised him and said:

"Don't bow; brother; I am placed here [to supervise] by God, and my duty is to see to it that anyone unworthy is not rewarded; and anyone worthy is not deprived; if you will be good [effective]-- you will be doing good not to me but more to yourself and your fatherland; if you will be bad--I shall be the claimant, for God demands from me that I should not allow the stupid and the evil any opportunity. . . . Serve with faith and truth! at first God, and following Him, I will have to support you."¹⁶

This could have been said by Peter's father, Tsar Alexis, as an expression of humility. The emperor's use of this seventeenth century proverb showed that he ". . .intended to maintain the association of God and the Tsar but also to point out the distinction between the two conveyed in the difference between prayer and duty."¹⁷ The preceding statement, which expressed a desire to close the gap between the ruler and his subjects, reveals a greater degree of humility on the part of Peter than on the part of his predecessors. A change in the Russian conception concerning the tsar did take place--a change which is illustrated

¹⁵Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 72.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 73-74.

symbolically by Peter's loyal followers. For example, when Nepluiev heard of the emperor's death, he concluded his words of praise for his master with the following words: "And may the Lord put his soul, which worked so much for the common good, among the righteous."¹⁸ For Nepluiev, the emperor was not the saint-prince, saintly in function and in essence. All he could do was pray for a place among the righteous for Peter. Nartov, another admirer of Peter reached a different conclusion. To him the emperor was not a saint-prince, pious Orthodox tsar, nor the image of God, but a god himself. "Neither of the two men seem to have thought within the framework of the myths we have studied, for both of which the keystone was the equation God-Prince."¹⁹ The denial of the theocratic foundation of the ruler-myth during Peter's reign could have two alternative consequences within the Russian tradition of the saint-prince--the rejection of a tsar who did not correspond to the ideal image or a new exaltation of the tsar on a different ideological foundation. The first alternative was reflected in popular reaction to Peter which was based on the conclusion that an evil tsar could not be a true tsar and evil was determined according to the degree of the tsar's impiety. Consequently, many claimed that Peter was the Anti-Christ and those who opposed him translated their grievances into the language of the myth, justifying their opposition, rebellion, and self-immolation by denying the validity of the myth of the ruler and of the state.

Others found a different answer to the problem of the changed

¹⁸Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 74.

image of the tsar. Nartov, for example, claimed that Peter was God on earth. The argument was consistent.

The saintly prince, Christlike in his being, became the godlike Tsar in order to lead Russia and the world to salvation; the end of the eschatological focus meant the existence of the state for its own sake and meant that the tsar, godlike for the sake of Christ, was now god for his own and the State's sake.²⁰

Christ became irrelevant to the secularized prince. Thus, Peter secularized the image of the Russian tsar and thereby created true absolutism. If there was not a revolutionary change in the ruler myth as far as the majority of the Russians were concerned, there was at least at the beginning of the eighteenth century ". . . a process of crystallization, of increasing explicitness consequent on the establishment of the secular state."²¹

In light of the above it is seen that Peter's reforms affected each of the social forces that, over the ages, influenced Russian history. As has already been noted, the impact of these reforms upon the very foundations of the Russian society had the potential of creating conditions which could, in turn, have given rise to new episodes of collective action.

²⁰Ibid., p. 78. ²¹Ibid., p. 79.

CHAPTER IX

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

In Chapter VII, Peter the Great's reforms were analyzed within the context of Smelser's theory of collective behavior. Though the examination of these innovations as instances of particular forms of collective action is an interesting endeavor, it raises a fundamental question. For instance, how applicable is Smelser's theory to historical investigation? In other words, what are the disadvantages and/or advantages of employing a theoretical framework in reconstructing past events? An evaluation of the theory's suitability with reference to the above is presented in the following paragraphs. This is done in three stages. To begin, a general assessment of the theory will be presented. This is followed by a discussion of each of the components and determinants of collective behavior in relation to the historical period in question. Finally, tentative conclusions will be drawn regarding the theory's utility in examining the Petrine period and some speculations will be made concerning possibilities of further research and analysis along similar lines.

Using the sociological system of Talcott Parsons, Smelser has conceptualized social action in terms of four components: facilities, mobilization, norms, and values. These components are used by Smelser to formulate a general theory of collective behavior. Though the author's work has given a neglected field a new respectability,

. . .It must nevertheless be said that, despite extensive documentation and the admirable dexterity with which theoretical issues are handled, the book offers less a theory than a language for talking about collective behavior.¹

Smelser defines collective behavior as ". . .mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstitution of a component of social action."² According to his social action framework, there are logical processes for effecting social readjustment. In the typical collective outburst, however, these are somehow short-circuited. A passage on this point follows:

Collective behavior involves a generalization to a high-level component of action. Like many other kinds of behavior, it is a search for solutions to conditions of strain by moving to a more generalized level of resources. Once the generalization has taken place, attempts are made to reconstitute the meaning of the high-level component. At this point, however, the critical feature of collective behavior appears. Having redefined the high-level component, people do not proceed to respecify, step by step, down the line to reconstitute social action. Rather, they develop a belief which "short-circuits" from a generalized component directly to the focus of strain.³

Hence the exaggerated character of collective episodes is explained ". . .by premature generalizing with regard to the cause of the underlying strain and premature application of the presumed remedy."⁴

The postulated hierarchical relationship between the components of social action⁵ provide Smelser with the logical basis for a typology

¹Kurt Lang, "Review of Theory of Collective Behavior," Social Forces, XLII:1 (October, 1963), p. 251.

²Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 71.

³Ibid. ⁴Lang, op. cit., p. 251.

⁵Smelser, op. cit., p. 32.

of episodes. Strain at the highest level component implies strain downwards through the hierarchy--but not vice versa. Similarly, the various generalized beliefs that underlie each type of episode are defined in terms of this relationship among the components.⁶

By reference to the notion of "value-added" process Smelser finds that the generalized belief defining each episode can be directed as a progressive generalization upwards along the hierarchy of components. More stages are posited in the value-added sequence involving the higher-level components, since the short-circuiting at higher level logically implies a prior short-circuiting at lower levels.⁷

However, Smelser states that the link between the components of action and the value-added process is purely formal. "Many different kinds of strain may give rise to one type of belief, and one kind of strain may give rise to many types of belief."⁸ But conduciveness, strain, and generalized beliefs do not by themselves produce an episode of collective behavior. Other determinants must be invoked. By introducing more conditions which become activated at each stage of the value-added process, the range of possible outcomes is progressively delimited. Again, it is evident that priority in this value-added sequence is logical and analytical rather than empirical.

Thus "structural conduciveness," the first among the determinants in the value-added sequence, signifies the minimal conditions under which an occurrence becomes possible; hence its logical priority. Like many categories in the explanation, structural conduciveness is an "empty box" into which Smelser places such diverse conditions as the possibility for communication. . . , the lack of "opportunity" for alternative modes of behavior. . . etc.⁹

⁶See page 37. ⁷Lang, op. cit., p. 251.

⁸Smelser, op. cit., p. 83. ⁹Lang, op. cit., p. 19.

Each of the remaining determinants in the value-added process contributes to making a particular outcome more probable until mobilization for action determines the collective episode that occurs.

Most of the above relationships are formal. As Smelser states, "The value-added logic implies a temporal sequence of activation of determinants, but any or all of these determinants may have existed for an indefinite period before activation."¹⁰ Hence, invalidation of the sequence is precluded since the possibility that a logically prior subsequent factor can itself be activated by a logically subsequent factor points to the fact that the causal sequence can operate opposite to the logical sequence.¹¹

As is evident in Chapter III, Smelser's theory is vigorously sociological. As a consequence, while the determinants of collective behavior are clearly defined and illustrated, the behavior of the participants in these episodes seems at times almost incidental to the analysis.

Differences in the spatial and temporal dimensions of compact and diffuse collectivities are disregarded, and there is little systematic analysis of the differential participation of the human actors in the collectivity. Individual differences in perception of the situation and in responses to these perceptions are acknowledged but given almost parenthetical treatment. Instead one is left with the impression that responses to the determinants are essentially uniform.¹²

The foregoing criticism, however, appears to miss the point. Smelser

¹⁰Smelser, op. cit., p. 19. ¹¹Lang, op. cit., p. 251.

¹²Lewis M. Killian, "Review of Theory of Collective Behavior," The American Journal of Sociology, LXIX (1963-64),

does recognize the importance of psychological variables but insists that it is necessary to introduce determinants at the social level for an adequate explanation of collective episodes. "With psychological variables alone we cannot discriminate between occasions on which these variables will manifest themselves and occasions on which they will be dormant."¹³ What the author does, then, is to move to a 'higher' level of analysis. Thus, rather than treating individual personalities as the principal systems, he considers the relations among the actors. At this, the social-systems level, the units of analysis are not need-dispositions or motives but such units as norms, roles, and organizations.

A social system may be constituted by an informal even casual interaction among two persons, or it may be constituted by a large-scale, enduring institutional complex such as a church, a market system, or even a society.¹⁴

Basically, the author's theory deals with action at the social system level.

In the preceding pages a general discussion of the theory was presented. Attention will now be focused on each of the components and determinants of collective behavior. Referring to the highest-level component, Smelser points out that the concept of value is a construct referring to an aspect of social action which is not physically or temporally isolable. "Therefore the social scientist cannot simply identify values as things which are given in nature; rather he must impute values to social systems."¹⁵ For any given period in history, a

¹³Smelser, op. cit., p. 20. ¹⁴Ibid., p. 24. ¹⁵Ibid., p. 26.

given society is characterized by some values which are more or less universally accepted, some which are in conflict with dominant values, and some toward which the populace is ambivalent. The identification and classification of these values, especially in the case of non-extant societies, poses an extremely intricate problem. With respect to the Petrine period, the problem was particularly difficult since the present writer did not have the necessary means for exploring primary source material.

Less serious is the problem of establishing the normative structure of a specific society since many of its norms are expressed as explicit regulations in the legal system. However, norms range from the formal ones indicated above to the ". . .informal, sometimes unconscious understandings found for instance, in the neighborhood clique."¹⁶ Identification of the latter type would compare in difficulty with the task of delineating a given society's value system.

By themselves values and norms supply general ends and general rules. They do not determine the form of organization of human action. Smelser, therefore, specifies a third and fourth component--mobilization and situational facilities--which give more detail to social behavior. These two refer, respectively, to the motivation of the individual person as actor or the motivation of individuals for organized roles and to the individual's knowledge of the environment, predictability of consequences of action, and tools and skills. Evidently, the

¹⁶Ibid., p. 27.

two lowest components involve psychological variables--variables which Smelser points out, must be taken into account in a detailed analysis of the structure of social action.

To facilitate such analysis, Smelser visualizes the major components as having an internal organization referred to as levels of specificity.¹⁷

The levels of specificity of each component can be grouped into larger segments. The top three levels (Levels 1-3) generate resources, or "prepare" them for utilization in concrete action. Level 4 marks a transition between preparation and utilization. Finally, the lower levels (Levels 5-7) utilize the resources in concrete action. These lower levels constitute short term operations which take the higher levels for "granted."¹⁸

The levels of specificity admittedly yield no dynamic propositions concerning the course of behavior during an episode of collective behavior. However, Smelser claims that they provide a common theoretical framework for understanding the kinds of strain that give rise to collective behavior and the level of flow of collective behavioral responses to structural strain. Despite the fact that the author devotes twelve pages to explaining the applicability of this concept in analyzing collective episodes, the only clear concept that emerges from this highly abstractual and sociologicistic discussion is the principle that

. . .When any given level reaches a limit and becomes inadequate to deal with the conditions of strain, it is necessary to move up to the next higher level. . .in order to broaden the facilities for attacking strain.¹⁹

¹⁷ See pages 28-31. ¹⁸ Smelser, op. cit., p. 49. ¹⁹ Ibid., p. 69.

In dealing with Peter's reforms only this general concept was employed with matters concerning mobilization or situational facilities. It is interesting to note, at this time, that Smelser, in his earlier book, Social Change in the Industrial Revolution, had apparently not yet evolved the concept of the levels of specificity.

From the foregoing, it is again clear that Smelser is not specifically interested in psychological variables of the nature that concern Methodological Individualists.²⁰ Rather he considers these variables in terms of relations among actors as determinants of social action--that is, within the context of the social systems level.

The first determinant Smelser introduces and one to which he gives priority in the logical sequence of collective behavior is structural conduciveness. Referring to the degree to which any structure permits a given type of collective behavior, this determinant includes such diverse conditions as the level of specialization of a given kind of action, the presence of channels for expressing grievances, the structure of responsibility in situations of strain, etcetera. The general nature of this category suggests that in very few societies (certainly not in Russia of the Petrine period) was the social structure of such a nature that the possibility of the prevalence of conduciveness was absolutely precluded.

Similarly, the author's definition of strain--the impairment of

²⁰Methodological Individualists, represented by J. A. N. Watkins, claim that "rock-bottom" explanations of social phenomena can only be deduced from statements about beliefs, dispositions, and resources of individuals which comprise a social system.

relations among parts of a system and the consequent malfunctioning of that system--is so broad that one can safely conclude that such a condition is found, to a varying degree, in all societies. Certainly in a country as Russia, where the oppression of the masses was justified by the doctrines of the Orthodox Church and the secular concept of service, severe strain resulting in the malfunctioning of the social system was inevitable. But even if this determinant was manifest in the Russian society long, long before the advent of Peter the Great, there can be no argument against the claim that this tsar, in driving his country forward along strange paths with pitiless unconcern and without thought of the sacrifices he demanded, severely exacerbated the condition of strain. However, a basic question still remains unanswered. What degree of strain, for instance, is necessary for the condition to become activated as a determinant of social action? To illustrate the relevance of this point, suppose that a sociologist informs us that discontent among the peasantry arising from strain is one of the determinants that leads to a value-oriented movement--a revolution. The scientifically minded individual is unlikely to be satisfied with this generalization because it is too indefinite. At what stage does strain give rise to overt discontent? And how much strain must there be to justify expectations for it to become an active determinant in the value-added process? Are there different kinds of discontent arising from strain and what kind is required by the generalization? Is there a method of measuring both strain and the consequent discontent? Is it possible to conclude with any certainty that when a given degree

of strain exists that a certain percentage of peasantry are discontented to the extent that, given the remaining determinants, a value-oriented movement will take place? Is there a time interval that can be specified?

Smelser, however, evades dealing with the crux of the problem. He simply states that each determinant must occur in the context of all the other determinants which must combine in a particular way to produce a particular episode of collective behavior. Still this is but a generality for the author does not or cannot identify the degree of strain that must exist before it combines with the other determinants to produce a specific outcome.

The third determinant of social action, the generalized belief, ". . . identifies the source of strain, attributes certain characteristics to this source, and specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate."²¹ Since most human activity is based on some rational or irrational belief, and since beliefs manifest the desires and anxieties of a particular society, they are within time and space rather than vague abstractions about humanity at large. In the Russian setting they indicated popular reaction to the particular conditions of Russian life. Hence, Peter and his coterie believed that by introducing Western technology, customs, and ideas, Russia could be transformed from a backward, ignorant nation to a great power. Generalized beliefs also underlay the expression of discontent and the outbreak of

²¹Smelser, op. cit., p. 16.

active resistance to Peter's reformatory measures.²²

Another aspect of the generalized belief that appears to be validated by historical data from the Petrine period, is the concept that such a belief restructures an ambiguous situation in a short-circuited way. Short-circuiting, in Smelser's terms, involves the transition from high levels of generality to concrete situations. With regard to the Petrine era, the high level generality was the belief in the possibility and omnipotence of regeneration. But this in itself offered no empirical program for reviving Russia. If concrete outcomes were to accrue, this generalized belief had to be short-circuited into specific measures. Such a process did occur. The war with Sweden, the military reforms, the financial and administrative changes, and the educational innovations are examples of concrete steps that were taken in the hope of realizing the objective implicit in the high-level generality.

In the logical sequence of collective behavior the next determinant--the precipitating factor(s)--confirms the existence, sharpens the definition, or exaggerates the effects of one of the preceding conditions. As far as Peter's reforming activity is concerned, it is possible to identify a number of factors that gave the generalized belief immediate substance, thus providing a concrete setting toward which collective action could have been, and in fact was, directed. The desire to Westernize Russia, aroused by his early contact with foreigners

²²See pages 214-17.

and sharpened by his experience of Western Europe, necessitated, in Peter's opinion, obtaining a window to Europe--thus the war with Sweden. But the defeat at Narva impressed upon the Tsar the necessity of military reforms not only to be able to eventually attain the above goal but also to insure the survival of the Russian state. Following this, a series of reforms were undertaken²³ with each measure contributing, in part, to the creation of conditions that subsequently acted as precipitating factors for other episodes of collective behavior.

It seems, however, sensible to say that given any set of historical circumstances antecedent to or concomitant with a particular historical phenomena, one could always logically identify a specific event as a precipitating factor. Of course it is easy to be wise after the event but it appears to be intellectually dishonest to insist upon a chain of necessity in retrospect. Thus, one is always left in a degree of doubt as to whether the conditions or events selected were indeed the factors that precipitated social action. Moreover, it could be argued that for the occurrence of any phenomenon, every historical event is necessary. Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish between the importance of necessities. "No event is merely negative, none is non-contributory."²⁴ If such is the case it would be a contradiction of the character of history to attempt to explain the world of changing

²³ See page 195.

²⁴ Michael Oakeshott, "Historical Continuity and Causal Analysis," Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. William H. Dray (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 198.

identities by means of a factor or factors that are arbitrarily selected. But to take into account all the events that occurred and all the conditions that prevailed prior to and during Peter's time in discussing precipitating factors would make the categorical determinant in question a meaningless abstraction.

According to Smelser, once the determinants discussed above have been established, the only necessary condition that remains is to mobilize participants for action. This point marks the onset of some form of collective episode. In this process the behavior of leaders is important. As in most cases of collective behavior, the conditions of time and the requirements of the situation determine the type of leadership.²⁵ Hence, Smelser distinguishes the following kinds that are prominent in norm-oriented movements--leadership in formulating the beliefs, leadership in mobilizing participants for action, and new types of leadership that appear as the movement progresses.

In Chapter VII, it was mentioned that Peter the Great in the context of the military and educational reforms, performed both of these leadership roles. Following the 'terrible set-back' at Narva, the Tsar had little difficulty in convincing his supporters of the need to organize a regular army trained on up-to-date lines. A concerted plan of action designed to realize this objective was then put into effect. Concerning education, he was also the principal figure in formulating and disseminating the belief that, ". . . learning is good and

²⁵ Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, An Introduction to Sociology (third edition; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 702.

fundamental, and as it were the root, the seed, and first principle of all that is good and useful in church and state."²⁶ As far as mobilizing participants for action to overcome Russia's backwardness, ample exemplification of his participation in this role was presented in Chapter VI, in the section dealing with his educational reforms.

Throughout his reign he also assumed other leadership roles for unless the Tsar ". . . was present driving and supervising, everything was neglected."²⁷

From the foregoing, it is evident that an adequate understanding of social movements cannot be attained without considering leadership roles. Smelser's inclusion of this concept within the determinant--mobilization of participants for action--contributes to the usefulness of his theoretical model in studying Peter's reforms as particular types of norm-oriented movements. However, his classification of leadership types is broad to the point of being vague. A more elaborate categorization has been formulated by Dawson and Gettys. The employment of their typology in historical analysis might be expected to enable one to obtain a clearer picture of the type of leaders that emerge as a social movement progresses from its initial to its final stage.²⁸

The final determinant that Smelser considers in his theory of

²⁶B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London: English University Press Limited, 1950), p. 149.

²⁷Ian Grey, Peter the Great (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1960), p. 384.

²⁸See Appendix A.

collective behavior, and one which arches over all the others, is the operation of the agencies of social control. This refers to those ". . . counter-determinants which prevent, interrupt, deflect, or inhibit the accumulation of the determinants just reviewed."²⁹ For analytical purposes, Smelser divides social control into two broad types:

1. Those controls which minimize conduciveness and strain.
2. Those controls which are mobilized only after a collective episode has begun to materialize.

Though the division seems to leave this condition sufficiently broad to enable one to employ it in the analysis of a wide range of temporal and spatial conditions, Smelser's actual illustrations of the dynamics of social control leave the reader with the impression that such agencies are invariably individuals or groups of individuals who represent the legitimate or recognized authority of any given society.

The above has vital implications concerning the applicability of Smelser's theory in analyzing the Petrine reforms. Thus, if by agencies of social control, the author means only the political or recognized authorities, then episodes of collective behavior could only be initiated by disaffected individuals drawn from the masses since the model requires that the determinant in question be constituted of members wielding such political or recognized authority. Such, however, was not the case in the Petrine era. Agitation for change and concrete steps towards realizing this aim were initiated at the top of the power

²⁹Smelser, op. cit., p. 17.

structure. Resistance to this came from the masses in general, whose behavior was determined by the social forces manifest in Russian history--for example, the traditional beliefs, ideas, and customs. Thus, Smelser's conception of the final determinant had to be modified in order that the Petrine reforms could be analyzed within the broader context of his theory.

In the preceding discussion each of the determinants was dealt with as a separate condition even though empirically the processes are sometimes indistinguishable. To a degree, this obfuscation of reality can be attributed to the highly analytical nature of Smelser's model and to the fact that for two reasons models in behavioral science cannot be expected to fit the data exactly. First, some of the relevant variables are likely to have been omitted. And second, the variables that are brought into the analysis are not always measurable. These limitations lend credence to the contention that Smelser's theory is not truly a scientific one. It is true that the author observed historical phenomena, classified them, and developed hypotheses to explain the data he collected. But are these procedures alone sufficient to make a science? Merton has called interpretations so based ex post facto interpretations. Concerning them, he writes:

This procedure in which observations are at hand and the interpretations are subsequently applied to the data has the logical structure of clinical inquiry. . . .The defining characteristics of this procedure is the introduction after the observations have been made rather than the empirical testing of a predesignated hypothesis. . . .

Such post factum explanations, designed to "explain" given observations, differ in logical function from speciously similar procedures where the observational materials are utilized in order to

derive fresh hypotheses to be confirmed by new observations.

Post factum explanations remain at the level of plausibility . . . rather than leading to "compelling evidence" (a high degree of confirmation). Plausibility, in distinction to compelling evidence, is found when an interpretation is consistent with one set of data (which typically has, indeed, given rise to the decision to utilize one, rather than another, interpretation). It also implies that alternative interpretations equally consistent with these data have not been systematically explored and that inferences drawn from the interpretations have not been tested by new observations.

The logical fallacy underlying post factum explanation rests in the fact that there is available a vareity of crude hypotheses, each with some measure of confirmation but designed to account for quite contradictory sets of affairs. . . . The basis of plausibility rests in the consistency between the interpretation and the data; the absence of compelling evidence stems from the failure to provide distinctive tests of the interpretations apart from their consistency with the initial observations. The analysis is fitted to the facts, and there is no indication of just which data would be taken to contravene the interpretations. As a consequence, the documentary evidence merely illustrates rather than tests the theory.³⁰

Since the absolute test of any theory lies in its ability to predict, Merton, it appears, is questioning the value of procedures and models that are unable to perform this function. If predictability is the criteria that sociological theories must meet, then the title of Smelser's book is a misnomer since his conceptualizations are stated in such broad generalizations that it is impossible to employ them for other than explanatory purposes.

But, Merton carries his argument too far:

Our knowledge, especially in the behavioral science is often limited to what is necessary for a certain kind of event to occur but does not comprise what is sufficient to produce it. In that

³⁰Robert K. Merton, cited by Dawson and Gettys, op. cit., pp. 733-34.

case, what we can explain on the basis of that knowledge is not strictly deducible from it, and surely not predictable.³¹

These, then, are partial explanations and in the behavioral sciences explanations are only partial. But because they, like Smelser's theory, are of this nature and do not allow for prediction, does it mean that they are not valuable in their own right?

An automobile accident is said to be due to defective brakes or to excessive speed or to a drunken driver; none of these allow us to predict the accident, but in particular cases they may have considerable explanatory force. . . [and may help us predict rates of accidents from different causes].³²

Similarly, Smelser's theory, though characterized by a number of weaknesses--for example, its capability of making only limited predictions--has merit. With respect to the Petrine period, it provides a framework within which one can examine an extremely complex era in a logically organized manner. The danger, though, is that the events that transpired during this time can, as a result, be formally structured to a degree that belies reality. Yet, in practice the reverse has often been true. Thus, Peter's efforts have been interpreted as a series or jumble of disconnected ad hoc measures. In contradistinction, the analysis of his reforming activities, within the context of Smelser's model of collective behavior, shows that though the Tsar's reforms often failed to dovetail, a basic pattern emerges in his overall reforms.

At this point it should be remembered that Smelser has:

³¹ Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 347.

³² Ibid., p. 348.

. . .Not tried to account for the evolution of any single movement, but rather to extricate from the histories of many movements the principles which shape the development of norm-oriented movements in general.³³

The aim of his genuinely sociological approach to the field of collective behavior was to establish generalizations in the realm of human behavior at the social-systems level. The demonstration made in the present study of the applicability of Smelser's theory in analyzing Peter's reforms provides at least some proof of the success of his efforts.

On the basis of the above, it would be tempting to generalize and claim that Smelser's model could be validly employed in examining any historical period characterized by social movements. Such a claim would seem particularly valid if the movement were initiated by individuals who did not constitute the legitimate authority of the state since this would not necessitate any modifications in Smelser's general theory. However, such a generalization would be premature. The applicability and utility of Smelser's model in analyzing episodes of collective action in other times and other places would have to be tested by further research.

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

Generally speaking, Smelser's classificatory scheme of types of leadership is comparable to the typology formulated by Dawson and Gettys.¹ The analogy is depicted below:

Smelser	Dawson and Gettys
1. Leadership that formulate beliefs.	Agitator Prophet Reformer
2. Leadership that mobilizes participants for action	Statesman
3. Others	Administrator

The agitator may stir people by what he says; he may attract the attention of people by his dynamic and energetic behavior; he may incite individuals by verbal articulation and by overt behavior. An example of Peter's role as an agitator is cited below.

At a banquet, when he noticed a group of Russian officers wearing the old costumes, he took a pair of scissors, and cut off the part of their long sleeves. "See," he said, "these things are in your way. You are safe nowhere with them; at one movement you upset a glass, and then you forgetfully dip them in sauce. Get gaiters made of them!"²

As a leader, the prophet has the feeling that he has special knowledge concerning the undesirable situation and of what is necessary

¹Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, An Introduction to Sociology (third edition; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), pp. 691-709.

²Ian Grey, Peter the Great (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1960), p. 138.

to remedy it. Furthermore, "there is the feeling that he is not himself; someone else speaks through him."³ Both of these criteria were met by Peter the Great. The Undesirable situation, from his perspective, was largely the consequence of the medieval traditions that bound the Russians so that:

. . . Like blind-folded horses on a treadmill, they plodded along the same tracks, unaware of anything different; they did not even want to move from the old ways which gave them a sense of security in the flat, timeless expanse of Russia.⁴

The Tsar also felt that he knew what was necessary to rectify the deplorable conditions. Following his tour of Europe, "his practical mind had translated his impressions into numerous plans which he was impatient to introduce."⁵ Finally, Peter believed that God had placed him upon the Russian throne to see that service to the state was efficiently and effectively carried out.

Functioning in the same period and reacting to the same basic conditions is the reformer. However, his reaction is different. "It is conceived by him to be his function to lead in attacks on specific evils."⁶ By this definition, Peter also qualified as a reformer. Many things were directly attacked by him. One illustration is the caustic criticism he levelled against the monks.

He spoke of the greater part of the monks being "parasites," given over to idleness and superstition. "The order of monks," he wrote, "was antiently a kind of mirror of the Christian religion, and the pattern for repentance and good discipline; but it is now the reverse, and the origin of infinite disorders and disturbances."⁷

³ Dawson and Gettys, op. cit., p. 702. ⁴ Grey, op. cit., p. 134.

⁵ Ibid. ⁶ Dawson and Gettys, op. cit., p. 702.

⁷ B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London: English Universities Press Limited, 1960), p. 149.

The agitator, prophet, and reformer appear to be basically concerned with formulating and disseminating beliefs. In function, then, they correspond to the first type of leadership mentioned by Smelser.

As the movement progresses, it becomes organized around its leaders and a program--that is, it develops a structure. The leaders of this stage, the statesman type, formulate policies and propose measures which will realize the interests of the affected group. Broadly speaking, the statesman is similar to the leader who mobilizes participants for action. This role Peter also played. For example:

Soon after his return to Moscow from Kerch, Peter called on the Patriarch and talked at length of his ideas on education. He began by expressing dissatisfaction with the illiteracy of the priesthood; an educated priest, he observed, was essential to teach the people. . . .As a first step, he proposed sending ten priests to study in Kiev.⁸

If conditions are favorable, a movement may terminate in the form of a lasting organization. In other words, successful movements result in the establishment of institutional forms. Thus, Peter's ecclesiastical reforms, which produced a revolution in the Church, culminated in the creation of the Holy Synod--an institute that lasted until 1917.

The successful leader in the final stage, the administrator, translates the policy of the movement into action and is responsible for getting the organization to operate effectively with respect to its policies. Historical evidence points to the fact that besides being an

⁸Grey, op. cit., p. 165.

agitator, prophet, reformer, and statesman, Peter the Great also acted as an administrator in the social movements he and his supporters initiated. An example of this is seen in the role he played in his newly created army.

Peter himself was indefatigable. As a bombardier, he filled bombs and grenades with his own hands, and worked at the mortars like any common soldier. With all this, he took part in the councils of war (and) supervised all the plans of action. . . .⁹

Moreover, by reason of his being a monarch in an autocratic state, Peter played an institutionalized administrative role. Perhaps this was, in part, due to force of necessity for unless the Tsar was present, everything was usually neglected.

⁹Eugene Schuyler, Peter the Great Emperor of Russia (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884), I, p. 248.

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